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Seweryn Bialer — Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects

Kenneth A. Shepsle — Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off

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Robert H. Johnson — Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine

James J. Best — Who Talked to the President When? A Study of Lyndon B. Johnson

Book Reviews

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SEWERYN BIALER gives a comprehensive analysis of the changes going on in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev. This article is part of *PSQ*'s policy of occasionally publishing pieces by senior scholars and statesmen that argue a point of view based primarily on their long-term personal experience and insights.

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE explores the importance of a legislative division of labor and power in the American Congress. He suggests that recent reforms, termed a "representational revolt," have compromised the capacity of Congress to play a role independent of the president.

PAUL F. DIEHL analyzes the conditions that make for success or failure in peacekeeping operations. He concludes that operations are more successful when all combatants, including third parties, cooperate and the conflict is not a civil war. He further argues that superpower behavior has a minimal role once the operation has begun, but the location of deployment and the neutrality of the peacekeeping troops are significant.

ROBERT H. JOHNSON examines the moral arguments for the U.S. policy of supporting guerrilla forces attempting to overthrow Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World. He argues that the moral case for that policy is not well grounded in Third World political reality and that most of the arguments made by its supporters relating to the morality of the ends, means, and consequences of the doctrine are not sustainable.

JAMES J. BEST examines the people with whom Lyndon Johnson interacted during the first twenty-five months of his presidency, using LBJ's presidential diaries as a data base. He finds significant changes over time in whom Johnson interacted with, how he interacted with them, and when.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects

SEWERYN BIALER

In the fall of 1987, the Soviet Union had become the most interesting country in the world. What is happening there is nothing less than a gigantic experiment, now only in its infancy. The massive changes initiated in the Soviet Union call to mind Robespierre's observation that one week in the life of a revolution may produce more significant events than an entire year of normalcy. But to change the Soviet system, the new course initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev needs far more than a single year. It will require at least a decade.

In one of the world's most secretive countries, there is now official talk of openness. In a society that has known not a single day of genuine democracy, the leadership preaches democratization and grass roots participation in the institutions of governance. A state that has put an extraordinary premium on stability and conformity is shifting toward innovation and individuality. Today, authorities promote clashing views where once a single truth was proclaimed the only truth. While continuing to emphasize patriotism, the authorities no longer equate it with a cult of the military. They are retreating from the idea of a "perfect society," from the goal of a secular utopia that they invoked in the past to justify the shortcomings of Communist rule. They are now beginning to recognize the errors of the past in order to avoid perpetuating or repeating them. In this sense, the new mood reflects

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SEWERYN BIALER is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia University and the Director of the Research Institute on International Change. He is the author of *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion and Internal Decline* and *Stalin's Successors.* In summer 1983, Bialer became the first political scientist and the only sovietologist to receive the prestigious award for creative academics, the MacArthur Foundation fellowship prize. This article draws on his recently published book (with Michael Mandelbaum), *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (Westview Press).

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what was best in the critical and searching spirit of the old democratic Russian intelligentsia, which Joseph Stalin virtually extinguished.

Gorbachev's greatest plans for the change are in the economic sphere. Yet the most startling developments of his two-and-one-half years in office are not economic: they are in the political and cultural areas. If they endure, these measures will profoundly change the system he inherited.

In short, a major program of planned change, of reform in almost all aspects of life, has been initiated by the new leader and has struck a responsive chord in the Party and in the society. But this process has only scratched the surface of Soviet life. Its impact on the massive country, on the everyday life of its citizens and on the standard behavior of the ever-present bureaucracy is still modest.

The "new" dominates top level decision making, the media, and official declarations about the future direction of the country. But the "old" is dominant in the everyday lives of Soviet citizens. Thus the key question is not primarily how much further Gorbachev will go with his iconoclastic ideas, but rather how deeply the process that he has initiated will penetrate Soviet society.

The Sources of Change in the Soviet Union

Why does this type of change occur in the Soviet Union? Major change in other societies is often described as inevitable. But in political life, all that is inevitable is what has already happened. This is particularly true in a country such as the Soviet Union, where social, economic, and cultural forces are largely subordinated to political considerations. The simplest answer to the question, therefore, is that these changes in the Soviet Union are taking place because a new leader took the reins of power and found them either desirable or necessary or both. If Leonid Brezhnev or Konstantin Chernenko had lived several years longer, the Soviet "reconstruction" would probably not now be taking place.

Although the transition in leadership was a necessary cause of the changes, it was far from sufficient. Six major factors combined to bring them about: the domestic performance of the Soviet system in the Brezhnev era; the new requirements for Soviet economic growth; the changed nature of Soviet society and the conditions for its stability; the character and consequences of the technological revolution in capitalist societies; the deterioration of the international position of the Soviet Union; and finally, the ascent not only of a new individual but of an entire new political generation to leadership.

The Crisis of the System under Brezhnev

One phrase used by the new general secretary at the June 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee succinctly sums up the present leadership's assessment of the Brezhnev era; it was characterized, he said, by the appearance of "pre-crisis phenomena." The implication is that, without the urgent actions undertaken by Brezhnev's successors, the Soviet Union would have found itself today in an acute

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crisis that would endanger the stability of the regime. The new leadership also makes it amply clear that the "pre-crisis" conditions were present in almost all fields of domestic endeavor. By the end of the Brezhnev era, Soviet society was chronically ill. The system was not functioning well.

In the political arena, the most significant development was the alienation not only of the population at large but also of the Party, from both the rulers and the regime. Political stability was achieved through coercion, mass political apathy, and a lack of civic spirit. The Party and the administration became highly bureaucratized, penetrated throughout by a corporate spirit that expressed a lack of interest in anything but its own well-being and power and controlled in several regions by Mafia-like informal associations.

While the people of the Soviet Union are highly literate and deeply interested in music, ballet, and literature, the officially sanctioned culture was wooden and banal and the most creative and independent spirits were suppressed or exiled. Even the enforced artistic standard of socialist realism, with its hollow, relentless optimism could no longer hide the sense of deep cultural pessimism permeating the educated strata of the society. This was the artistic expression of the feeling of hopelessness prevalent among the workers. The Soviet Union has probably been the only major country in the world where the youth neither rebelled nor expressed any youthful enthusiasm that could be channeled into creative public endeavors. The heroes of the youth were their own "private" poets and balladeers (in particular, Vladimir Vysotsky) who were barely tolerated by the authorities, and their major public expression of dissatisfaction was the flaunting of the artifacts of western mass culture, such as blue jeans and popular records, officially permitted but never encouraged.

Major reforms, as well as revolutionary transformations grow out of major crises. The Soviet Union is no exception. The new leaders who took power in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, and at least a part of the Soviet political elite, knew that they had inherited a country and a system in a state of material and spiritual crisis.

The Economy

Soviet economic performance depended on the viability and efficacy of two things: the Stalinist model of the economy and the model of economic growth. The first has been the organization of the Soviet economy as engineered by Stalin and largely retained by his successors until recently. The second defines the sources and the nature of Soviet economic growth.

The functioning of the Stalinist model of the economy depends on administrative activity and regulation—for this reason it is sometimes described as a "command economy"—and not on self-generating and self-enforcing market forces. The Bolshevik fear of *political* spontaneity found its extreme *economic* expression in the Stalinist model. The Polish economist Oscar Lange aptly characterized this economic model as a "war economy," a definition that has found its way into Soviet economic discussions in the Gorbachev years.

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In one discussion in 1986, at which I was present, a member of the Central Committee characterized the Stalinist economic model, which he made clear still existed in the Soviet Union, as "war communism." The use of this term is important in understanding present Soviet thinking on this subject and its attitude toward the Stalinist model. The term describes a short period in Soviet history, during the Civil War roughly from 1918 to 1920, and the economic policy imposed by V. I. Lenin during this period. Lenin's war communism eliminated both market and money, made wide-ranging use of coercion to confiscate without compensation almost the entire production of the peasantry, nationalized industrial and service units of any kind and size, and regimented labor in a military fashion. "War communism" was the ultimate expression of administrative socialism. The Stalinist economic model was a somewhat less extreme variant of war communism, but applied on a much larger scale to the expanding Soviet economy. Moreover, while the Leninist model was basically egalitarian in that it distributed poverty equally among the working people even including the party members, Stalinist war communism decreed poverty only for the working class and abundance for the party elite.

The model of economic growth that accounts for the enormous expansion of the economy, by now the third largest in the world, from the late 1920s through the Brezhnev era was neither Stalinist nor anti-Stalinist. It was one of extensive growth, which in one form or another characterized other societies at an early or intermediate stage of their modern industrial and agricultural development during their "First Industrial Revolution." Economic expansion was achieved by ever increasing contributions of labor, capital and land into the process of production. The extensive model of growth has persisted in the Soviet Union until the present, making it unique among countries of a similar or even a lower level of industrialization. According to the estimates of the economist Clark Kerr, 90 percent of the economic growth of the United States in the twentieth century was achieved through intensive growth—that is, through technological progress, and only 10 percent through capital investments. For the Soviet Union, these figures are reversed.

The extensive method of growth has its limits and in the early 1970s, these limits were being reached in the Soviet Union. The Soviet political leadership, not to mention Soviet economic experts, were aware that the Soviet economy had to switch to an intensive growth that would rely on productivity of labor and capital through technological progress and better incentives, declining relative costs of production, conservation of raw materials, improved quality of products, and a build-up of the infrastructure. The many resolutions, decrees, and exhortations to this effect that emanated from the political leadership in the Brezhnev era bore witness to this.

Yet the understanding of Brezhnev and his associates of the gigantic task facing the Soviet economy in its conversion from extensive to intensive growth was at once superficial, abstract, and inconsistent. They had overlearned the lessons of the Soviet Union's initial industrialization. While their speeches and decrees spoke

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of the necessity of intensive growth, their five-year plans still put the greatest stress on extensive factors. Even when they were making serious efforts to emphasize intensive factors, they were determined, because of inbred conservatism and political and ideological reasons, to attain it without any major changes, through the Stalinist model of the economy.

There existed reasonable compatibility between the Stalinist economic model and the extensive model of growth, especially in a country as large and as rich in labor and natural resources as the Soviet Union. Moreover, this compatibility was largely effective because the Soviet Union was a latecomer to the international process of industrialization and was able for a sustained period to utilize the advantages of its backwardness by borrowing heavily from the technological advances of more developed industrial countries. The First Industrial Revolution—that of heavy industry and basic light industry (*e.g.*, textiles, mining, electrification, and railroads)—can be started and can reach relatively high levels by different methods of growth and within diverse dominant models of the economy. To go further, however, requires methods for which the Stalinist system does not provide an effective framework.

Before it assumed power, the new leadership had already recognized elements of the unhappy economic reality hidden behind Brezhnev's bombastic phrases about "advanced socialism." They had reached the conclusion that what was required was a simultaneous change of the model of the economy from the Stalinist administrative, command economic organization to an as yet undefined system in which market forces would play a much more significant role. It must be distressing for the Soviet leaders to recognize that Marx's dictum that the relations of production become a fundamental obstacle to the development of productive forces—that is, the prevailing economic system can stifle economic growth—applies not to the capitalist, but to the socialist countries, and particularly to the Soviet Union.

The New Soviet Society

The society over which the new Soviet leadership presides is in many respects different from the one of twenty to thirty years ago. It is a younger society, where those between the ages of 18 and 35 constitute about 60 percent of the urban labor force, and those born after Stalin's death in 1953 account for two thirds of the total population. It is a society in which the level of skills of industrial workers and employees has risen markedly. It is a society socially dominated by a large new middle class, which may be politically fragmented and powerless but which sets the lifestyle for the society at large. It is a far more highly educated society than in Nikita Khrushchev's time, in this respect fully comparable to other industrial nations. It is a society with a professional class that is, numerically, the largest in the world. It is also a society in which the previous high rates of upward mobility have declined significantly and, thus, where the structure of class, status, and power has become more settled and permanent than before. The superimposition of a stagnant, conservative political leadership and a system where politics

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is in full command, on a society that was changing significantly, created a chasm between the regime and the society at large.

The sociopolitical stability of the Soviet regime was not entirely predicated on the regime's highly coercive character, or on the harshness of the Soviet police state. The regime passed several significant tests of stability for which the level of coercion alone could not account. The victory in World War II, the abolition of Stalinist mass terror after 1953, the ineffectiveness of dissent in the 1960s and its isolation and the decimation of its practitioners in the 1970s, and the lack of major disorders in the non-Russian republics in the post-Stalin era are the most notable examples.

The changing Soviet social landscape diminished the effectiveness of many of the traditional non-coercive sources of stability and introduced new destabilizing forces. It is ironic that, in a country with an official vision of a secular utopia, the people's actual expectations were, for many decades, very modest. These modest political, social, cultural, and economic expectations were the result of bitter experience, of dashed hopes, and of perenially unfulfilled promises.

The last decade, however, has been different. The expectations of the peasantry as a whole and of the older generation of the working class have remained modest, since their point of comparison has been a more difficult past. But the economic expectations of the *younger* working class have been much higher, and their dissatisfaction with their status, particularly with their economic conditions, more overt. *Their* point of comparison has not been the past, but rather the much higher current status of the middle class, the economic conditions of the politically privileged, and, especially in the large metropolitan areas, second- or third-hand knowledge or suspicions about conditions in the West or in Eastern Europe.

To make matters worse, the urban working population and the members of the middle class who are now in their late thirties grew up during the Khrushchev period, with its unrealistic promises of heaven on earth. In other societies bad conditions alone do not necessarily promote instability; it is conditions of improvement and raised hopes, followed by visible deterioration, that are potentially destabilizing. Such a pattern can be discerned in the Soviet Union. In the decade of 1965–1974, the Soviet Union began the process of the Second Industrial Revolution and significantly improved the level of consumption throughout the society, especially in durable consumer goods and housing. By the beginning of the next decade, however, this process had ended, and stagnation and even decline far outweighed any improvements.

The Soviet middle class felt increasingly frustrated by the discrepancy between its social status and its political and economic position. Politically, it was entirely powerless. Its substrata were fragmented and politically vulnerable, isolated from one another and from the political elite, which was characterized by a closed network of friendship, and from the working people below, whom they regarded with ill-concealed disdain.

The middle class was particularly frustrated by its economic position. Its members were the victims of the policies of economic leveling and egalitarianism, practiced

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by both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, which resulted in the middle class being paid salaries lower than those of highly skilled workers or cotton growers. Moreover, their salaries were deliberately frozen beginning in the early 1970s. The middle class was moving into a state of social anomie.

The case of the Soviet upper-middle class is of special importance here. This upper segment is composed of two groups, which are distinguished by the Soviets as the "creative intelligentsia" (including writers, film makers, journalists, artists, and scientists) and as the "technical intelligentsia" composed of engineers, agronomists, economists, and statisticians. In Western terminology, both of these groups would be referred to as "professionals." Not all of the elements of middle-class dissatisfaction were felt by every part of the professional strata; scientists, for example, were better paid than economists.

Many significant causes of the professionals' frustration and alienation from the system first appeared during the Brezhnev era. The essence of their alienation was a single fact: most professions in the Soviet Union are treated by the political rulers as no different from occupations such as plumbers, carpenters, or tractor drivers. Professions in the West generally enjoy a high degree of autonomy: in the Soviet Union professionals are not at all independent.

In addition to being treated no differently than plumbers or tractor drivers, Soviet professionals are beset by both practical and political problems, as the following examples will illustrate: the doctor who has neither syringes nor needles available for necessary injections; the playwright whose play is transformed beyond recognition by constant "advice and suggestions" from cultural officials; the economist who is without accurate information about the Soviet economy, in fact knowing less than Western economic specialists on the Soviet Union; the filmmaker whose film, which has been made only after major concessions have been made to the system, then disappears into the vaults of the Ministry of Culture; the professor of Renaissance history who is unable, even once, to visit Italy; the physicist who is cut off from contacts with his Western colleagues working on projects similar to his own; the journalist who is forced to deny in print an outrage that he himself witnessed; and the poet who is forced to write the same Party line as the general, but the general always says it before him.

The Soviet professional strata have now attained a socially critical mass. They are indispensable to the smooth running of the Soviet system. Most of them aspire to a truly professional status, which conflicts with the role assigned to them by their government, which is characterized by a lack of independence and freedom for self-expression. The fact that they are more aware than before of the possibility of better conditions only serves to intensify their frustration and alienation.

Moreover, in contrast with the middle class as a whole, its upper crust, the professionals, have been able to develop social networks, centered on individuals like the Moscow theatrical director, Yuri Lyubimov, or an institution (e.g., the Novosibirsk branch of the Soviet Academy of Science). Much of the current analysis of the Soviet "pre-crisis situation" emanating from the Gorbachev administration, and many of the policies that he initiated, were discussed among profes-

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sional groups during Brezhnev's rule. There can be little doubt that the stirrings of the professionals in the late 1970s and early 1980s prepared some of the ground for the Gorbachev policies. The new leadership was able to identify the growing tensions between the new society and the antediluvian social-political and economic system. It recognized, furthermore, that the system's sources of stability had seriously deteriorated in the late Brezhnev era and in the period of interregnum in the early 1980s. Gorbachev's policies are intended to rescue the Soviet system from this growing and potentially explosive destabilizing social force through far-reaching directed change. In this limited sense Gorbachev's function is similar to that of President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression: to save the system from its own follies by a process of evolutionary reformation.

It is clear that the new leadership is also beginning to understand that plans must take into account the new character of Soviet society, which is far less malleable than it was in the past. The circumstances that made possible the accomplishment of the past "revolutions from above," especially the one imposed by Stalin—a peasant society vulnerable to mass terror—are no longer present. Gorbachev's task is not to crush any class or group but rather to create conditions that will stimulate and engage the energies of all of them. What is needed is the creation of conditions that will promote the self-interests of the various strata in modernization. What is necessary is to create a coincidence of interests between the modernizing interests of the state and the society. Gorbachev hopes for a reconciliation of the interests of the state with those of the society, which is the new requirement of stability in the Soviet Union.

The Technological Challenge from the West

The Soviet population, particularly outside the major metropolitan areas, measures Soviet economic progress by comparing their present conditions to those of the past. For the Soviet leadership and political elite as well as larger professional groups, however, the key measure of progress was and continues to be that of the industrially advanced capitalist countries. This is a Soviet tradition. Beginning with Lenin and intensifying under Stalin and afterward, the slogan of "catching up and surpassing" the principal capitalist countries was at the center of attention.

Three causes are responsible for this tradition, which is as strong today as it was in the past: Soviet ideology, Soviet security and foreign policy, and the psychology of the Soviet leadership. The official ideology proclaims the superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. This superiority is to be primarily, although not exclusively, demonstrated in the economic sphere. To do so the Soviet Union must grow faster than the main capitalist countries; surpass the main "capitalist bastion," the United States, in the absolute size of its Gross National Product (GNP) and eventually in the per capita size of the GNP; and then to move beyond the capitalist world in technological sophistication. As Lenin wrote, "In the final analysis the competition and struggle between capitalism and socialism will be resolved in favor of the system that attains a higher level of economic productivity."

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The close relationship between a country's economic strength and its military power and international influence is a truism in the modern era, one which has been elevated by the Soviet leadership to be the central premise of their economic policy. Their fear of "capitalist encirclement" assumed undying enmity between the Soviet and imperialist states, with the ever-present danger of war. They assumed also, particularly with the growth of Soviet military power, an unending and unrelenting Soviet-capitalist competition in the international arena for control and influence, for strategic bases and economic advantages. For Lenin, "peaceful coexistence" meant only a *peredyshka*, a "breather," between the inevitable clashes with imperialism. This attitude was reinforced by Stalin and tempered, but not abandoned, in the post-Stalin era with the advent of the nuclear age.

The economic strength of the Soviet Union relative to the capitalist states has played a major role in the leadership's thinking about foreign policy in at least three ways. First, to be effective as a model for others the Soviet Union had to be more successful than its capitalist adversaries economically, and in particular, more technologically successful. Second, to conduct an active, and increasingly global foreign policy, to have allies and friends, the Soviet Union had to be able to protect major resources abroad. The cost of these resources was high and required a strong and dynamic economy. Third, the stability, loyalty, and control of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam could not depend exclusively on the presence of Soviet military power. The Soviet Union had to be able to offer these countries economic resources and technological progress to assure their sociopolitical stability and loyalty.

The importance to the Soviet leadership of measuring their own economic-technological progress by Western standards has had a psychological dimension. It has often been noted that the Soviets, even in high places, suffer from feelings of inferiority toward the West. Their often blustering, arrogant behavior is intended to compensate externally for their inner feelings. One might expect that, with the advent of strategic parity and recognized global power status, these feelings of inferiority would disappear. Nothing of the sort has happened. The persistent Soviet demand to be recognized as "equals" by the Americans expresses a psychological need for reassurance about their position in terms of world power, as if they themselves did not believe it.

This insecurity would radically diminish were it not for the fact that by the standards of contemporary western civilization the Soviet Union is not at all the equal of the United States. It lags behind the West not only by material standards, but also in the relationship between the state and society, the civic culture, and indeed, the very concept of citizenship. The comparative perspective then serves as a reference point for the self-evaluation of the Soviet leader.

In the last fifteen years, almost all capitalist countries entered the era of the Third Industrial Revolution. The Soviet Union has yet to create many of the prerequisites for this revolution, from reliable telephone networks to the much more complicated production of such primary electronic components as super-miniaturized microchips. By the end of the 1970s, some members of the Soviet political class

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and the professionals were well aware of the revolution that was sweeping the West and the Far East, but the Soviet leadership apparently did not understand the nature of the challenge nor did it contemplate a realistic Soviet response to it.

The Third Industrial Revolution of the capitalist world was gearing up at the same time that Soviet economic growth was slowing down. The simultaneity of these two developments was calamitous for the domestic and international aspirations of the Soviet rulers. Excluding World War II, the decade from mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was the first prolonged period in Soviet history when the Soviet Union was falling behind the capitalist nations according to the key economic indicators of growth. Most importantly, the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the advanced capitalist countries was sharply widening.

Yet even these comparisons do not tell the main story. The most important comparisons concern factors that can seldom be quantified. The major physical indicators of Soviet production, which were once the most visible signs of its accomplishment and a matter of great pride to the Soviet leadership, political elite, and people, now seemed either irrelevant or even an expression of backwardness. A few examples will illustrate this point:

The Soviet Union produces twice as much steel as the United States, with a GNP one-half the size, but still encounters chronic shortages of steel. The reason is simple: the Soviet Union is wasting steel. The amount of steel in Soviet capital and consumer goods is far too high by world standards. Furthermore, Soviet steel mills overproduce low-quality steel and underproduce steel of high caliber.

The Soviet Union is the largest producer of shoes in the world. But an average shoe may fall apart within a few weeks and enormous inventories of shoes that no one wants to buy, at any price, rot in Soviet warehouses.

Soviet educational facilities graduate each year three times as many engineers as do American universities. But we know now from the experience of Soviet-Jewish emigration to the United States that only a few of them can qualify to work in American industry because of their extremely narrow specialization and the severe limits on their knowledge of contemporary production technologies and methods.

The Soviet Union is the world's largest producer of lumber, but Soviet industrial utilization of lumber constitutes only 30 percent of its weight, while in America, Canada, or Sweden, the rate of utilization is 95 percent. More than one-half of the Soviet production of lumber does nothing but rob future generations of their inheritance of natural resources.

What counts economically in the contemporary world is not the quantity but the productivity of the production process, the modernity of the product mix, and the costs, quality, and the ready availability of the products. In all of these respects, in the last fifteen years the Soviet Union has regressed relative to the West.

The present Soviet leaders are well aware of this state of affairs. They feel that their sense of purpose is endangered. Their patriotic pride is hurt. The progress of Japan and the modernization of the newly industrial nations in Asia must be a particularly bitter pill for them to swallow. More importantly, what they under-

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stand as their destiny of international greatness has been called into question. Their sense of urgency in countering the economic and technological challenge is reinforced by their fears of its potential military consequences. They recognize that their international aspirations cannot be reconciled in the long term with their relative economic weaknesses and the narrow range of their foreign policy resources. In the final analysis, this is the deepest source of the present Soviet leaders' commitment to real change.

The Soviet International Position

Toward the end of the 1960s and during the early 1970s, the Soviet international position significantly improved. It appeared to the Soviets that a great change in international politics was taking place, the fulfillment of a dream for which generations had been sacrificed. The Soviet leadership began to regard the favorable change in the correlation of forces as a secular trend with the potential of becoming irreversible. Soviet leaders expected favorable consequences from American public recognition of a state of strategic parity with the Soviet Union. The *Ostpolitik* and the détente of the early 1970s were increasingly considered by the Soviet leaders to be an offensive strategy. Détente seemed to guarantee the avoidance of dangerous confrontations with the United States, the stabilization of Europe including the recognition of Soviet domination of East-Central Europe, the expansion of economic relations with the West including the large-scale technology transfers needed by the Soviets, and at the same time a free hand for Soviet expansion in the Third World.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the Soviet international position had deteriorated significantly. While détente with Western Europe was still alive, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put an end to Soviet-American détente. American defense policies in the late 1970s, and particularly in the early 1980s, ended the deterioration of the strategic balance against America. The Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Europe backfired by bringing the Atlantic Alliance closer together. The Soviet anti-Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) campaign was a textbook example of diplomatic clumsiness following a major military blunder.

While still weary of international military involvements, the United States had largely abandoned its post-Vietnam nihilistic attitude toward international activism, and had regained much of its sense of confidence. It increased its military budget and began a new stage in the modernization of its conventional forces. At the same time, the Soviet Union found itself overextended. Its international commitments were a drain on Soviet resources and held no promise of short-term victories. Indeed, the so-called national liberation movements that in the 1970s were a symbol of increased Soviet influence, became by the early 1980s anti-Soviet forces. The Soviet Union found itself without major friends abroad and with a troubled empire at home.

The Soviet Union's relative international decline combined with its domestic crisis led to an urgent reassessment of the strategic direction of Soviet security

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and foreign policies. The unimaginative Soviet leadership, tactically inflexible and strategically frozen in old concepts and traditional policies, could not even begin to redress the situation. The obvious seriousness of the Soviet predicament provided a forceful stimulus for change. As Gorbachev and his associates have argued, the most important Soviet foreign and security policy statement consists of the program of domestic renewal and radical reform.

The Soviet Succession

The five factors examined thus far explain why, in the early 1980s, a powerful force for change was building in the Soviet Union. Yet such radical, multidimensional change was not at all inevitable. What *was* inevitable was that without such change the crisis of effectiveness that had gripped the Soviet Union in its domestic and international roles would deepen, and at some point might become a crisis of the nation's very *survival.* The powerful need for change had to find a historical agent to transform it from a potential into a reality. This historical agent emerged during the Soviet succession, confirming once again the central role of leadership in human affairs.

It was inevitable that the leadership succession after Chernenko's death in March 1985, when the pressures for change were particularly strong, would have become a catalyst for reform. That these reforms, however, became so broad in scope and fundamental in nature was the result of four characteristics of this particular succession: it involved not one but three changes in the position of the general secretary; it involved a major turnover in the top leadership and upper levels of the elite in all spheres of Soviet life; it both overlapped with and facilitated generational change within the Soviet political elite; and it placed in the position of general secretary a reform-minded and headstrong leader whose personality and mindset are decidedly different from those of the members of the party apparatus from which he emerged.

In its entire history the Soviet Union has had only four top leaders—Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. In the present succession, however, within the span of less than three years, four leaders consecutively occupied the position of general secretary—Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev. Moreover, those four leaders were very different from one another and each represented a different base of power. This had a number of consequences. The personal loyalties within the top leadership and between elite groups and top level leaders, established through decades of association, were now weakened or broken.

This pattern of succession permitted a leader who did not have a developed political machine, who was a newcomer and a relative outsider to the top leadership, and whose pro-reform orientation was known well before his victory, to win the top prize. Brezhnev, when he assumed power, had been a member of the Politburo for thirteen years and of the Central Committee for twenty. Andropov had been a member of the Politburo for almost fifteen years and of the Central Com-

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mittee for seventeen years before 1982. Chernenko had been a member of the Politburo for ten years and of the Central Committee for fifteen years. Gorbachev had been in the Politburo, of which he was the youngest member, for less than five years, and a member of the Central Committee for only ten years. A contender for the top position, regardless of his real preferences concerning the substance of policies and patterns of politics, normally cannot disclose any tendencies toward reform as long as the old leader is in charge. That Gorbachev was in the Politburo for a relatively short time increased the likelihood that he might be an innovator. Moreover, he assumed power under highly unusual, almost emergency conditions. Under these circumstances, and with a powerful patron, Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev was identified as a reform-minded leader as early as 1982.

Gorbachev was, to a large extent, an outsider in the top leadership until he assumed power. In all probability, he was designated by Andropov to be his successor and was denied the position by Chernenko. In the period between Brezhnev's death in 1982 and Gorbachev's election in 1985 he was not adopted by the Old Guard nor did he seek an alliance with them. In fact, Gorbachev was selected for the top position because there was a large enough mass of members in the Politburo who did not dare to oppose his candidacy and again select another member of the Old Guard such as Chernenko. The mood of frustration among the elite and the Party unmistakably favored the selection of a new man. But his margin of victory was actually quite narrow. For Gorbachev the outsider, the Politburo's dirty trick of electing Chernenko in 1984 and the struggle and estrangement from the Old Guard in the period of 1984–1985 clearly reinforced his reform tendencies and nontraditionalist approach.

In retrospect, one should not underestimate the significance of the Chernenko "Incident": the selection for the top leadership position, in a situation of deep crisis and growing expectations, of a nonentity, a second-rate Party hack. The anger, disgust, and shame in segments of the political elite, or the educated strata, and parts of the population, significantly weakened the power of the Old Guard. This made the election of Gorbachev when Chernenko died, easier than it otherwise would have been and undermined the prestige of the Old Guard. On the other side of the ledger, in one respect the Chernenko interlude increased the difficulty of the job of new leadership. The election of Andropov in 1982 to succeed Brezhnev met with enthusiasm within the elite and, it appeared, overall support and growing expectations among the professionals and the population in the large metropolitan centers. The let-down, to put it mildly, that set in with Andropov's death and the election of Chernenko, muted the enthusiasm, the expectations, and people's willingness to commit their active support to Chernenko's successor.

Succession can, in a narrow sense, be understood as the simple act of replacement of the top Soviet leader. In a broader sense, however, it includes the change of the top leadership *group* and even large segments of the political elite. In this broad sense, the succession is even today not entirely finished at the top leadership level and far from complete at the level of the political elite. For practical purposes

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the Politburo, the Party Secretariat, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers are institutions of the top leadership, and the Central Committee of the Party is the institution that defines the Soviet top political elite.

Still, the turnover of the leadership and top and intermediate level political elite during Gorbachev's short tenure in office has been very high. At the Twenty-seventh Party Congress that convened one year after Chernenko's death about 40 percent of the Central Committee members were replaced. (A similar percentage was replaced at Khrushchev's Twentieth Party Congress, which took place three years after Stalin's death.) In the entire Secretariat of the Central Committee there remains only one person who occupied the same position in the Brezhnev era. In the Politburo, including both full and candidate members, only three leaders have been held over from the Brezhnev era, one of whom is on his way out (the boss of the Ukraine, Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky), and the other two, Andrei Gromyko and Mikhail Solsmentsev, occupy largely symbolic positions. The replacements in the elites of all major hierarchies and almost all Republics is accelerating, and will probably reach an apogee at the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988. This is the result not simply of the reforming character of Gorbachev's leadership, or of the extent of his power, which is still circumvented, but of the actuarial tables as well. Gorbachev inherited from Brezhnev a leadership group and a political elite that was much older than at any point in Soviet history, and with the exception of Mao Zedong's China, probably the oldest in the world. Demographics helped to reinforce Gorbachev's ability to push his reform initiatives.

The post-Brezhnev succession coincided with the change of political generations in the Soviet political elite and the leaderships of the major bureaucratic hierarchies. In all of Soviet history there has been only one comparable period—between the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Party Congresses, from 1934–1939. In this period, Stalin's great purge replaced the revolutionary Bolshevik generation with a new elite composed of people who had come to political maturity since the revolution and who owed their promotions to Stalin himself. The post-Brezhnev succession is now replacing this political generation.

During the first year of Gorbachev's succession I characterized the newcomers to elite positions, as a group, in the following way:

> These new leaders seem to be less ideological and more interested in efficiency in domestic policies. They believe that the economic system should be improved by reforms that will stress increased managerial rights, greater efficiency, and technological progress, more rational methods of planning, and the use of pricing and cost-effectiveness considerations. But they do not believe in changing the fundamental principles of the system. They seem to think that a thorough overhaul of the system with its existing structures, conducted by the new Party and state managers, will exploit enormous reserves of productivity that were left fallow by the old, tired, and complacent leadership. The primary requirement they believe is discipline. They feel that in the long run partial reforms and enforced demands for greater work discipline and greater responsibility of managers of

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basic production and service units will produce an upsurge in economic growth. (Seweryn Bailer, *The Soviet Paradox* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986], 119–120).

In light of what has happened in the Soviet Union in the last two years, was my characterization accurate? In my opinion, it was correct when it was written, and to a large extent remains so even today, but with three important reservations. First, the new political generation is much less homogeneous than it seemed at that time; even as Gorbachev came to power, an important segment of the new elite stratum was already far more critical of the system and convinced of the need for deeper changes than those initiated in 1985. Second, under the influence of Gorbachev and his close associates, many in the new elite accepted the need for more profound changes, and not only in the economy, than they had sought when the succession process had just begun. Third, the main actor in the succession, Gorbachev himself, had a vision of change in the Soviet Union that went further than his initial policies and speeches had suggested. Gorbachev and his close associates moved well ahead of the mood and temper of the overall new elite generation.

Finally, the person and character of Gorbachev himself looms very large. When he took power he was an almost unknown quantity in the West. Today, after having been in office for more than two-and-one-half years, we can speak with some confidence about key aspects of his personality and his style of leadership, and the extent of his commitment to change—although the deepest motivations for his plans and actions may well remain hidden.

Gorbachev has demonstrated that he is a leader in the strict sense of the term: that he has the "capacity or fitness for drawing others, for guiding them, for giving a particular quality or character to a movement." This was not always the case with the Party's general secretaries in the post-Stalin era. Khrushchev had strong elements of it, which, however, other elements of his character and his pattern of behavior either counteracted or nullified. In his short tenure in office, Andropov showed clear promise as a leader. Neither Brezhnev, nor, of course, Chernenko, were leaders in the sense in which I use the term here. The second was a puppet to whom even the extremely strong paraphernalia of his office afforded little stature and dignity. The first was primarily a "Chairman of the Board," a corporate chieftain who reconciled bureaucratic interests, but utterly without personal dynamism. By contrast, Gorbachev is admired, is being emulated, and has stamped the imprint of his own personality on the powerful position he holds. Even people who do *not* believe in the ultimate success of his program admire him. Among his close supporters and aides he has been able to create in this very short period of time an aura of exceptionality, of charisma.

It is also clear that Gorbachev is an astute politician. He came into office lacking a personal political machine of his own. His bureaucratic power base is still extremely frail. He came to power at a time of domestic and international difficulty,

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with exaggerated expectations of what he could achieve and how quickly he could accomplish it. And yet, without producing any visible material improvements at home, he was able to consolidate his power at the top and prepare conditions for a similar consolidation at the upper-middle levels of the political elite at the Party Conference in June 1988. He established himself as an international statesman and has taken the initiative in arms control.

As a politician he is, unlike Khrushchev, quite cautious, but at the same time he can make decisive personnel and policy decisions. By Soviet standards, he is well educated. Where Khrushchev was primarily emotional, he is cerebral. He can both plan ahead and improvise. His previous experience was quite limited, but he is a quick learner. More importantly, he is critical and skeptical. He has a questioning mind. At heart he is an innovator who does not accept answers just because they come from an authoritative source, or reflect past experience. He shows great determination to implement his views, and by all accounts has a forceful personality. He is probably driven by patriotism and historical personal ambition to reverse the decline of his country.

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader since Lenin who does not read his speeches but actually talks to his audience. As a speaker he is both exciting and convincing. He is adept at informal exchanges, at telling jokes, and at working a crowd. He is learning to use television; in his televised appearances, he is a serious, powerful and sincere personality. People respond to him partly because he appears to show genuine curiosity about their work and lives. One has the impression that even if the majority is still skeptical about the durability and success of his "new course," Gorbachev is nevertheless able to ignite in them a spark of interest and even excitement. He is a modern leader in the sense that he has begun to conceive "modernity" not as a thing, an object, but primarily as a set of attitudes or approaches that is innovative and dynamic in all spheres of activity.

When we examine the question of the origin of the present cycle of change in the Soviet Union, the question leads to an answer that stresses the confluence of a number of critical objective and subjective factors, both domestic and international, but that cannot attach specific weights to each of these factors. The centrality of each of these factors is unquestionable. Yet what was decisive for the cycle of changes to take hold in the Soviet Union was not their individual weight but rather their confluence.

First, the multidimensional Soviet domestic crisis incubated for a long period of time. Its scope and depth was magnified by the inaction of the past leadership. By the end of Brezhnev's rule the crisis constituted a virtual emergency.

Second, the technological progress in the capitalist world, combined with Soviet stagnation, reawakened fears for Soviet security and global status. It unleashed in the political elite the deepest motivating force, Russian patriotism, in favor of reform.

Third, changes in the structure of the Soviet society coincided with the determination of the new Soviet leadership to pursue modernization at almost any cost. The necessity to mobilize the intelligentsia to support reforms combined with bu-

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reaucratic opposition to change created the need to fuse economic reform with political democratization and cultural liberalization.

Fourth, and finally, the existence of a man like Gorbachev, with his talents *and* independent thinking, within the Party apparatus, and his elevation to a position of top leadership was an accident of history. In his almost three years in office, Gorbachev has grown in stature and shown impressive qualities of leadership and a growing determination to reform the Soviet Union. He became, indeed, a central factor in the attempt to modernize the Soviet Union politically, socially, culturally, and economically.

The Significance of Changes in the Soviet Union

Neither Western officials and experts, nor the Soviet educated stratum, have formed a consensus on the significance of the changes in the Soviet Union that Gorbachev has already wrought or that he plans to effect. It could hardly be otherwise when the process of change in the Soviet Union has just begun and when the political and expert community in the West is divided by ideological predispositions that influence their analyses. This threshold question, thus, emerges: what yardsticks apply when evaluating the present changes in the Soviet Union and their apparent directions, and what expectations are realistic and what are not?

Economically, the Soviet Union is not becoming a capitalist country. Markets and capitalist economic instruments existed before the advent of capitalism and are potentially compatible with diverse economic models including nationalized, socialist economies. Yet the marriage of the market and capitalist economic mechanisms with socialism is, and will probably remain, very far from complete in the Soviet Union. Economic rationality will certainly expand and grow. But major economic decisions will remain under the administrative control of the political authorities.

Politically, the Soviet Union is not becoming a Western democracy. Nor are there any indications that this is a goal toward which the Soviet leadership desires to move. Probably some institutions of Western democracy will develop in the Soviet Union, but these will not lead to a Western system in the foreseeable future. The Western democratic model is not the birthright of every nation or society nor is it the natural state for all societies. The odds of a Western-style democracy developing in an immense, multinational country that has never in its entire history known a single day of political democracy are very long.

Socially, the Soviet Union is not becoming an open society with few restrictions on the free flow of information. It is not becoming a society in which the relations between the state and the society are bridged by authentic participation and a network of voluntary, independent associations or in which the prerogatives of the state are sharply curtailed. Freedom of religious belief and practice is not being restored, or rather created, in the Soviet Union. The freedom to abstain from political participation, to develop legal forms of employment free from state control, to earn private incomes are as yet only marginally enhanced by the reforms.

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Nor is the dominance of the Russians and to some extent other Slavs over non-Russians in almost all fields of endeavor now being abandoned in the Soviet Union.

In my opinion, the critical benchmark for the evaluation of change in the Soviet Union is the Russian and Soviet historical experience itself. It is as unwise to dismiss changes within this framework as unimportant for Russia and the West and irrelevant to our assessment of the convergence of Gorbachev's reform as it is unwarranted to see them as forerunners of the convergence of the two kinds of systems.

There are two recurring patterns of Russian and Soviet history within which Gorbachev's experiments can be understood. One is simple: it refers to Russia as the eternal latecomer, trailing behind the West in industrial, technological, and scientific progress. This analysis invariably notes that Russia tried cyclically to catch up by borrowing from the West and engaging in revolutions from above and in revitalization movements. Peter the Great and Alexander II are invariably cited as examples of these cycles. From such a historical perspective, the Bolshevik Revolution could *also* be seen as another such movement of revitalization. Gorbachev fits perfectly into this pattern. While in the most general way true, this pattern tells us little about the substance and relative significance of the reforms begun by Gorbachev. It offers no guidance concerning the nature of the borrowing from the West under Gorbachev as compared with that under his predecessors.

The second pattern, one that I prefer, emphasizes the ebb and flow of change in the Soviet system that occurs initially in one sphere of public life and is then carried to other spheres. The Soviet Union has gone through four primary cycles of change and two transitional periods, all associated with the person and program of a specific leader. The first cycle, with Lenin in power, performed a *political* revolution and consolidated it in the victorious Civil War. "War Communism" (1918–1920), as it was called, an attempt to use political power for the transformation of the society, the economy, and the culture, was based on the unrealistic assumption that the Bolshevik Revolution would spread to Europe. The restabilization of the advanced capitalist countries of Europe forced a Soviet retreat and the limitation of the Bolshevik Revolution to the political sphere.

Stalin's accession to supreme power in the Party, and his policies in the decade of 1928–1939, brought about a social, cultural, and economic transformation through the use of political power. This cycle ran its course when the political system that Stalin inherited was itself transformed into a personal dictatorship based on mass terror. Stalin's economic and social revolution was much deeper and more difficult for the Soviet people, and had more important consequences than the strictly political revolution of Lenin. However, without Lenin's political revolution Stalin's transformations would have been impossible. But it was Stalin's program of change that decisively shaped the Soviet system as we know it today.

When Stalin died, the choices open to the successor leadership, which until mid-1957 was collective, were in some respects wide and in others quite narrow. They were narrow with regard to two key characteristics of Stalin's rule: unlimited personal dictatorship and mass terror as the basic method of rule. The entire political elite and the top echelons of all bureaucratic hierarchies, including the KGB and

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the custodians of the means of violence, the Soviet High Command, yearned for an end to both. They simply wanted to enjoy the privileges granted to them by Stalin without the fear associated with the all-pervasive mass terror and the arbitrariness of Stalin's personal dictatorship. Only a leader who would fulfill these yearnings had a realistic chance of ruling Russia.

The choices, however, open to Khruschev in the social, political, economic, and cultural fields, and in foreign and security policy, were quite broad. During his rise to power, Khrushchev embraced a number of policies in these areas that broke with Stalin's policies and that served him well in his struggle with his powerful, conservative opponents. He continued to move away from Stalinism even after he consolidated his power in 1957 with the defeat of the "anti-party" group and the dismissal of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov. The Khrushchev era clearly marks a separate cycle. It partially dismantled the Stalinist political system. In other areas some of Stalin's major policies and many organizational arrangements were significantly changed (*e.g.*, the immense growth of the investment in agriculture, the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations [MTS], the Sovnarkhozy structure, etc.). Yet, the key Stalinist institutions outside the strictly political field remained intact. Most importantly, the Stalinist model of the economy entirely survived Khruschev's reforms.

Gorbachev's rule begins a fourth new cycle of change. It already touches almost every sphere and field of public life—just as Stalin's revolution did. Its centerpiece, however, its dominant element to which changes in other fields are subordinated, is economic. Gorbachev's program amounts to an attempt to dismantle the Stalinist model of the economy. The logic of Gorbachev's dismantling effort, however, also requires major social, cultural, ideological, and eventually political reforms.

The pattern of the ebb and flow of transformations in Soviet history contains, therefore, two phases in which the system was created, Lenin's and Stalin's on the one hand, and two phases, Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's, in which Stalin's system is being dismantled on the other. In both cases the political cycle of change was followed by a socioeconomic crisis; in both cases political change was the point of departure for the socioeconomic changes; in both cases different major leadership figures presided over the political as compared to the socioeconomic cycle of transformation; and in both cases the political and socioeconomic cycles were separated by periods of transition.

On the surface, the two transitional periods—the years of the New Economic Program (NEP) and the Brezhnev era—appear to be sharply different. Yet in some ways they were similar, particularly in the function that they served in the process of change in the Soviet Union. In both periods modifications of the system were incremental rather than sweeping. In both periods the internal contradictions of the system accumulated and led finally to a crisis. Both periods provided conditions for the gestation of ideas that eventually led to a new cycle of changes.

Gorbachev's actions and programs are thus of potentially historical significance. They may already be more important than the transformations in the Soviet system

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wrought by Khrushchev. In the same way that Lenin paved the political way for Stalin's revolution, Khrushchev established the minimal political conditions for the social, economic, cultural (and ultimately political) revolution that Gorbachev is attempting to force on Russia. His goal seems to be the dismantling of the entire Stalinist legacy, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere, which was left largely untouched by Khrushchev.

Gorbachev's post-Stalin predecessors – Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko – all took Leninism as their ideological touchstone and as the source of legitimacy of the Party's role in Soviet society. Gorbachev and his associates are doing so as well. They are attempting to trace their current reforms and their programs for the future to the period of Lenin.

However, Gorbachev's attempt to revert to Lenin raises a major question: to which Lenin is he reverting? What is his understanding of Leninism? Lenin's political and sociological theories were far from homogeneous, as were his practical policies. There can be no doubt that the Lenin to whom Gorbachev refers so often as his inspiration and as the legitimizer of his reforms is the Lenin of the NEP and the last year of his life.

It is the Lenin who declared a truce with the peasants, restored the "capitalist" institutions of market, money, and small private enterprise, who saw taxation as the main form of regulating private economic activity and cooperatives as the chief form of economic transition to socialism, who sought joint ventures with foreign capital, permitted a very high degree of cultural pluralism, opted for a reconciliation with "bourgeois specialists," and who defined the economic system of NEP as "state capitalism." It is the Lenin of the last year of his life who was besieged by doubts about the future, and troubled by many features and patterns of development in the system that he created, who declared the necessity of a slow process of social and political change, who was desperate about the fast-growing bureaucratization of the Soviet state and the growth of bureaucracy in general, who in a private letter to Stalin broke personal relations with him, and who criticized Stalin as the People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs for the excesses and brutality of its dealings with Transcaucasian nations.

Gorbachev's commitment to *this* Lenin seems genuine. This is confirmed by the serious attempt of Soviet historians and ideologues, at Gorbachev's request, to rethink the experience of NEP, and to reevaluate Soviet history from the October 1917 revolution until Lenin's death. In fact, some of Lenin's views and concerns are relevant to Gorbachev. The most obvious example is the NEP. A second example of equal importance and relevance concerns the issue of bureaucratization and bureaucracy which obsessed Lenin toward the end of his life.

The steps Gorbachev has taken during his first three years in office have been directed at important changes in the traditional configuration of the Soviet political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. Some of these changes have already proved significant, and partly unexpected. As one Western author has remarked, "We knew that Gorbachev was going to be different. We did not know

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that he was going to be *that* different." But this is only the beginning. The longer range significance of Gorbachev's changes is primarily in their potential.

Thus far, Gorbachev has been reluctant to publicly express a coherent, integrated vision of what he is working to realize. His slogans—"new ways of thinking," "acceleration," "renewal," and "reconstruction"—resist clear definition. This approach, of course, avoids meaningless promises and emphasizes the pragmatic character of his reform activities.

Soviet officials and economists have a clear appreciation of the existing ills. They also understand, more or less, what they want to achieve. The confusion, unclarity, and indecision, however, concern the question of how to get from here to there. There is nothing unusual about this. Gorbachev, after all, has set a course well outside of his own and his nation's experience.

Three elements constitute the major components of Gorbachev's *political* vision of the future. The first is the curtailment, decentralization, and change of the political orientation of the Soviet bureaucracies. The second element is the democratization of Soviet life. The third is the enhanced role of law and legality.

The question of bureaucracy is one of the central problems faced by Gorbachev in his effort to implement his program of transition to modernity and at the same time a key component of his vision of modernity. Gorbachev's policies seek to curtail the bureaucracies, reducing them in size, bringing them closer to the production process, and most importantly, changing their political orientation.

As the Israeli sociologist, S. I. Eisenstadt, has demonstrated, from ancient empires to modern days, bureaucracies have displayed three types of political orientation. They are either ruler-dependent, corporatist (that is, centered on their own collective interests), or client-oriented. In reality, particular bureaucratic organizations have seldom conformed precisely to any of the three configurations; rather, they have exhibited combinations of all three. From the time of Stalin's ascension to power to the beginning of Gorbachev's rule, the principal Soviet bureaucratic organizations have experienced two changes.

Under Stalin's personal dictatorship they became more ruler-dependent than those of any modern state (including prewar Nazi Germany). Under Khrushchev, the ruler-dependent orientation of major Soviet bureaucracies slowly eroded. When Khrushchev, during his last two years in office, attempted to build a power base independent of the bureaucracies, the alliance of leaders of *all* major bureaucracies ousted him without difficulty. Brezhnev's rule signaled the transformation of the major bureaucracies into corporatist-oriented bodies, presided over by an oligarchy within which the interests of every principal bureaucracy were represented. The corporatist nature of Soviet bureaucracies, their strength, their ability to escape control from above and pressure from below was only reinforced by the prolonged interregnum between Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

The political logic behind Gorbachev's program of reforms is to suppress the corporatist spirit of Soviet bureaucracies, and to make them at once more leader-oriented and client-oriented. Gorbachev's most important method of dealing with

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the bureaucracy is his wideranging replacement of personnel. This may be effective to some degree in the short run. Yet every bureaucracy has an inherent tendency to become corporatist. The new appointees will in time build their own machines. The real challenge will be to create conditions that will preserve their different political orientation.

Gorbachev confronts the same paradox that faces every major reformer. He has no choice but to use most of the people who broke the machine to repair it. Gorbachev's economic program will reduce the actual power of all bureaucracies, including the all-powerful party *apparatus*. Yet these bureaucracies are indispensable in his efforts to implement far-reaching reforms. The Party *apparatus* is particularly necessary to mobilize an army of Party activists behind his program. He then wants the bureaucracies to work actively against the privileges to which they are accustomed, to work against their own interests.

He is attempting to achieve this through *glasnost'* and grass-roots democratization. The new independence of the media, and particularly of investigative reporting, serve Gorbachev's anti-corporatist purposes by putting pressure on recalcitrant bureaucrats, as does the growing freedom of the creative intelligentsia in the cultural fields. The grass roots democratization of communal affairs, the increased participation of the working people in the life of their economic units, a greater attention to complaints against the abuse of the power and privileges of the local leaders are all intended to restrain the bureaucracies. Yet today in the Soviet Union, these developments, encouraged by the general secretary, resemble guerrilla warfare against entrenched interests. They are marginally effective hit-and-run raids rather than frontal assaults.

The place of Gorbachev's program of democratization in his vision of the new Soviet Union is intriguing. What the general secretary says and does suggests that what may emerge in the Soviet Union is something that might be called "inverted democracy." In capitalist democracies, democratic institutions and behavior are primarily those that affect large groups of people; they are macro-institutions. Smaller units, especially those concerned with economic life, are in most cases far from democratic in intent, structure, and behavior. Businesses are to a greater or lesser degree authoritarian in nature; workers do not elect their bosses, although they do, of course, have many rights in the workplace and are free to change jobs. Nor are most trade unions democratic.

Gorbachev's "democratic" vision seems to be the reverse of this. He envisages elements of a "grassroots" democracy at the micro-societal level—election by the workers of the enterprise director, election of members of the local soviet, perhaps even genuine elections of local trade union leaders, the accountability of industrial enterprise management to the workers and of local officials to their constituencies, and probably also the genuine election of leaders in primary, *i.e.*, the lowest level, party organizations.

In the society at large, however, Gorbachev's initiatives do not envision democratic patterns in either state or party institutions either now or in the foreseeable future. It would be unjust to assert that Gorbachev anticipates no democratic elements

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whatsoever here. There is already openness on the part of the Soviet government in dealing with its peoples, an increased flow of information from the top down, and a frankness in the public discourse that was previously unknown. Another such element is the attempt to create institutional constraints on officials that will make their abuse of power more difficult. This will also include greater scope for the Soviet citizen to criticize unjust behavior of lower and middle rank officials with less fear of retaliation. Yet, the basic thrust of Gorbachev's program is not in the direction of developing democracy on the macro-level.

Gorbachev seems to be conscious of the unusual nature of the "democracy" he is trying to bring to his country. He has spoken from time to time of the pioneering, innovative role of his efforts and of the Soviet Union becoming a unique international model. On the basis of our observation of efforts to install this sort of "inverted democracy" in capitalist *and* socialist states (such as Yugoslavia), Gorbachev's concept would appear to have little chance of success.

However far Gorbachev stands from Khrushchev's utopianism, the hopes he attaches to micro-democratic reforms nevertheless contain a strand of utopian thinking. His efforts are likely to prove futile for at least two reasons. First, historically, modernization neither requires nor is it associated with this kind of democracy. Indeed, the reverse is true. The vertical line of organizational authority, the line-staff division, the need for technological discipline, for steep stratification of responsibilities and rewards all contribute to the authoritarian nature of the modernization of economic institutions. Second, Western sociology has established the validity of the "iron law of oligarchy" in formal organizations: trade unions, governmental bureaucracies, cooperative movements, and religious associations demonstrate, even if their origins are genuinely democratic, that they soon become authoritarian and oligarchic. If this is true within a macro-democratic order like the United States, how much more likely will it be in the Soviet Union, with its traditions.

What is true of Gorbachev's program of democratization in the society at large is equally true of the Communist Party itself. "Democratic centralism" was always identified in the West, and rightly so, as the guiding principle of the Communist Party's internal life and as the pillar of the authoritarian nature of the Party. The principle itself, even if truly adhered to, has nothing in common with our Western understanding of a democratic order. We often forget, however, that the perniciousness of the principle was particularly associated with its breach in practice when the "democratic" disappeared entirely and what was left was the unvarnished and uncompromising "centralism." The pursuit of the principle of "democratic centralism" in Party life as it was initially intended would constitute a grass roots democratization of the Party.

The restoration in practice of the prefix "democratic" into the centralized principles of Party behavior seems to be exactly what Gorbachev is striving for. Yet even if he achieves this goal, the Soviet Communist Party will remain a highly authoritarian organization and not only because of the preservation of its monopolistic position in the Soviet Union. Even if some individuals whom the

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upper Party authorities do not desire are selected to the Party committees at the lower levels, the professional Party bureaucracy that represents the Party and oversees its everyday activities will be appointed from Moscow or from the republican centers. The Party Bureaus and Secretariats on the local and republic levels, that is, the Party's decision-making and executive institutions, will be composed of individuals who were selected by Moscow; the Central Committee of the Party that is empowered to elect the Politburo and Central Secretariat will remain in fact selected by the Politburo and Secretariat; and the general secretary and his closest associates will select the individuals whom they want to be members of the Politburo and Secretariat, when they consolidate their power.

Finally, Gorbachev's reforms in the political realm address the question of the role and substance of law and legality in the Soviet Union. It is not entirely clear how important legal questions are deemed to be in Gorbachev's program of change. The legal reforms that are officially contemplated, however, are extensive in design and move decisively away in substance from the Soviet tradition. They include the preparation of new criminal and civil codes, as well as a new code of legal procedures. There is also consideration being given to the feasibility of separating the office of public prosecutor from the courts, which are now a part of a single institution, the Ministry of Justice. This Soviet review of the legal system is also addressing the changes that would be necessary to bring about the greater independence of the courts, and greater rights for the accused. Also under consideration are plans to revamp the office of the public defender and to significantly increase the rights and the independence of the office. Finally, the Soviets are seeking a reformulation of legal statutes to codify the actual and proposed changes in the economy, in cultural life, and in communications.

In the discussions concerning the legal system, which are extraordinarily outspoken, and which include not only academics but also prosecutors, public defenders, judges, Ministry of Justice officials, writers, managers, and ordinary citizens, a consensus is emerging about the role of law in the society and about the rule of law. It bears a certain resemblance to the German concept of "Rechtsstaat" as it was initiated by Frederick the Great and took shape in nineteenth-century Prussia. This concept conferred enormous prerogatives on the state and favored the state in conflicts with citizens. At the same time, it stressed the sanctity of legal norms, the predictability of legal procedures, and the limits of the rights of the State in its relations with citizens or legal entities. While the Prussian legal system may not appeal to Americans, an approximate equivalent of it would constitute a major improvement for the Soviets.

In the economic sphere, Gorbachev seeks to introduce change of two types. The first is the replacement of the Stalinist economic model with one in which market forces and economic instruments would play a major role. The second is a decisive change from an extensive strategy of growth to an intensive one. The issue raised by the second group of changes is not what Gorbachev intends to do, but how successful can he be and how quickly. The first group of changes, however, requires some elaboration.

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All Western analysts of Communist societies distinguish among various types of reform in a centrally planned economy. The distinction that I have most frequently applied in my own writings are those among policy reforms that redistribute resources; organizational reforms that redistribute authority; and structural reforms that abolish or create basic institutions. The first two types occur within the parameters of the existing system, while the third changes the parameters themselves. Very often these distinctions are expressed by distinguishing between changes "within the system" and changes "of the system."

The Soviet Union is now in a period of rapidly occurring and farreaching economic change, both in terms of policy and organization, which touches its institutional structure and behavior. The decisions of the Central Committee Plenum in June 1987 and the State decrees that followed it are, at the time of this writing, the most far-reaching steps taken by Gorbachev in the economic sphere. Gorbachev's proposals to the Plenum were presented as a plan of "fundamental reconstruction of the management of the economy." They mark a radicalization of his vision of the proposed economic future of the Soviet Union.

Can the new system, in its proposed form, fulfill the promise of radical improvement in capital and in labor productivity, in the quality of goods and in the rate of growth? This seems doubtful. In the crucial areas of economic activity, such as price formation, quality control, and competition, it is not the market forces that will play the decisive role, but rather the administrative structures. And yet the proposed reform is of great importance. Its significance is that it established the organizational and psychological conditions for a series of reforms to come later. These reforms will introduce the market mechanism into price formation, quality control, and competition. The reform announced at the Plenum makes sense only if it is understood as such a prelude.

The *social* domain is of immense importance to Gorbachev's program for the modernization and the transformation of the Soviet Union. The new leadership seeks reconciliation between the regime and society, a relationship endangered during the second half of Brezhnev's leadership. It also seeks to create conditions in which the modernizing impulse will penetrate the society. These aims are not always compatible. Gorbachev's social policies and reforms are oriented toward both. The most important of these policies concern social discipline, welfare, alienation and stratification.

Gorbachev's first acts after assuming power were directed at strengthening social and particularly work discipline. These steps were not intended to be a short-term campaign but rather a long-range, continuous effort. Normative appeals, new laws, but most importantly, stricter enforcement of existing laws succeeded in part in improving social discipline. A Soviet official put it into perspective: "A modern society is first of all a society where by and large people are honest and work honestly." The initial aim of these policies was a radical improvement in the working, or rather non-working, habits of the blue and white collar workers. At the time Gorbachev took power the reality was very gloomy, indeed, for both the Soviet leadership and society.

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Almost from the beginning, Gorbachev's policies were also directed at strengthening the discipline of the bureaucracies and fighting official corruption. Proper—from the point of view of the interest of the state—bureaucratic behavior can be reduced to two types of behavior: accurate, honest reporting to superiors and a just and thoughtful attitude to the public. On both scores the Soviets created a bureaucratic monster.

Under Brezhnev, the control of the bureaucracies by the political leadership was superficial. Many of the controlling individuals or institutions were coopted by the bureaucracies. The flow of information to the top was outrageously manipulated and misleading, forcing the leaders each year to produce ever more grandiose lies to cover up those of the year before. Officials of lower units provided false documentation to buttress the rosy reports sent upward by their superiors. This reporting pattern created in every bureaucracy a criminal system of mutual interdependence and protection from top to bottom.

Corruption has probably less potential to harm Gorbachev's plans and vision of the future than the bureaucratic ills of dishonest reporting and indifference toward the Soviet public. A modern society cannot tolerate a notoriously high-level flow of false information. Yet, within a highly centralized and coercive system, this may be unavoidable. Research has firmly established that high-coercion systems are low-information systems. Gorbachev does seem to understand that, along with better control and less tolerance, this bureaucratic scourge can be reduced to tolerable levels only if the administrative apparatus is drastically cut in its middle levels, radically decentralized, given new rights and responsibilities on the managerial level, and finally, made more accountable to the public.

In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet Union developed a welfare state of enormous scope, if not of great quality. At the present, this welfare state is facing a most serious crisis. The problem is two-fold. On the one hand, the welfare state fails to perform many of its functions well, is underfinanced and backward. On the other hand, it is far too large, attempting to provide many services it should not, and it is far too expensive. It suffers simultaneously from a crisis of underdevelopment and a crisis of overdevelopment.

The Soviet welfare state performs many services that all welfare states offer, such as retirement pensions, medical care, day care for children, summer camps, and environmental protection. Gorbachev's anti-alcoholism campaign is a good example of a desperately needed program that falls within the purview of a welfare state. Yet most of the traditional functions of a welfare state are seriously underfinanced in the Soviet Union and, in many areas, are of a quality that even the Soviets themselves now describe as scandalous.

The most serious and tragic example of the Soviet welfare state scandal is medical care. An indirect indication of its low priority is the fact that about 70 percent of Soviet doctors are women. This is certainly not intended to imply that women make worse doctors than men, but rather that medicine is a low-paying and thus low-status job and, therefore, it is reserved mainly for women. What occurred in Soviet medical services may be described as de-professionalization. The educa-

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tional level of medical schools is low. Pharmaceuticals are scarce and of poor quality. Hospital equipment dates from World War II. The problems in health care are so serious (as reflected in mortality statistics), that they were singled out as a target for major changes by Gorbachev himself at the June 1987 Plenum.

The crisis of underdevelopment of the Soviet welfare state concerns the quality of the services it provides and the level of financial support it receives. The average pension of 60 rubles a month is not enough for survival.

The underdevelopment crisis is serious, but from the political point of view and from the point of view of socioeconomic development, the overdevelopment crisis of the Soviet welfare state is equally serious and more difficult to tackle. In essence, it is the consequence of a conscious decision by past Soviet leaders, beginning with Khrushchev, to include in welfare services offerings that can be better dealt with through other approaches. Those services include ridiculously low apartment rents under conditions of major housing shortages, very low prices for basic foods, transportation, telephones, and a variety of other goods and services. The complete job security of Soviet workers, regardless of their performance, is also an aspect of social welfare. It is the Soviet equivalent of Western unemployment benefits, but it probably includes a much higher percentage of the work force than does the Western average. All the Soviet welfare services and entitlements are financed by truly enormous state subsidies; the agricultural subsidies, for example, are more than double the retail price of agricultural products in state stores.

Gorbachev is apparently aware of the two-fold crisis of the Soviet welfare state. He is attempting to deal with the crisis of underdevelopment as part of his program to resume the Second Industrial Revolution. Gorbachev also clearly intends to deal with the crisis of overdevelopment, but this is a difficult task. The immense subsidies for housing, food, and transportation have a deleterious effect on the Soviet economy. They drain resources from the state investment fund. There is a direct connection between the very low apartment rents and their rapid deterioration, because of their lack of upkeep and maintenance. There is also a direct connection between the low prices for basic food and the constant shortages (except of bread) in supplying the state retail stores and the long lines in front of the stores.

Gorbachev will have great difficulty in cutting the subsidies and thus increasing the prices, because by doing so he will undercut the basic unwritten agreement between the Party and the workers. Moreover, the standard of living of the working class is so low that major price increases may be dangerous and will have to be gradual. Finally, the working class has become accustomed to the existing scope of the welfare system. It is convinced, partially by the words and actions of previous leaders, that there is a "free lunch" under socialism. Of course, the "free" education, housing, transport, and the like are not clearly free. They have, however, become associated in the minds of Soviet workers with Soviet-style socialism. Reeducation will be most difficult, both politically and economically.

Gorbachev clearly opposes the psychology of the "free lunch." He knows that his market reforms require the sharp decline and eventual elimination of most

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state subsidies. He has not yet faced, however, the popular reaction to major cuts in subsidies. He will probably have to show some visible improvements in people's lives before he can risk a wholesale cut in subsidies. This will complicate his program. He must simultaneously preach the need for austerity and the imperative of raising people's living standards. Without doing both, without resolving the two-fold welfare crises of underdevelopment and overdevelopment, the modernization that Gorbachev seeks will remain largely unattainable.

One of the most disquieting sociopolitical phenomena for the Soviet leaders must be the almost palpable alienation of a large part of the society from the Soviet regime. It is expressed in the skepticism that greets government promises and the cynicism about the system itself. It combines apathy with indifference to reform. It is manifest in the lack of pride in work and in the neglect of state property. This alienation cuts across generational lines, but some Western studies of recent emigrants from the Soviet Union to America conclude that the younger the people are, the more intense their alienation.

The major source of alienation is the deep sense of injustice shared by large segments of the population. The experience of other societies, as well as of the Soviet Union and Russia, show that a shared sense of injustice may be a more important cause of unrest and declining stability than materially unsatisfactory living conditions. This was the case in Poland in 1980. This phenomenon does not threaten the survival of the Soviet regime, but it does endanger its stability and the success of Gorbachev's reforms.

The main source of the widespread sense of injustice is the typically indifferent, negligent, and sometimes brutal treatment the average citizen receives from the lower level bureaucrats with whom he must interact. Regardless of how rapid and profound the changes at the upper level of the establishment turn out to be, it will take a very long time before they trickle down to the local bureaucracies. In the meantime, the sense of injustice and the anger that it produces among the rank-and-file citizens is, if anything, increasing. The average citizen now hears everywhere the openly expressed views of how bad things have been and how everything is changing for the better. But everyday experience has not changed at all, rendering the citizen even angrier, and able to express anger more openly now because it is much safer to do so.

Gorbachev's goal of modernizing the Soviet Union will have an enormous impact on the society, especially its stratification. Some tenets of stratification always seem to be associated with modernization. Common sense, if nothing else, would argue that two such tenets are that people should be rewarded according to the quality and complexity of the work they perform and that businesspeople in the main should be the ones who take care of business.

If the second tenet was never adopted in the Soviet Union, the first was elevated to a doctrinal canon of the Socialist society. According to Marx, in socialism, the lower phase of communism, each contributes to society according to his or her abilities, and each is rewarded according to his or her work. In practice, however, this canon was honored in the breach.

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The Soviet pattern of stratification includes the worst possible combination of traits. It is highly elitist in its correlation of political power to economic rewards. It is the powerful who get rich: politics governs the distribution of economic rewards. But it is distinctly egalitarian in its correlation of the quality and complexity of work performed to real rewards. An enterprising, efficient worker does no better than a lazy one. Thus, there is no incentive for enterprise and efficiency. This is a deadly combination for a country that has set out to modernize, a fact that Soviet leaders are beginning to realize.

Yet change is difficult. The Soviets are caught in a Catch-22 predicament. In order to raise economic incentives and increase pay scales, the productivity and quality of available goods must also improve. This is likely, however, only when material incentives improve. The transition to a more functional economic stratification is therefore extremely difficult. It must be Gorbachev's plan to fill this transitional void, partially at least, with exhortations, calls to patriotism, and other such substitutes.

Perhaps no less difficult than the economic aspects of the shift are the sociopolitical ones. They may even become explosive. In the post-Stalin period the party entered into an unwritten contract with the Soviet working class, which is expressed in the workers' saying, "They pretend they pay us, and we pretend we work." This was far more than a joke. One party to the contract, those in power, raised minimum wages, increased average wages, promised and delivered a modest but steady growth in the standard of living, kept the differential between wages and salaries low and even lowered them, and, crucially important, provided the workers with an almost complete job security. (They also started to treat the collective farmer as a citizen.) In addition they expended enormous subsidies on commodities such as bread, lard, potatoes, and services such as rents and transportation, to keep prices low. On the workers' side, docility, low expectations and aspirations, and participation in the farce of the propaganda double-talk were their contributions to the social contract. The contract became rather frayed at the edges when, from the mid-1970s, the economy experienced stagnation.

It is this contract (and other, similar, "equilibrium contracts" with managers and administrators) that Gorbachev seems set to break, and which he must break if he wants his plans of modernization to become more than mere slogans. Such a policy, potentially of great value for the modernization program, carries with it, however, major threats to stability. These are greatest in the transition from the old social contract to a new one, the benefits of which can be promised but not yet delivered.

The changes that have already occurred or are intended in the cultural sphere, broadly understood, were the most surprising of Gorbachev's actions. *Glasnost'*, and the entire range of freedom of expression for the creative intelligentsia, are instruments of Gorbachev's effort to break the resistance of the bureaucracy and to mobilize broad support for his leadership and his program. But these steps are much more than cultural instruments in the service of sociopolitical change. If they continue, expand, and endure, their consequences for Soviet culture, for So-

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viet society, and for the nation at large may be enormous. Three such potential consequences are of particular importance. They concern civil society, ideology, and the understanding of the very term "modernity" in the Soviet Union.

From Hegel to de Tocqueville to Gramsci, social thinkers have been concerned with the relations between state and society, and particularly with one of its aspects that they have defined as "civil society." This concept refers to the independence of such social units as community organizations or professional associations from direct supervision, control, and management by the state. Totalitarianism eradicates all vestiges of "civil society." Populist capitalist democracy, as exemplified by the United States, is the best illustration of the other extreme, in which civil society is widespread, legitimate, and dominant.

Gorbachev's program for the future of the Soviet Union seems to envision the creation and cultivation of selected elements of "civil society" never before known in Soviet or Russian history. If Gorbachev is serious about, and successful in abolishing cultural censorship, in permitting freedom for investigative reporting, encouraging participation in local community life, in giving workers a voice in enterprise management, and in holding free elections in the Party's primary organizations, he will be granting relative autonomy to selected segments of the population, and thereby creating elements of "civil society" in the Soviet Union.

This process may be reversed, perhaps triggered by economic troubles. The ebb and flow of encouraging then limiting *glasnost'* will be controlled by the vicissitudes of Soviet domestic politics. Zig-zags are inevitable. The longer the process of *glasnost'* survives, however, and the greater its scope becomes, the more difficult even its partial reversal may become for the Soviet leadership to manage. The members of the creative intelligentsia who have committed themselves, in growing numbers and with increasing intensity, to Gorbachev's reforms, will not return with docility to their former function, to use Stalin's phrase, of being "engineers of human souls" in the service of the leader. What is happening today in the Soviet Union in the cultural sphere is not simply a thaw, one of the many of the post-Stalin era. It is potentially a sea change, the consequences of which are unpredictable.

The public criticism of Stalinism is broader in scope and deeper, albeit less dramatic, than that of the Khrushchev era. It is gaining momentum. It also includes a revisionist interpretation of the pre-Stalin period and of the Brezhnev era. In contrast to the critique of the past under Khrushchev, which concentrated on Stalin himself and ascribed all evils to his personality, the current criticism centers on the policies and structural characteristics of the Stalinist system. Gorbachev's decision to give vent to criticism of the past is necessary for establishing his credibility with the intelligentsia. The key weakness of the Khrushchevian criticism of Stalin is, to a lesser degree, present now: no interpretation is given to explain how Stalin and Stalinism were possible in the Soviet Union.

Marxism-Leninism, adapted to Soviet conditions and supplemented by the experience of seventy years of Soviet history, still constitutes the conceptual framework, the political culture within which Gorbachev, his associates, and the polit-

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ical elite think and operate. (This is no longer true for a large part of the creative intelligentsia, a fact that has caused a potential chasm to develop between them and the leadership.) But Gorbachev and his associates also operate according to the tenets of Russian nationalism, or, if one prefers, patriotism, and by the managerial ethos. Both in domestic and foreign policy the Soviet leadership is moving away from doctrinal principles. Their approach to ideology is becoming far more instrumental than in the past. This is reflected in their ideological eclecticism, which selects from the Marxist-Leninist menu those elements that suit Gorbachev's line.

Gorbachev's power base within the various bureaucratic hierarchies is not solid. Yet the alliance he is trying to forge through his program of "reconstruction" is broad and heterogeneous, and shows signs of both growth and consolidation. The alliance includes purist Marxists or Leninists who think that the original goals of the revolution, which they idealize, were perverted by Lenin's successors, and hope that at last they can return to what they consider the original sources of the revolution. It also includes people who consider themselves very far from Marxism-Leninism and adhere to democratic and liberal principles, following in the tradition of the democratic, non-revolutionary intelligentsia of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It attracts Russian patriots who bemoan the decline of their country and believe that Gorbachev represents the final chance to make Russia great once again. It encompasses those within the military and the industrial-military sector who fear for the security of the Soviet Union if its relative technological decline continues. It attracts scores of careerists who increasingly believe in Gorbachev's survival and want to hitch their futures to his rising star.

Gorbachev's alliance appeals to the instincts and interests of the professional groups who are convinced that the general secretary's new course will provide greater scope for them. It invites those who are beginning to believe that the Gorbachev policies will, in fact, reward hard work and skill. It draws those in the non-Russian republics who hope that the program of modernization and democratization will create a new deal for their nations more favorable than past practices. In fact, Gorbachev's reforms, and the alliance that is evolving to support and implement them, constitute an attempt to create a new social contract between the regime and various social groups and strata. The essence of a binding contract in sociopolitical life is the trust each party to the agreement reposes in the other. Thus far, the trust on either side is still limited. The groups that have committed themselves to the new contract in the upper political class and in the subordinate strata still constitute a minority. This is not unexpected. Major revolutionary and reform movements in the Soviet past, as in other countries, were initially propelled for a protracted period by active minorities that attained legitimacy only much later.

It is apparent that the new Soviet leadership understands the concept of modernity differently than did their predecessors. For Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, modernity meant new factories, new construction, a larger labor force, improved technology, and above all, increased production of basic resources and products. Stalin's speech of March 1946, in which he discussed the future of the Soviet Union,

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and Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's speeches, in 1959 at the Twenty-first Party Congress, and in 1971 at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, respectively, are almost identical in their understanding of modernity, and of their nation's progress to achieve it. They emphasized the production of tangible "things" rather than the modernizing process itself. They focused on quantifiable growth in the economy. This kind of approach was typical of the First Industrial Revolution and its mechanistic approach to the creation of wealth, of the economic macro-theories of the early capitalism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, which led Marx to develop his mechanistic "labor theory of value" and his distinction between "productive" and "nonproductive" labor. Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev were all schooled in the principles of Soviet prewar industrialization, the industrial mobilization of World War II, and the postwar reconstruction. Marxian principles of economic thinking, characteristic of the First Industrial Revolution, corresponded to their own experience. The cult of technology characteristic of the Soviet ruling circles throughout Soviet history focused primarily on its material aspects. The Soviet technological *ethos* was that of an engineer, a mechanic, an inventor of industrial improvements on the one hand, and of the robber baron on the other. It was, in a way, a replication of the American industrial experience from the post-Civil War period to World War I, adjusted to Russian and Soviet conditions. The meaning of modernity for Gorbachev and many in the political elite, as well as for many scientists and economists, is quite different. They recognize the importance of high technology, but their perception of the *process* of modernization, however, centers not on *things* but on people, their attitudes and skills, and the conditions necessary for their creativity and their commitment. This is the basic reason why Gorbachev should be recognized as the first modern leader of the Soviet Union.

Many questions about Gorbachev's vision of the new Soviet system cannot yet be answered, partly because the requisite evidence is lacking, but also, and more importantly, because Gorbachev himself probably has something less than a comprehensive view of the system that will emerge from his reforms. We do not know, for example, the answer to such a major question as the role of the mass party and of the professional party *apparat* in the new system, although we know from Gorbachev's speeches what he does *not* want their role to be. We do not know how central the market will be in the reformed economic system and what weight the separate sectors will have in the mixed economy yet to emerge. We cannot be certain of the new long-range policy pertaining to the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union and the degree of autonomy they will enjoy. Such questions can be multiplied, but one thing we do know with certainty: the answers will emerge in a bitter struggle for high stakes. Both for Gorbachev and his opponents, what is at stake is not only their personal fate, but the future of Russia and of the Soviet Union.

The significance of what is happening in the Soviet Union may be summarized by the following conclusions:

In the post-Stalin era many reforms were initiated and accomplished. They dealt, however, with only one or another aspect of politics, economics, or culture. Gor-

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bachev's program constitutes the first *comprehensive* reform of the system since the advent of Stalinism.

The Soviet leadership has begun to dismantle the Stalinist socioeconomic and cultural systems and is modifying the political system bequeathed by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The potential significance of this process for the evolution of the Soviet Union and its transformation is as great as was Stalin's revolution from above in the 1930s. If successful, it will conclude the cycle of anti-Stalinist changes initiated by Khrushchev in the political field.

Gorbachev's economic reforms move in the direction of a rather eclectic model of "market socialism." This dramatically reverses the trend of Soviet history, with the exception of the nine years of NEP. In two respects the current reforms seek to move beyond NEP. The New Economic Policy initiated by Lenin and ultimately destroyed by Stalin permitted private farming, small private enterprise in industry, craftsmanship, and services. The industrial, construction, mining, transportation, finances, and foreign trade areas were, however, highly centralized and based on the principles of strict planning and state distribution of goods. Today these sectors are all being decentralized in varying degrees and are gradually being exposed to market forces. Moreover, the NEP moved in the direction of stricter limits and higher taxation of private economic activity. Gorbachev's reforms, of course, seek to encourage such activity.

The personality and character of the general secretary has been crucial to his program of change. Gorbachev's personal importance to the cycle of reforms cannot be over-emphasized. The accidental confluence of a deep crisis of the Soviet system, the exhaustion of the old guard, the patronage of Andropov, and an unusual period of succession put Gorbachev in power. His talents, determination, political orientation, and the fact that he is the first modern leader of the Soviet Union all give shape to the direction, scope, and dynamism of the reforms. But it was important that he was a member in good standing in the association of professional party functionaries, that his career was typical of that of an *apparatchik* of his generation. It has been said that only a rabid anti-Communist such as President Richard Nixon could have succeeded in initiating an opening to the People's Republic of China and a Soviet-American détente. Similarly in the Soviet Union, only a party *apparatchik* could succeed in initiating significant liberalizing reforms. This is because he is recognized by the closely knit brotherhood of the party *apparat* as one of them, and because he knows well the tactics and the values of party politics and has developed the instinct to survive and to strike decisively when necessary. The purely managerial types such as Georgi M. Malenkov or Alexei I. Kosygin or, today, Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, could not have pulled off what Gorbachev did.

Gorbachev's reforms are associated with a widespread change of leading cadres. The extent of this change already surpasses the turnover initiated by Khrushchev over a longer period of time. Moreover, the new leading cadres seem to be more favorably disposed to reforms because they all belong to a new, post-Stalinist generation. While experience shows that major changes in a political system can occur even when the composition of a political elite is stable, it also shows that a major

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turnover in personnel, especially when accompanied by generational transition, facilitates the program of reforms and increases the chances of success.

The Soviet leadership's analysis of its own society implicitly recognizes the bankruptcy of the concept of the "new Soviet man," the model "Homo Sovieticus." Entrepreneurship, initiative, spontaneity, and social discipline are among the traits in short supply in the Soviet Union but typical of modern societies. It is essential that the regime introduce significant changes in the process of socialization and education, as well as in terms of the rewards and indices of Soviet success.

Gorbachev's reforms in the cultural and communication fields, known as *glasnost'*, mark the beginning of the political and professional emancipation of the Soviet creative intelligentsia. Their significance can only be compared to the emancipation of the Russian peasants from serfdom in the 1860s—and, indeed, the two developments share some of the same limitations. This process of emancipation serves not only Gorbachev's needs of the moment but is also a recognition of the indispensability of the intelligentsia for the program of modernization of the Soviet Union, and thus is likely to represent more than a short-term thaw.

The implementation of Gorbachev's reforms would lead to the development of elements of a "civil society" in the Soviet Union. Trade unions, professional groups, cultural associations, and other similar institutions may gain a significant degree of autonomy from the political authorities. This will not only reverse the Stalinist and post-Stalin pattern but will also signify a retreat from some highly authoritarian aspects of Leninism.

Gorbachev's reforms go beyond policy and organizational changes. They promote structural, institutional changes in the Soviet system. Institutional reforms attempt to change permanently the behavior patterns of individuals, social groups, or organizations. Traditional organizational features of the system may in important respects remain unchanged while the functions of these organizations could be altered as could the behavior of individuals within the organizations.

In the broadest sense, what Gorbachev seeks is nothing less than a redefinition of Soviet socialism. His aim is to make socialism more attractive both at home and abroad, and perhaps even restore some unity and vigor to the nearly defunct international Communist movement. The "new" socialism will abandon opposition to *all* capitalist institutions, especially economic micro-institutions and what the Soviets still call capitalist "formal democracy"—that is, democracy in political life. When Gorbachev visited Prague in the spring of 1987, his official spokesman, Genadii Gerasimov, was asked at a press conference: "What is the difference between Gorbachev and Dubcek?" Gerasimov replied, "Nineteen years." In fact, Gorbachev's thinking is beginning to resemble the views of those reformers in Eastern Europe who have not wanted to abandon Marxism but rather to reinterpret it and adapt it to contemporary realities.

Plausible Outcomes of Changes in the Soviet Union

What are the likely outcomes of the sweeping changes in the Soviet Union? While many are possible, some are more likely than others. There is much speculation

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over whether Gorbachev will succeed or fail. One meaning of "success," as defined by Webster's Third International Dictionary is a "favorable termination of a venture." Another is "the degree or measure of attaining one's desired end." The second is the more pertinent to our inquiry because it views success as a relative, as opposed to an absolute, state.

Seldom in human affairs is the outcome of a venture either a total success or a complete failure. This will be most likely the case as well with the present process of change in the Soviet Union. It is likely that it will partly succeed and partly fail. Gorbachev's central goal is the modernization of the Soviet Union. The dismantling of the Stalinist system and the redefining of socialism is less an intrinsic goal than a means to achieve the central goal.

Can the Soviet Union become modern in the contemporary sense of the term, and if so, how soon? The Soviet Union has already developed many of the material prerequisites of modernity. It possesses a skilled labor force, an educated urban population, advanced science, a very large professional class, pockets of high technology; it is rich in natural resources; its economy is gigantic; the rate of capital formation is high. It has, in short, the proverbial bootstraps by which to pull itself up. But the Soviet Union's transition to modernity will depend on how effectively those resources are developed and used. Here, optimistic predictions are not warranted.

The power of attitudes that are dysfunctional for modernity, the commitment of the managerial strata to the irrelevant or harmful lessons of early industrialization, the political constraints imposed by oligarchic rule, the existence of a political elite that is loathe to abdicate its privileges, and the constraint of multi-ethnicity will make the process of changing attitudes in the Soviet Union difficult, prolonged, and probably ultimately inadequate to replicate the current phase of modernization in many capitalist countries.

If Gorbachev's revolution continues, the Soviet Union may create large pockets of modernity outside the military-industrial sector. Yet to become truly modern, it is not enough to have a modern *sector* in the economy: it is necessary to change the way of life of the society at large. The creation of a large high-tech sector in the Soviet economy would be a major achievement indeed, but it is still a far cry from modernity.

There is no disagreement in the Soviet Union or in the West that modernization will require the abandonment of central planning, and the introduction of some sort of "market socialism." Yet we should remember that economists still consider Hungary a centrally planned economy, inasmuch as political authorities continue to make the macro-economic decisions. And there are very few Sovietologists who would consider a retreat from central planning as extensive as in Hungary applicable to Soviet conditions, or who would not consider a thoroughly "Hungarianized" Soviet Union a virtual miracle.

Gorbachev's own timetable for Soviet modernization is clear: time and again, he has referred to the turn of the century, the year 2000. Yet, his evaluation of the difficulty of the task at hand has steadily increased and continues to increase. In discussions with Soviet officials and economists, the "catch-up" deadline of

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the year 2000 is almost invariably discounted. I asked a high Soviet official whether if by the year 2000 the Soviet Union is not falling further behind the advanced capitalist countries, he would consider that a major victory for Gorbachev's program. His answer was an unqualified "Yes." Thus, if Gorbachev's revolution is continued, it may well achieve enough in ten to fifteen years to improve significantly the Soviet standard of living. It will achieve enough to decrease the *rate* of Soviet technological *decline* relative to the West or – which is less likely – perhaps even *stop* the decline. It will not achieve enough to fulfill Gorbachev's program of making the Soviet Union modern.

The second of Gorbachev's goals, and at the same time the means to reach the goal of modernity, is a thorough de-Stalinization and liberalization of the system. The difficulty of carrying out such a cycle of reforms in diverse spheres of Soviet life is complex beyond imagination. As Samuel Huntington of Harvard University has remarked, "Reforms are more difficult than revolutions." In the Soviet Union, this is certainly the case. The victory in the Russian revolution in October 1917 and in the civil war that followed were far easier to achieve than the tasks of Stalin or Gorbachev.

Revolutions like the Russian one of 1917 occur in political systems and social orders that are on the verge of disintegration. The ensuing political vacuum is filled by the revolutionary organization and consolidated by political mobilization. Major reforms that grow out of crises are substitutes for revolution; they are meant to *prevent* developments that could lead to revolutionary situations. The system within which they take place is far from the brink of revolution. Its institutions are still solid; there is no power vacuum. Revolutions develop from crises of survival; major reforms take place and are intended to counteract crises of effectiveness. Revolutions tend to devour their children, expel from leadership and even annihilate the originators of the revolution, and abandon their utopian goals; in reforms, the great danger is that they will be absorbed and neutralized by the system that still displays a powerful instinct for survival. New structures and processes created by major reforms may still shelter old behavior.

It is hardly surprising that in the conceptualization and implementation of his "new course" Gorbachev is facing major obstacles. These barriers to the implementation success of Gorbachev's strategy of reforms are multidimensional, and can be divided into sociopolitical, structural, and international categories.

Political and Social Obstacles

Gorbachev faces organized political opposition to his policies from individuals or groups at the high political level in Moscow and in some capitals of the Republics, as well as from groups outside the official power structure. This opposition is partly submerged in the Byzantine court politics in Moscow and can only be deduced, and its individual participants identified, through the inexact art of Kremlinology. The opposition has taken advantage of *glasnost'* to express unmistakably its enmity to Gorbachev's new course. Its tactic is not to deny the need for reforms but

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rather to protest their breadth, scope, intensity, and the speed with which they can be implemented. In its propaganda, the opposition conveys the fear that these reforms may destroy Russia and the Soviet way of life, and endanger the survival of the system.

The existence of opposition, even at the very highest level, was indirectly confirmed by Gorbachev himself when he publicly mentioned that because of differences of opinion in the Politburo, the crucial January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, which gave the major impetus to the sociopolitical and cultural reforms, had to be postponed three times. At the highest Party and government levels, the people who are most often identified in Moscow political circles with opposition to Gorbachev can be divided into two groups: the first consists of the remnants of the Old Guard who are, however, on their way out; the second, more important group is formed by contenders from Gorbachev's own generation. The figure generally recognized as Gorbachev's principal foil is Yegor Ligachev, the titular second secretary of the Party. Ligachev is deeply respected in the Party apparatus, in which he served longer and probably enjoyed a higher standing before the final succession than Gorbachev. His prominence in the affairs of the Party remains great. His skills as a politician are said to be considerable. In his speeches to Party activists he supports Gorbachev's political course, but he always manages to sound a strong note of caution and to insert passages that warn against excesses of the "new course" and stress the value of the experience accumulated by the Party apparatus.

The political base of Ligachev, and whoever is allied with him at the top, is the powerful Party apparatus, the conservative part of the cultural intelligentsia, the lower-level managerial stratum, and nationalistic Russian groups who were brought into the open by Gorbachev's *glasnost'*.

An extreme example of the fierceness of the opposition is provided by the vicious attack on Gorbachev's political course at the meeting of the leadership of the Union of Writers of the Russian Republic (RSFSR). One of the leaders, Yurii Bondarev, said in his speech, published in the newspaper "Literary Russia":

> I am being asked by foreign correspondents whether a civil war has broken out in our literary circle. No, comrades, what has developed is not a civil war. It can be rather compared to the brutal onslaught of our country in the summer of 1941 of the forces of barbarism. If this onslaught is not halted it will endanger the very existence of our great Russian cultural heritage and of our Soviet way of life.

Many of the participants in the meeting quoted Ligachev in their speeches.

Still another example of opposition is provided by an association that was created last year in Russia under the name *Pamyat'* or "Memory." Its members may be divided into two groups. The first is composed of those who are concerned with the preservation of Russian folklore and monuments. The second group brings together the worst kind of Russian chauvinists with a very pronounced anti-Semitic bent, who see in Gorbachev's policies some sort of Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. They have resurrected the notorious "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." In the spring

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of 1987, this group organized a march on the Kremlin in which a few hundred people participated, carrying posters proclaiming the need for the "Rebirth of Russia" and demanding an audience with Gorbachev. The unquestionable existence of opposition to Gorbachev does not, however, constitute a real present danger to his leading position. The struggle at the top concerns the extent of Gorbachev's power. It is also extremely unlikely that the history of Khrushchev's initial years in office will be repeated, with Gorbachev facing his own "anti-party" group with a majority in the Politburo, as Khrushchev did in June 1957.

Moreover, Gorbachev's personal power is steadily on the rise. One can discern, for example, his hand in events affecting Ligachev. His position traditionally carried with it the supervision of personnel policies (the *nomenklatura*) and of ideological matters. Yet without touching Ligachev's formal position, Gorbachev transferred personnel policy to his loyal Central Committee secretary, Georgii Razumovsky, and made Ligachev share the top ideological position with the man who is personally closest to Gorbachev, the Central Committee Secretary Alexander Yakovlev.

In June 1987, a plenary session of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee took place in Moscow. This meeting marks the end of the first act in the drama of domestic transformation initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. In almost every dimension of his domestic program and situation—political, economic, cultural, social, and psychological—it constitutes the beginning of a new phase of his reforms. In the mid-summer of 1987 the general secretary demonstrated his grasp on the levers of political power in the Kremlin.

Gorbachev's position within the leadership improved. The advancement of his right-hand man, Alexander Yakovlev; the Secretary of the Central Committee for Economic Affairs Nikolai Slyunkov; and the Secretary for Agriculture Viktor Nikonov to full membership in the Politburo has for all practical purposes ended the ability of his highplaced opponents to challenge his power position, or the speed of his reform activities, in this top decision-making body. It also underscored the dominance of the general secretary over the Central Party Secretariat, the executive arm of the Party. Yakovlev's promotion placed him on equal footing with Gorbachev's main competitor, Yegor Ligachev. His position is potentially as important in Gorbachev's regime as was that of Mikhail Suslov, the chief ideologue and *éminence grise* in Brezhnev's era. By now the Politburo contains only two holdovers from Brezhnev's days; close to two-thirds of its members and more than three-quarters of the members of the Party Secretariat were appointed by Gorbachev. This shift is especially remarkable when one considers that from July 1985 until the June 1987 Plenum, a full two years, Gorbachev was able to appoint to the Politburo only a single individual.

Another aspect of Gorbachev's consolidation of power concerns the military. His control over the Soviet Armed Forces has been visibly strengthened. The ludicrous affair of the 19-year-old West German Cessna pilot who landed harmlessly on Red Square provided the opportunity for a decisive shake-up of the High Command. The former commander of the Far Eastern Military District, General of

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the Army Dimitrii Yazov, who attracted Gorbachev's attention during his visit to Khabarovsk about a year earlier, was promoted in an unprecedented manner over forty marshals and senior Generals, appointed Minister of Defense, and coopted to candidate (non-voting) membership of the Politburo. His deputy for Political Affairs, the chief commissar of the armed forces is General A. D. Lizichev, an old friend of Gorbachev. Apparently almost two hundred generals of the rank of lieutenant general and below were retired or dismissed. At no other time since the Khrushchev era has the political clout of the armed forces, its visibility, prestige and credibility within the elite and the population, been as low as seems to be the case today.

A notable victory for Gorbachev was the resolution of the Plenum to convene in June 1988 the 19th All-Union Party Conference, a resolution that he was unable to achieve only six months earlier at the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee. The purpose of the conference was to evaluate the progress of managerial reform and "democratization," but most importantly, it will be empowered to make massive changes in the composition of the Central Committee. By announcing the convening of the Conference Gorbachev was, in effect, putting the second echelon of the Soviet elite on probation. He was warning them to shape up or face the consequences. While the June 1987 Plenum consolidated Gorbachev's power in the top hierarchy beyond challenge, the June 1988 conference was intended to reshape the Central Committee, which consists of more than 300 full members, depending on the needs of his power and his policies.

Yet, Gorbachev's power is, to a large extent, policy defined. That is to say, when one considers how much power he has, one should ask "power for what?" Gorbachev understands this very well and tried hard to build up a political machine that will not simply support his policies but be personally loyal to him. He has placed in high positions about a dozen individuals with whom he worked in Stavropol, or from the adjacent Krasnoyarsk and Northern Caucasus. One of them is the previously mentioned Central Committee Secretary Razumovsky, another is the head of the entire agro-industrial complex, Vsevolod Murakhovsky.

Finally, the question of opposition and Gorbachev's power must take into consideration an area about which information is scant: his institutional power base. It would appear that none of the traditional power bases of the top leader are as yet available to Gorbachev. The Party apparatus, the bedrock of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's power, is controlled in Moscow by the general secretary and his loyal followers. But many of the key figures of the Party apparatus outside Moscow, the secretaries of some republics, provinces, cities, and districts and their 200 thousand-strong army of subordinate, full-time Party functionaries, have developed neither bonds of personal loyalty to the general secretary, nor a deep commitment to his reforms.

The high level party *apparatchiki* constitute the largest bloc in the Central Committee and their support is absolutely vital to the general secretary. In normal circumstances the symbolic power and prestige of his office keeps them at bay; but in an unexpected crisis, their support may not be forthcoming. It must have been

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disconcerting to Gorbachev at the Party Congress in March 1986 that despite the turnover of the provincial secretaries, who are members of the Central Committee, about 40 percent failed to create a sufficiently loyal power base in this body. It is therefore not surprising that Gorbachev is systematically replacing the local Party secretaries, old and new alike, and selecting their successors with particular attention paid to their loyalty and policy orientation. The state administration and the economic bureaucracies, especially in the Moscow and republican ministries, can hardly be considered Gorbachev's power base. It is among them that the most vociferous dissatisfaction with his policies is being voiced.

The greatest riddle with respect to Gorbachev's power and his power base concerns the KGB. Rumors in Moscow suggest entirely contradictory situations. Some say that there are plans to split the KGB into two parts – one to deal with intelligence and one to deal with domestic secret police work. This would weaken the domestic secret police, whose authority and prestige largely derive from their association with tasks of foreign intelligence. According to other rumors, the head of the KGB, Politburo member Viktor Chebrikov, is committed to the general secretary and fully supports his policies.

Logic may not be the best guide in this case, but the KGB hierarchy and its chief would seem to have no particular reason to be Gorbachev's loyalist followers and helpers. The process of democratization and *glasnost'* is antithetical to the precepts of the KGB. The new stress on legality, the tolerance of some dissent, the freeing of political prisoners and other elements of the new course would appear not to be to the KGB's liking, not unlike some recent cases in which KGB officials have been accused of abuse of power. Chebrikov is not a Gorbachev appointee and no close past ties between the two men are known in the West. The past loyalties to Andropov of both Gorbachev and Chebrikov may have created a bond of mutual loyalty, and the fact that Gorbachev elevated a man respected in the KGB, Eduard Shevardnadze, to be foreign minister and his close associate in the Politburo, may have pleased the organization. But there is no evidence for either proposition known in the West. Still, at a time of major change, of a general loosening of the rules of social and political behavior, the KGB may be even more important than in the past. It may serve as the regime's last line of defense against a loss of control. In these circumstances a Gorbachev-Chebrikov alliance is fully consistent with Soviet-style political logic. My own guess is that Gorbachev has close ties with the Soviet intelligence community which deals with other countries, but is harsh and forbidding in his attitudes to the domestic secret police sector of the KGB.

The analysis of Gorbachev's power base leads to some curious conclusions. His position as general secretary now and in the near future is safe. A coup against him is most improbable. Yet aside from the central Party apparatus, it is extremely difficult to identify a structural power base for him. His most loyal allies are in the ranks of the creative intelligentsia. But the creative intelligentsia hardly constitute a power base in the Soviet Union. The symbolic value and prestige of his office are a key asset. But now, and probably in the near future, his greatest strength probably lies in skillful and convincing manipulation of public relations. His power

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and influence are personalized. He is an intelligent and clever statesman, an instinctive natural leader of a sort rarely found in the Soviet Union. His public persona is that of a celebrity, a TV performer whose dynamism and charisma attract growing popular sympathy, attention, and perhaps support. Gorbachev's nontraditional power base and sources of support could be sufficient if his new course proceeds smoothly. But if he does not expand his power base, he could be severely hurt by a crisis of the type that Krhushchev faced in Hungary in 1956, a major defeat abroad, or, most importantly, a serious domestic crisis growing out of the unintended consequences of his new course, like the massive student demonstrations in China.

The greatest obstacle to Gorbachev is not opposition, but resistance. Unlike opposition, resistance is neither organized nor open. Its practitioners are the intermediate-level administrators in the ministries in Moscow and the capitals of the Republics, the lower level Party and state officials, the managers of enterprises and the local Mafias, particularly in the non-Russian republics.

In resisting Gorbachev's orders, the ministerial administrators in Moscow and the high-ranking Party and state officials in the republics and provinces are defending their privileges and ways of life. As one government official put it, behind every one of the almost 200 economic targets that are transmitted to the enterprises by the planners, there stands an army of 30 thousand officials who will become superfluous if *their* target is abolished.

All of Gorbachev's economic reforms, even those that fall far short of fundamental change, require two contradictory conditions for their success. The intermediate-level officials must begin to implement the reform; but in the process of reform the intermediate level of administration must lose its importance, be reduced in size, and perhaps eventually disappear.

It is too much to ask of large armies of officials to participate voluntarily in their own elimination. So officials will fight rear-guard battles in the hope that, as before in Soviet history, these reforms too will pass. It is interesting to note that Gorbachev's wrath has recently been directed not only at state officials but also against Party functionaries. This would indicate that it will be difficult for the general secretary to overcome the resistance of the state and economic officials by using "assault teams" from the Party apparatus. The middle and lower level Party apparatus gained power and independence during Brezhnev's rule and particularly in the period of interregnum. It will require greater doses of control, increased pressure from Moscow, and certainly additional personnel changes to make these strata more supportive of Gorbachev's line.

Many in the West believe that Soviet managers and directors of enterprises and firms are supporters of economic reforms. In reality, the majority is probably among the most determined opponents. In general, Soviet managers have learned to live with the traditional Stalinist economic system and to take advantage of it. They are geared to the traditional way of doing business. They have a limited capacity to learn new skills and new patterns of work. They are afraid of the new environment that major reforms are supposed to create. They are afraid that they may

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be replaced by younger and more flexible people. Most of them are not eager to exchange what they have for the promise of larger monetary rewards and greater independence from the middle-level economic bureaucracy and the planners in Moscow. Nor do they like Gorbachev's proposals for electing heads of enterprises and for increasing the participation of workers in the administrative affairs of their enterprises. (The resistance of the managers seems uncharacteristic of the attitudes of the technical intelligentsia, who chafe at the condition of technological stagnation. These are the technocrats who support economic change.)

The best organized and fiercest resistance to Gorbachev's ideas and programs comes from the Soviet-style "Mafia families" who live in some Russian provinces, but particularly in the non-Russian republics. They are formed by all types of officials – party, state, economic, and police – who have long worked together and become accustomed to concealing one another's mistakes and crimes. The term "families" is apt, because these Mafias usually include people with family ties to key officials.

The most powerful Mafias seem to be located in the non-Russian republics. Their chieftains were among the main beneficiaries of the relaxed control from Moscow and the security in office that were characteristic of the Brezhnev years and the interregnum. These men became uncrowned kings, ruling their fiefdoms with an iron fist, corrupting officials and inspectors from Moscow, and keeping their doings well-camouflaged from their nominal superiors. Some of them were members of the Politburo or had close personal and sentimental relations with Brezhnev, and therefore could not be touched by any control organization.

The Party boss of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, was one notorious example; Vladimir Shcherbitsky of the Ukraine is another. For the last thirty years, Shcherbitsky occupied in sequence the three most important positions in the Ukraine – Republican Party Secretary for Personnel, Prime Minister, and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. For the last twenty years he has been a member of the Politburo in Moscow. It is difficult even to imagine the depth and the scope of the personal machine that Shcherbitsky was able to build up during three decades in the Ukraine. It is also difficult to imagine the extent of the difficulty that Gorbachev is facing in purging a political machine in a Republic that is bigger and more populous than France. It will not be enough merely to expel Shcherbitsky from all of his positions, although the majority of the Politburo will certainly agree to such a step. In light of Shcherbitsky's connections, friendships, and alliances, this will create considerable ill will against Gorbachev in the second most important part of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev must proceed cautiously. Shcherbitsky's dismissal must be preceded by, or coincide with, a thorough purge of high- and middle-level officials in the Ukraine. Even more difficult, their replacements must be found primarily in the Ukraine (where the pattern of selecting Russians for the key top positions, which is followed in the non-Russian republics, is unthinkable), among individuals who have sufficient experience for high office but who are not closely identified with Shcherbitsky and therefore promise to become loyal to Gorbachev and supporters of his policies. Gorbachev is clearly

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preparing for a showdown with Shcherbitsky and his machine. He has made frequent trips to the Ukraine and substantial personnel changes have taken place. In Moscow it is said that Shcherbitsky is for the moment still useful to Gorbachev because he plays a stabilizing role in the Ukraine, and tries to balance the nationalistic pressures evoked by *glasnost'* against the interests of the Russified Ukrainians.

Yet purges alone, however extensive, cannot eliminate resistance to Gorbachev's policies. New people must be found, with inclinations far different from those they have learned under the tutelage of the Old Guard. From top to bottom, new officials will have to adopt new ways of party, state, and economic work. This process of change will be a long and difficult one at best. Yet it is a process absolutely essential for breaking the resistance to Gorbachev's programs, for the success of his new course, and for economic policies that will probably be more radical in the future.

A major barrier to Gorbachev's policies is sociopolitical inertia. It is present everywhere in Soviet society. Its most important expressions are apathy, routinization, noninvolvement, and deep skepticism about anything new. It emerged from the many tribulations of Soviet history and the ever present distinction, even among officials, of "they" the authorities, and "we" the ruled. Inertia is a state of mind that puts personal security and safety, caution and private preoccupations ahead of social obligations, a sense of social responsibility, or aspirations for public recognition. It constitutes the main obstacle to Gorbachev's economic innovations and political and cultural reforms. They have not yet made a substantial dent in the widespread fear of commitment and involvement, in the passivity expressed in the phrase, "this too shall pass," and in the predominance of purely private preoccupations and concerns.

Research conducted by Soviet television's public opinion poll concluded that the new programming substantially increased viewer interest across all strata. But it succeeded only minimally in stimulating active participation in the new course. A Moscow University professor reports that about 20 percent of his class actively joins in discussions of the "new course," another 20 percent limits itself to asking questions, and the remaining 60 percent remains silent.

When Gorbachev took power he thought that he would be facing a brick wall of conservatism that his hammer blows would destroy. He has encountered instead a sponge of resistance and indifference that bounces back whenever it is hit. Inertia and indifference predominate even among the educated strata and the creative intelligentsia, from whom the most active and effective supporters of Gorbachev's policies have been recruited. Few editors and journalists and even fewer scholars use their writings to test the limits of what is possible under the new conditions.

For every editor such as Vitaly Korotych of the now-exciting mass weekly *Ogonek*, the courageous editor Yegor Yakovlev of the daily *Moscow News*, and the pioneering editor of the monthly *Novy Mir*, Sergei Zalygin, for every path-breaking sociologist and economist, such as Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan, there are hundreds and thousands of editors and journalists, social scientists, and economists

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who do only the required minimum to avoid being classified as opponents of the "new course." For every active supporter of Gorbachev's line there are hundreds of Party members who are indifferent to the new policies and pay only lip service to them. Many admire Gorbachev and follow his policies with great interest, but still do not trust him.

The most widespread emotion evoked by Gorbachev's "new course" is probably neither opposition nor resistance but simply confusion. There is a lack of coherent understanding of what he wants to achieve, combined with instinctive skepticism in the broadest strata of the population. The only way Gorbachev can successfully overcome the resistance to his program is to combine two components: first, an attack from above through an intensive use of the media, support from that part of the creative intelligentsia that is willing to commit itself to the struggle, and pressure from the Party and state officials who are loyal to Gorbachev; second, major, consistent and intensive efforts to mobilize commitment and support for Gorbachev's program from below. It is impossible to know whether this necessary combination of pressures from above and from below can be created on a large scale in the new future. But it appears clear that a major crisis may make such a combination necessary for Gorbachev's survival. Even without such a crisis, the implementation of his program will depend on his ability to reduce inertia and mobilize active mass support.

The task is complicated by the fact that the Soviet people of all strata, but particularly the urban working class and the peasantry, do not trust or believe their leaders on any level in domestic affairs, and particularly where grandiose plans for improvement are concerned. Popular trust in the Soviet leaders' foreign and international security policy is a different matter.

Throughout Soviet history, the government has repeatedly lied to the people about the conditions in which they live and the prospects for change. The lack of trust in the political leadership has been passed from generation to generation. It affects the Communist Party itself (almost 8 percent of the population), which has evolved from an authentic political movement, an association of idealistic believers in an exalted and common cause, into a loose organization in which opportunists and careerists hold court, well versed in the Soviet doubletalk. Moreover, the minority who remain idealistic is primarily composed of dogmatists and fanatics whose views are rooted in the Stalinist past.

The alienation of the Soviet people, and the mind-set of the bureaucrats who run their lives, are part of the moral crisis of the Soviet people. The Russian writer and journalist Volkov speaks of a "moral degradation" of the society, brought about by the fact that open discussion of problems has long been forbidden. Another writer, Kunitsyn, in an interview on Moscow Radio unprecedented for its harsh openness, asserts that almost everybody in the Soviet Union has fallen victim to "a loss of honesty . . . and any real concern for other people." For Gorbachev the most painful expression of this alienation and decay, and his most immediate concern, is the far-reaching erosion of the work ethic. It may take quite some time before even real material incentives will take hold of the working class. As far

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as the peasantry is concerned, it ceased to exist as a class, and probably even the implementation of wide-spread market reforms would evoke a response infinitely weaker than that of the Chinese peasantry.

Gorbachev's new course will require perseverance, continuity, and honesty to reverse the process of alienation. It will require much greater *glasnost'*. The criticism of the reality of Soviet life under Gorbachev has clearly gone further than under Khrushchev. But it has a crucial shortcoming: by and large *glasnost'* does not explain, and most often does not even attempt to explain, *why* Soviet society has reached a stage of such deep crisis. It raises the question whether Gorbachev himself has the insight, to say nothing of the power and the necessary time, to address these basic questions.

The bureaucratic resistance to the implementation of Gorbachev's program is closely connected to two other trends within the bureaucracy: the chronic distortion of information and widespread corruption. The gross falsification of reports has already been noted. Its scope is not, however, fully understood, nor its destructive consequences adequately appreciated in the West. The fact is that in the Soviet Union nobody tells the truth to one's superiors. The entire bureaucracy, from the lowest clerk to the highest government minister, regardless of the area of responsibility, is engaged in unending deception.

Corruption has long been considered characteristic of the Soviet Union. Its scale and range are unknown in any capitalist industrial society. It is not confined to the occasional bribe, or even the regular and customary *baksheesh*. It is rather an entire "culture of corruption," a way of life. The Soviet writer Kunitsyn complained in a radio interview in Moscow that moral decay has penetrated a sphere in which honesty had flourished for centuries—that of medicine. Kunitsyn said that "in recent years such an atmosphere has been created in some medical organizations . . . that sick people have simply begun to feel that they are doomed if they do not give bribes not only to doctors, especially surgeons, but also to nurses." He ended with a grotesque description of the state of Soviet medicine: only a person who pays a bribe will be permitted to live.

The enormity of the theft that goes on in the Soviet Union every day involving both the lowest worker and the government minister has assumed such proportions that it significantly skews the official figures on the distribution of the national income. There are heated discussions in the Soviet Union among specialists about what proportion of the GNP is simply stolen; a conservative figure is 15 percent. To cover corruption honest people are sent to jail and authority is abused.

There are numerous reasons for Gorbachev to fight this corruption. The income from theft of state property is a disincentive to hard work. The corruption of officials is one of the root causes of the alienation of the people from their government. Corruption corrodes the spirit of discipline, the work ethic, and the devotion to duty that are central in Gorbachev's plans of renewal. The effectiveness of Gorbachev's battle against corruption will be a test of his promise to have an honest and truthful government and to bring justice to society. How can he win this battle? Harsher punishment will certainly help, as will closer control over

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the coercive apparatus itself. Will it not be, however, a situation in which the little fish are caught and the big fish are permitted to continue to swim? Here again, *glasnost'*, grassroots democratization, and other elements of the new course are expected to carry the burden of the struggle. On what basis should one conclude that this burden, on top of other burdens, will not be too heavy?

Finally, another obstacle to Gorbachev's success concerns the near-term prospects for his regime. Before the June 1987 Plenum some officials said that a mistake had been made in the last half year when too much effort and attention had been centered on democratization and the *glasnost'* process and not enough *directly* on economic matters. This view seems justified. Before the Plenum, a gap was beginning to open between the increasingly unorthodox (for Soviet conditions) activities in the sociopolitical and cultural "superstructure," and the visibly slow economic progress and the modesty of edicts proclaiming the transformation of the economic "base." Democratization and *glasnost'* were, in the design of the leaders, to serve as the battering ram against bureaucratic resistance to Gorbachev's economic reforms and social inertia and apathy. But without visible economic improvements, their very existence was endangered. The key reason for the Party leadership to support them would disappear. The opposition to their continuation by the Party traditionalists would have gained momentum. A country with Russian and Soviet traditions, in the absence of dynamic economic thinking and the hope of better economic conditions, has no place for the "luxury" of democratization. Democratization can occur only if it goes hand in hand with economic development and not as its substitute. In fact, the continuation of harsh economic conditions without the prospect of their radical change calls for steps in the political arena that are the precise opposite of democratization. The June Plenum, in its reforming economic thinking and hope of economic improvements, closed the gap between the economic "base" and the political and cultural "superstructure." The instrumental role of democratization and *glasnost'* in the service of economic modernization has been again established.

Yet, another domestic gap is now in the process of developing in the Soviet Union: a gap between what Gorbachev preaches and what he can deliver in the short run. The Soviet population and, most importantly, the working class in the large metropolitan areas has yet to see a single improvement in its situation. Their hopes have been raised. Their sense of injustice (because of their treatment by the bureaucracy) is now stronger than their sense of deprivation (the lack of consumer goods). Their rising expectations on both counts, however, focus on the short term, and their anger will rise if Gorbachev cannot deliver on his promises.

The deliberations of the June 1987 Plenum attest to Gorbachev's understanding that he must deliver, and deliver fast, if he wants his reform program to take hold. The reason for the pressure on Gorbachev's plans is as important from the economic point of view as they are from the political. If, in the next two to three years, he is not able to provide real material incentives to the working force and the managerial strata—that is, more money to buy more consumer goods—his entire reform program may fail.

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The Plenum centered on the restructuring of the managerial and planning systems—a long-range task that has only begun. Gorbachev made it amply clear, however, that some immediate economic tasks are pressing and must be accomplished at the same time that the reform is taking place. The priorities that he emphasized were: major increases in agricultural production and in the marketing of produce, an improvement in services with special attention to health care, the acceleration of housing construction, greater emphasis on industrial consumer goods. Gorbachev is a man in a hurry who wants to inculcate his subordinates with the same sense of urgency that he feels. Yet, every major reorganization is bound to produce disorganization. Restructuring the planning and management system and immediate increases in consumer goods production may, in the short run, be incompatible goals.

The Soviet economic model is, of course, the prime obstacle to reform: it discourages innovation, initiative, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking; it does not stimulate technical progress; it emphasizes quantity over quality. Gorbachev's edicts on improving productivity and the quality of products, on bringing scientific-technological institutes closer to the production units, and on a strict accounting of costs can have only a marginal effect. For the director, the engineer, the foreman, and the worker to change their long-established behavior, they will have to be satisfied with the answer to the question, "What's in it for me?" Moreover, they will have to believe that the changes will endure. As yet they do not have a satisfactory answer to the question and are skeptical about the durability of Gorbachev's initiatives.

The Soviet economy lacks a key incentive for modernization—competition. Soviet industry exists in a seller's market. The new Soviet leaders recognize this. It is not clear, however, what they are planning to do about it, and how they can find a functional equivalent of competition. In the Hungarian economic model, a strong element of competition was introduced by extensive participation in the world market. This is scarcely possible for the Soviet Union.

It is not yet proven that Gorbachev is a convinced *radical* "marketizer." In a meeting in the spring of 1987 with a Yugoslav delegation, according to Yugoslav sources, Gorbachev is said to have castigated the Yugoslav system and questioned its socialist character. The potential for liberalization in the Soviet economy within its present parameters is great. But its ceiling without structural marketing reform is not as high and flexible as Gorbachev evidently believes.

Not the least of the obstacles to Gorbachev's program is the multinational character of the Soviet state. Gorbachev's policy toward the non-Russian republics contains two elements that illustrate the complexity of the issues involved. The first is to root out the tightly knit Mafias of party-state officials who ruled their republics as fiefdoms during the Brezhnev period and the interregnum.

The second element of Gorbachev's policy toward the non-Russian republics is a measure of *glasnost'* and democratization: open discussions of nationality relations in the Soviet Union will occur. There may be greater cultural autonomy for the intelligentsia and the populations of those republics and perhaps even a

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somewhat greater toleration of their religions. It is probably clear to the Soviet leaders that transplanting *glasnost'* and democratization to the non-Russian republics carries with it a greater danger of producing unintended negative consequences than in Russia itself. The cohesive glue of Russian patriotism is missing in these republics. It is quite probable that the "new course" will reinforce native nationalism, centrifugal tendencies, and demands for much greater autonomy.

Recent examples are the riots in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, when its leader, D. A. Kunayev, was replaced by a Russian, Gennadi Kolbin; the Tatar demonstration in Moscow to press for a return to their Crimean homeland, from which Stalin had evicted them; the far from frivolous dispute in the Ukraine about whether menus in restaurants should be printed in Ukrainian or Russian; and a letter from thirty-eight Byelorussian intellectuals to the general secretary asking for radical changes in the teaching and use of the Byelorussian language in the Republic in place of Russian.

Many Western and Soviet analysts see the rise of national friction and discord in the Soviet Union as a major danger to Moscow. They may be right. The anti-Russian demonstrations in Alma-Ata may have been a taste of things to come. National disintegration is not, however, imminent; nor will Russian authorities be unable to deal with the unrest. Of key importance here is the course of events in the Ukraine. The Ukraine is treated by Moscow less as an imperial province than as a junior partner in ruling the Soviet Union. As long as the bond of the Slavic nations of the Soviet Union is not drastically weakened, the national aspirations and even unrest among the non-Slavic elites and peoples can be contained.

Yet there is another aspect of the ethnic national question in the Soviet Union that may have an even greater impact on the fate of Gorbachev's reforms. The very fact of the multinational nature of the Soviet Union will affect the scope and depth of any plans by Gorbachev to institute structural reforms. Such potential reforms, and even some that are already underway, would inevitably involve a devolution of power and greater local autonomy. Knowing well the potential dangers that this would create, the new leadership may be unwilling to go far in such reforms in the Soviet Union as a whole. The multiethnicity would act as a powerful brake on any reforms desired or contemplated by Gorbachev. How the general secretary proposes to reconcile greater freedom, more *glasnost'*, more autonomy, while striving at the same time for greater cohesion of the multinational state is not at all clear.

From the inception of the Soviet Union, its domestic development was closely related to its international conduct. It is therefore not surprising that a number of obstacles to the implementation of Gorbachev's program are international in nature. The most obvious are the costs of the Soviet role as a global power "equal" to the United States and the burden of an arms race that, despite some progress in arms control negotiations, does not yet show signs of abating. The most important international obstacle is the Soviet East European empire and the likely impact of Gorbachev's domestic reforms on the socialist satellites.

The new leader is committed to the preservation of Soviet domination in its

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empire. This is not only for the sake of Soviet security but also, and primarily, in the interest of the leader's and his party's legitimacy within the Soviet Union itself. Gorbachev's East European policy is still not fully formulated, and contains much of the improvisation so typical of him.

These policies may be characterized as centrist. When he took power Gorbachev moved swiftly to reestablish Moscow's control over the East European Communist elites, which was weakened in the last years of Brezhnev and during the interregnum. At present his policy has three major components: to preserve sociopolitical stability in these countries; to assure the closeness of the empire to its metropolitan power; and to extract a greater contribution from Eastern Europe to the modernization of Russia itself.

Gorbachev is personally neither for nor against sociopolitical and economic reforms in Eastern Europe. He will speak in Rumania about the need for more democracy under this most oppressive European regime. To the Hungarians he will speak about the need for greater discipline. To the East Germans he will press for a greater contribution to the common cause and warn about the necessary limitations of their flirtation with West Germany. In the approaching succession of the top leaders of virtually all of the East European countries, he probably wanted the conservative Czechoslovak leader, Gustav Husak, to be replaced by someone more liberal, and the liberal, Janos Kadar of Hungary by someone more conservative. Husak was replaced by Milos Jakes in December 1987. In May 1988, Kadar was replaced by Karoly Grosz.

By all accounts Gorbachev's favorite East European leader is General Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland. Obviously, this cannot be because of the modernizing programs or initiatives in Poland. The country is economically stagnant and lacks a realistic plan for economic reform. But Jaruzelski saved the Russians from the terrible political and economic costs of invasion. A Polish nationalist, he showed himself in Gorbachev's eyes to be committed to a close relationship with his Russian "elder brother." He restored political stability. Yet his kind of stability is not that of Nicolae Ceausescu and Husak. It goes hand in hand with what are enormous private freedoms by Communist standards.

However flexible Gorbachev's policies toward Eastern Europe may be, potential developments there could threaten his reform program within the Soviet Union. There are two reasons for deeming this threat to be serious: incongruities in Gorbachev's policies toward the East European countries and the probable effect on these countries of the course of reform in the Soviet Union.

The East European governments do not have the legitimacy of traditional, democratic, or authentically revolutionary regimes. Their legitimacy and stability is shallow and critically depends on the economic performance of their regimes and, of course, on coercion and the threat of it from the Soviet Union. Their economies are faring badly. The primary goal of Gorbachev's policy towards these countries, sociopolitical stability, requires an improvement in their economic performance. This, in turn, requires closer economic ties with capitalist countries. Such ties are far more difficult to establish today than in the 1970s because of higher

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unemployment, stiffer competition, tighter credit in the West, and growing protectionism in the global economy. Closer political relations are often the condition for better economic ties. The second and third goal of Gorbachev's East European policy—greater cohesion of the empire and a more significant European contribution to Russia's modernization—are at odds with his first goal of stability.

Equally as important is the potential impact of events within the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe. The potential risks and dangers of Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union pale in comparison to their potential consequences in Eastern Europe. There is simply no way to prevent the Soviet example from encouraging the democratic and nationalistic aspirations of the elite, the liberal intelligentsia, and the dissatisfied workers in Eastern Europe, aspirations that cannot but take an anti-Soviet course. This potential danger is well understood in Moscow. It may affect the fate of Gorbachev's domestic reforms in two ways.

First, the recognition of the danger by the Soviet leadership may restrain the changes that are planned. Quite a strange situation has developed, in which the conservative regimes in Eastern Europe, primarily Czechoslovakia and East Germany (as well as Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba), are unhappy about Gorbachev's reforms, particularly in the political and cultural areas. A recent East European joke illustrates their concern. It refers to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which the Soviet Union invoked in 1968 to justify its invasion of Czechoslovakia to keep it Communist. The current joke has the East German and Czech armies preparing to invade the Soviet Union in defense of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Second, the spark in Moscow may create a fire in Eastern Europe that will create the necessity as the Soviets see it for an internal invasion like the one in Poland in 1981, or a direct Soviet military intervention, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is at least possible that Alexander Dubcek's course in 1968 would be acceptable to Gorbachev; but Poland of 1980–1981 and Hungary of 1956 certainly would not be. It is well to remember that reforms in the post-Khrushchevian Soviet Union were for all practical purposes cut off by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

It is unfortunate for Soviet reforms that *all* socialist countries that have chosen to move away from the traditional Stalinist model are in deep economic as well as political trouble. Yugoslavia is now economically in the worst situation of its postwar history. Politically, it is a country torn by deep, sometimes violent, strife. It faces a long period of economic austerity and social ethnic unrest.

Hungary, the major success story of the Soviet East European empire, is also in serious trouble. Two elements of the Hungarian crisis are worth emphasizing. First, the Hungarian model of market socialism has reached the limit of its effectiveness. To sustain a healthy economy the Hungarian leadership must cross the border between state-regulated economic policies and true freedom for market forces. This will require the recognition of the legitimacy of unemployment and of failure (i.e., bankruptcy) of many of its economic units. Such measures will not be easy. Second, at the center of the Hungarian model of socialism has been the country's close relation to and dependence on the capitalist world trade and credit

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market. Neither is particularly healthy at present. A declining capacity to sell its goods to the West and past credit commitments have left Hungary in deep economic difficulty.

In his struggle for radical reform, Gorbachev must therefore face the failures and difficulties of reform in other socialist countries. This cannot but help those who urge caution in the Soviet Union. Of course, the radical reformers can point to what Hungary has achieved in the past two decades and to the success of China's agriculture. But the troubles of socialist reform elsewhere certainly serve as persuasive arguments in the internal Party disputes and struggles in the Soviet Union.

Forces that Favor Gorbachev's Success

Seventy years after the Bolshevik revolution, which signalled the start of an enormous effort to achieve equality at any price with its capitalist enemies, the Soviet Union is again at the starting gate of another attempt at modernization. The Soviet Union's survival from foreign enemies is no longer at stake. What is at stake is the country's ability to achieve long-lasting domestic stability, to secure its imperial domain, and to attain a level of international power and influence commensurate with the aspirations of its leadership and political elite.

The Soviet Union today possesses many of the prerequisites of another successful modernization process. What it lacks, and what calls into question the success of its latest efforts at catching up with modern countries, are systemic social, economic, political, and cultural prerequisites of modernity as they are understood when the end of our millennium approaches.

It is probably futile for the Soviet Union to attempt to become another United States, Japan, or West Germany. But it does not have to remain backward. Many of the factors that prevent the country's modernization were created by purposeful human action or are the unintended consequences of such actions. They are man-made and can be un-made. The progress that the Soviet Union makes will depend on will and faith, trust and cynicism, divisiveness and justice, self-interest and compassion, routine and innovation, and above all else, the element in human activity with the greatest potential for both creativity and destructiveness—leadership.

Gorbachev's progress in his quest for modernization can be attained only if many of the dominant, insidious, and dark sides of the system over which he presides can be overcome. The foregoing review of his progress has not led to an optimistic conclusion. Yet the strength of a creative and goal-centered leadership rests exactly on its belief in success against all odds. What are the most significant forces in Gorbachev's favor? What are his chances of igniting the spark that will lift his nation to a new level? What are the chances that the human factor will once again give the lie to "objective" odds?

Our discussion of the obstacles to Gorbachev's plans for reform of necessity also pointed out the major elements of his relative strength. Not much more can be said about the general secretary's assets. The most important of them are the actual and potential powers and authority of his office. If he plays his cards right,

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and is both cautious and determined, what happened to past general (or first) secretaries will happen to him. His power, up to a point, will increase.

Gorbachev's mettle as a strategist has yet to be tested. His tactical skill in political infighting, however, is now clear beyond question. His power is increasing visibly, but so is the resistance to the implementation of his plans. In the top echelons of the leadership the power of his opponents is declining. The power reserves of his office are far from being depleted, and after the Party Conference in June 1988 his personal position within the top leadership and in the Central Committee probably became even more secure than it was six months earlier.

The tangible and symbolic assets of the position of general secretary are considerable, especially when the post is occupied by a dynamic and tactically skillful personality. The Soviet Party and State still remain highly centralized and the circular flow of power still provides major reserves of stability for the top leader. He can hire and fire, he can induce required behavior by a combination of carrots and sticks. He can build, as Gorbachev is building, in the higher echelons of the elite a political machine that is loyal to him personally and has acquired an ever-increasing stake in the success of his endeavors.

The Central Committee of the Party (over 300 full members) has in the past simply reflected the balance of power in the Politburo and in the Secretariat. Gorbachev may not yet have an automatic majority in the Central Committee, but it is immensely difficult, however, for his opponents to control a Plenary meeting of the Central Committee, establish its agenda, and manipulate its membership while they are a clear minority in the Politburo, and an insignificant part of the Central Committee Secretariat. In the era of *glasnost'* and democratization it is possible that the Central Committee will become more important. As of now, however, democratization has not yet reached the top decision-making, executive, and symbolic institutions of the Party and the State.

The office of the general secretary has also traditionally had immense symbolic power. The general secretary is statutorily elected by the Congress of the Party, not by his colleagues in the Politburo and Secretariat or even the Party's Central Committee. He alone speaks *for* the Party. He is the incarnation of the Party's power and of its infallibility. In an ironic way, the traditionalism of Gorbachev's opponents makes it clear, however, that the general secretary is not engaged in "experiments" but rather in the early stages of comprehensive reform. In the economic area, every element of the Stalinist model is being called into question. There is almost no sphere of public life in the Soviet Union that is not a target of reform. The political danger to a Soviet leader who initiates such comprehensive changes is much greater than the instituted "experimentation" and incremental reforms. But the chances that the reforms will succeed are also significantly higher.

All the elements mentioned above that favor Gorbachev's program are important. But the most important factors in his favor are psychological. There is a feeling in the Soviet Union that there exists no alternative to Gorbachev. In part this feeling refers to Gorbachev as a person and a leader. In part it refers to his program and

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the direction in which it is moving. The program may be imperfect, but it is the only one available. The alternatives of tyranny, stagnation, social miasma, and hopelessness are worse. The question, "Are you for or against Gorbachev?" requires the answer, "Compared with what?" In this respect the mood of the country supports change. Most of the people who do not actively support Gorbachev do not trust him yet, and are skeptical that he will bring about change. Stalinism and Brezhnevism have few supporters.

The active public may not constitute the majority of Soviet society. Yet it is the active minorities that are always harbingers of change and a decisive force in effecting it. However, until such reforms are tested and recognized as effective, the determination necessary for bold action will be lacking. Past Soviet experience tells us that the response to this contradiction tends to be largely self-defeating. From the range of possible reforms, the leaders usually select a compromise that will cause the least disturbance and require the least cost and effort. They usually introduce it as a limited experiment, virtually ensuring that the results will be far from conclusive and often disappointing. This outcome in turn fuels the arguments of the reform's opponents, who block its further implementation. The leadership soon reverts to the traditional way of doing business, tinkering with the system and thereby allowing it to absorb and nullify the well-intentioned, piecemeal reforms. This pattern explains the inherent stability of the traditional economic system and the failure of recurrent attempts at reform.

A variation of this pattern, the "hothouse phenomenon," constitutes yet another instance of counterproductive experimentation. In this variation, the leadership initiates reform on a carefully restricted scale under conditions that have been selected to encourage success. When the leadership attempts to expand the reform to different geographic areas or to other economic units, however, these conditions simply cannot be duplicated.

At the beginning of Gorbachev's rule it looked as if the incremental pattern of reforms would be repeated. By now it is working in his *favor*, just as it worked for Stalin in the late 1920s. The traditional view is that one does not fight against the Party, and Gorbachev *is* the Party. These factors work, of course, only up to a point, but they work in Gorbachev's favor. Moreover, the mood of the Party elite and activists in the last years of Brezhnev's rule and during the ensuing interregnum was increasingly one of embarrassment, impatience, and a desire for greater dynamism and openness to change at the top. (This was initially true of Stalin and Khrushchev as well, but not true of Brezhnev, whose leadership responded to the widespread desire for stability and retrenchment.)

Many of the people and groups who supported Gorbachev's coming to power oppose his policies today. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the general belief in the need for change has suddenly disappeared. Ironically, *glasnost'* makes the opposition to change more apparent today than at any time since Khrushchev's ouster. Yet the widespread desire for change persists. Other than the ideologues who condemn Gorbachev and his entire program, most people dislike one or an-

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other aspect of it. They do not necessarily overlap or reinforce each other, and the restrictive conditions of the Soviet system make it difficult for them to form an alliance.

Moreover, the investment that the party's *aktiv* has in Gorbachev is increasing the longer he stays in power. In this respect his status in the international arena influences his domestic status. The disarmament causes with which he closely identified himself are popular in Russia. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's symbolic recognition of Gorbachev as an historical figure strengthened his position in the Soviet Union. Similarly, his meetings with President Ronald Reagan have had the same effect.

Gorbachev's *social* power base may be broader than his base in the bureaucracy. Those to whom his program offers most, and most immediately, is the Soviet middle class. While this class is educated, it is not powerful. It lives better than the workers, but not dramatically so; and its aspirations are greater than those of the working class. As much has been suggested by the sociologist Tatiana Zaslavskaya, of the Academy of Social Sciences at Novosibirsk, who is closely identified with Gorbachev, when she wrote this year "the most qualified (*i.e.* professional) part of the population, which carries the burden of the movement of the society as a whole, is precisely the one that will come out ahead in the present situation." As of now, this stratum may not want to risk total support of Gorbachev's program. But the longer he stays in power the more active and supportive they will be.

Major reforms in Communist countries display two basic patterns—the incremental and the comprehensive. The Soviet Union and Poland in the 1960s were examples of the first; Hungary and the People's Republic of China are examples of the second. The incremental pattern is characterized by experimentation. Experiments are the enemies of major reforms. Far-reaching reforms must be carried out without hesitation. This is especially so within the generation that will decide the political fate of Gorbachev—his own generation. Most of them entered politics during Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign with great hopes of renewal and then saw their hopes dashed. They are now being given a second lease on life. Their mood, their determination, are a major factor in Gorbachev's progress.

Another emotion that is widely represented in the politically active circles in Moscow has an apocalyptic element to it. "This is our last chance," many say. For some, the "last chance" is an expression of patriotic feeling, of the need to make Russia great. For others it is of a last chance to break the dominant pattern of Russian and Soviet history. For still others, it involves the conviction that the Soviet people have suffered too much and too long for the sake of the "glorious future" that never came, and that they are presented with the "last chance" to live better during their own lifetimes.

The apocalyptic element is almost always present in the "this is our last chance" feeling. Not for the first time in Russian history, a large part of the intelligentsia—and this time joined by a part of the political elite—is filled with apocalyptic feelings and visions. They believe that, in the next decade and a half, the choice will not be between radical change supervised by the leadership and reform segments of

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the Party, on the one hand, and bureaucratic inertia, conservatism, in a word, Brezhnevism, on the other. For them, the most likely alternative to reforms is a new tyranny.

Yet another sentiment was best expressed to me by a middle-ranking member of the Soviet elite. When presented with the irrefutable evidence of the dramatic obstacles to radical change in his country he responded, "This may all be true, but psychologically I cannot even consider the possibility that Gorbachev will fail, will be defeated." The intensity of commitment to Gorbachev's plans of the relatively small band of his supporters may ultimately carry a greater weight than the majority, which is simply apathetic, skeptical, and uncommitted.

Similarly, another supporter of Gorbachev, when urged to face the probability of upheaval in Eastern Europe, angrily retorted, "Eastern Europe has already once in the past, in 1968, (in Czechoslovakia) cut off the possibilities of reform in our country. This time we will not let the East Europeans dictate whether we have or do not have a chance to modernize Russia. We will defend, if needed, our security interests, but they will not stop our efforts." It was useless to try to convince this Party intellectual that Soviet policies in Eastern Europe should be dramatically changed, if only because they may derail the reform movement in the Soviet Union itself.

There can be little doubt that for the leadership, segments of the Party, and the educated class, the greatest source of commitment and determination for change is patriotism—or, if one prefers, Russian nationalism. It is by now a cliché that the Soviets are insecure and that their relations with the West are influenced by this insecurity. But the strongest feeling one now encounters in the Soviet Union is shame; shame at the country's backwardness, at the brutality of Soviet life, at the lack of beauty, at the militaristic order at a time of worldwide revolution of democratic participation, at the drunkenness and social pathology that is everywhere. This feeling is encountered not only among the elite and the intelligentsia, but also among ordinary people. Sometimes in discussions with Westerners the shame is camouflaged by artificial arrogance or bitter humor, but it is nonetheless an angry, deep, and uncompromising shame, and a quest for respectability by the standards of civilized countries.

It is a shame that is most fully expressed in typically Russian heart-to-heart talks with friends that last long into the night. Such a deep, almost desperate shame is a powerful weapon in Gorbachev's arsenal. It provides a major psychological basis for his efforts.

Revolutions or sweeping reforms very often succeed when they fail, and very often fail when they succeed. The Russian Revolution of 1917 succeeded beyond the wildest imagination of its most ardent supporters. Yet it failed in the sense that it abandoned a major part of the Bolshevik program, for which the revolution was made and the Civil War was won. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 clearly failed. Yet some of the beliefs for which Hungarians risked their lives came into being in the next three decades.

Whether Gorbachev's reforms succeed or fail, their ultimate outcomes will al-

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most certainly be different from what Gorbachev expects and Western observers of the Soviet Union predict. He may succeed in modernization but not radically transform the Soviet political system. He may fail in ambitious goals and indicators of modernization but may still bring enormous and lasting changes to the Soviet sociopolitical system. This is because two variables intervene between the goals and the outcomes of reforms and revolutions. The first is the relative autonomy and importance of the "process" as opposed to the "product." The second concerns the unavoidability of unintended consequences of actions directed toward specific reform goals.

In Gorbachev's revolution the "process" is the social democratization, political liberalization, and economic decentralization. The "goal" is modernity. The process may well make possible major improvements in the Soviet Union. It is at the same time unlikely that changes in the Soviet Union's *relative* level of modernization compared with the West will be significant by the twenty-first century. It is entirely reasonable to expect that the changes in process, if they continue for more than a decade, will become *normative* rather than mainly *instrumental.* The Soviet political, economic, and cultural elites may elevate political necessity to a self-evident truth. It is also plausible, however, that the concentrated effect of the utilization of the Soviet Union's enormous objective reserves of growth and qualitative improvements, which have been so underutilized by past regimes, will create a positive, if not long-lasting, result sooner than expected and "freeze" the Soviet process at an earlier point than one would predict, based on the present speed of Gorbachev's reforms.

Brezhnev's conservative rule, and its prolongation beyond the patience of the political class by Chernenko's year in office, contributed decisively to an unintended consequence, the radicalism of the reforms proposed by Gorbachev. The development of *glasnost'* led to the unintended consequence of a reactionary backlash symbolized by the "Memory" group. In discussing the plausible outcomes of Gorbachev's "reconstruction that will lead to revolutionary transformation," what are the likely unintended consequences? Two are worth considering.

First, if Gorbachev does not succeed in injecting dynamism into the Soviet economy within a reasonable period of time, he may be ousted and his regime replaced. Depending on the domestic and international circumstances, which are impossible to predict, a successor regime could represent one of three orientations: it could be more radical in its program for change in the Soviet Union, it could return to the Brezhnevian equilibrium and settle for a slow decay and declining international position, or it could revert to a modernized version of strict authoritarianism, or even some form of despotism. The first outcome is most likely at a relatively early stage of Gorbachev's reform, in perhaps five to six years; the second is most likely when the Gorbachev regime becomes tired—in eight to ten years; the third is most likely to evolve if an international catalyst of major proportions is introduced, such as major revolts in Eastern Europe. The third outcome, a strict authoritarianism with elements of despotism, is the most likely consequence of Gorbachev's visible failure.

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A second unintended consequence of Gorbachev's program of reforms concerns the Soviet Union's international goals and position. The major source of Gorbachev's determination to make his country modern is his own, and the political elite's, growing recognition that Soviet and Russian international aspirations to greatness will rest on an inadequate foundation without modernization. Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism are the sources of the domestic creative turmoil that is gripping the country. As Gorbachev said in his first major speech in the fall of 1984 before he took power, "What is at stake today is the ability of the Soviet Union to enter the new millennium in a manner worthy of a great prosperous power. . . . Without the hard work and complete dedication of each and every one it is not even possible to preserve what has been achieved."

The most probable outcome of Gorbachev's efforts is, as noted, major domestic improvements and the elimination of a widening East-West technological gap (although not of the gap itself). Were such an outcome to occur by the turn of the century, it could affect Soviet international aspirations in one of two ways. The more likely would be a more active but less military Soviet Union. The less likely, but quite plausible, would be an eventual displacement or reduction of the international goals and aspirations, the international rationale, of Gorbachev's revolution.

What factors argue for the plausiblility of the second outcome? First, the Soviets have achieved strategic parity with the United States and there is nothing on the horizon that can change this. Never in their history have the Russians been as secure from external danger as they are now and will remain in the foreseeable future. The dangers to the Soviet regime are internal and imperial. With domestic progress, the Soviet insecurity that contributed so significantly to the arms race since the achievement of parity may diminish. The arms race was not, of course, the primary cause of the Soviet-American or East-West conflict, but it contributed significantly to the virulence of the conflict. A Soviet Union that understands that it is extremely secure may be less hostile to the West. The intermediate-range effects of Gorbachev's program of "reconstruction" may also partly redirect Soviet ambitions and aspirations from the international to the domestic arena. At the present such redirection is to a large extent strategic and tactical, but it may become permanent. The Soviet Union may become more a traditional great power than it had been, preoccupied internationally with the factors *directly* influencing its domestic security, and with its status rather than its power in the global arena. Such an outcome is plausible if Gorbachev is only partly successful in his modernization program. If this happens, however, the Gorbachev enterprise, which has begun to enhance Soviet foreign policy resources, may end, as a result of the unintended consequences of his reforms, with a Soviet Union that is much less belligerent and ambitious in the international arena.

After the revolution and civil war in Russia, Lenin defined his vision of the future in a now-famous phrase, "Socialism equals electrification plus Soviet power." Gorbachev has not yet given us his definition of what combination of technological level of development and political, social, and cultural characteristics is so-

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cialism. It is clear that "electrification," the symbol of the First Industrial Revolution, will not suffice on the technological side of the equation. But it is also becoming clear that "Soviet power" will not suffice in the political, economic, social, and cultural field, if it is represented by the Stalinist or Brezhnevian model.

The countries where Communist Parties rule have, with some exceptions, notably Cuba and Rumania, begun to move away from the traditional Soviet model. While in the 1950s and 1960s, the discussion within the Communist world examined the "different roads *to* socialism," today the focus is on "different roads *from* socialism."

Russia was a latecomer to the process of modernization. The Soviet Union has continued in this position throughout its history. From almost the beginning of the Russian revolutionary regime, its leadership borrowed on a vast scale, consciously, not only technology, but also methods of organization and technological culture from capitalist countries. Stalin's Soviet system fused the capitalism of the sweat shop with Oriental despotism. Gorbachev's vision of the new Soviet system is likely to be a combination of modern capitalism with enlightened authoritarianism.

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Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE

After so turbulent a decade in American politics as the 1960s, the 1970s were something of a letdown. But popular turbulence often has institutional repercussions, and these were surely felt in the 1970s. Public support of and affection for its political institutions had been on a downward trajectory for some time, reaching its nadir during this period. This disaffection spawned in presidential politics a number of serious anti-Washington, anti-status quo candidacies, three of which resulted in the capture of a major party nomination (George McGovern, 1972; Jimmy Carter, 1976; Ronald Reagan, 1980) and one only barely missed (Reagan, 1976). Of course, it also produced two presidents and, into the 1980s, a further proliferation of unconventional candidacies.[1]

The United States Congress was hardly immune to these larger social forces. As Leroy N. Rieselbach describes in considerable detail, reform fever struck the House and (to a lesser extent) the Senate beginning with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.[2] By the time Carter was inaugurated, significant changes in our national legislature had only just been concluded, having crested during the Watergate affair and its aftermath. It left an unmistakable mark on the structure of Congress and the way it presently goes about its business.

[1] Details on recent presidential politics may be gleaned from, among others, Samuel Kernell, *Going Public* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Press, 1986); and Charles O. Jones, *The Trusteeship Presidency* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).

[2] Leroy N. Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1986).

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE is professor of government at Harvard University and has written numerous articles about American politics and books about the presidency. His work is in the general areas of formal modeling, legislative behavior, and congressional history.

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TABLE 1

Summary of Procedural Changes in Congress During the 1970s

Categories of Change	*Actual Reforms*
Reduction of disparities among committees	Redistribution of committee power; realignment of committee jurisdictions.
Enlargement and wider distribution of member resources	Committee assignments; staff; office perquisites.
Taming of former power centers	Ways and Means and Rules Committees.
"Sunshine" reforms	Open committee meetings; recorded votes; televised proceedings over the C-SPAN network; disclosure of campaign finances; stricter ethics codes.
Reassertion of legislative branch powers	War Powers Resolution; Budget and Impoundment Control Act; creation of Office of Technology Assessment and Congressional Budget Office; enhanced capability of Congressional Research Service and Government Accounting Office; expanded use of the legislative veto.[3]
Centralization of legislative parties	Rise of the Democratic Caucus in the House; enhanced powers of the Speaker over committee assignments and scheduling; enlarged whip system.
Curbing of minority obstruction	Easing of rules governing quorum calls and reading of *House Journal*; expedited roll calls.

The range of procedural changes and the amount of activity they generated during the early 1970s were immense. Table 1 conveys only the broadest of outlines, but does suggest both a heightened attention to matters of procedure and a political commitment to democratization. After nearly a decade of experience with these reforms, scholars and other interested observers are beginning to assess their effects.[4] Did the reforms accomplish their intended purposes? Did adaptive responses to the reforms have unintended consequences? Have the effects, intended and unintended, on balance improved the legislative branch: is it more responsive, responsible, accountable, capable of governing? The jury of informed opinion is still out on many of these matters.

Nor shall I render any final verdict in this article. Instead I want to consider this procedural activity in the context of an essential constitutional feature of the American political system—the capacity of the national legislature to function as a consequential political force in the structure of government. I want to assess in a general sort of way the effects of reform on this capacity. I shall be less in-

[3] The future of the legislative veto is cloudy, owing to two Supreme Court decisions (*Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha*, 1983, and *Bowsher v. Synar*, 1986). See Louis Fisher, "The Administrative State: What's Next After *Chadha* and *Bowsher*?" paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1986.

[4] See Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform* and the extensive citation therein.

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terested in what the legislature does with this capacity. Views on this latter question are inevitably disputatious, depend on whose ox is being gored, and elicit abstract, philosophical responses. I want to be more practical-minded.

I begin with the observation, offered in detail by Nelson Polsby, that the U.S. Congress is a very unusual legislative animal.[5] Most of the world's legislatures are mere "arenas" (Polsby's term) for debate, deliberation, and possibly oversight of the executive. Even those based on the Westminster model, including the British Parliament itself, are little more than deliberative forums offering only limited checks on the executive. Indeed, the vote of no confidence, once a key check of legislature on executive, is now ineffectual inasmuch as the executive determines which votes will constitute no-confidence judgments. The U.S. Congress is decidedly, even uniquely, different. It is "transformative" (Polsby, again) in its effects on policy and politics. In a separation-of-powers arrangement it is, in Richard Neustadt's memorable phrase, a "separated institution sharing powers."[6] Why? How has it remained separated? How has it maintained a share of power? In short, is it possible to isolate the foundations of its capacity to participate in governance and then to determine the effect of recent procedural changes on these foundations?

In the remainder of this article, which focuses principally on the House, I advance a partial answer to these questions. In a nutshell my answer is that the U.S. Congress remains an active governing agent and has not been swallowed up by the executive as has so frequently happened elsewhere, because it has fashioned and refined an effective division- and specialization-of-labor institution capable of attracting and retaining talented and ambitious politicians. This, I claim, is the stunning achievement of the U.S. Congress and is the foundation of its capacity to share powers with the executive. It is against this standard that recent reform may be compared.

The Development of the Congressional Committee System

The Congress today is an immense and complicated institution, consisting of a vast array of enterprises: member offices, standing committees, select committees, joint committees, ad hoc committees, subcommittees, party committees, whip organizations, task forces, caucuses. Organizational bean-counters put the number of congressional enterprises (those that had some staff complement) at nearly one thousand in the late 1970s, a number still reasonably accurate today.[7] Such complexity defies comprehensive description, much less understanding (though an ad-

[5] Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislatures" in Fred Greenstein et al., eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 257–319.

[6] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[7] Robert H. Salisbury and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Congressional Staff Turnover: Its Causes and Consequences," paper delivered at annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tenn., 1979.

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mirable effort is that of Charles O. Jones[8]). Nevertheless, there is a consensus of sorts about the Congress. As Morris P. Fiorina concisely put it, "Through a complex mixture of accident and intention we have constructed for ourselves a system that articulates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly."[9] From the broadest of the broad to the narrowest of the narrow, interests are organized and represented in the Congress; they command member attention, energy, and resources; and they have access, if not a proprietary right, to forums for their advocates. But the process of passing a bill, much less formulating a coherent policy, is complicated, drawn-out, filled with distractions, and subjected to the whims of veto groups at multiple points. In short, it is often claimed that the organizational superstructure of Congress is a greater load than its political and constitutional foundations can bear. 'Twas not always thus, and it warrants a brief historical detour tracing how we got there.[10]

The Founding Fathers gave the legislature lawmaking powers and considerable freedom to organize itself as it saw fit. Aside from the formal specification of a presiding officer for each chamber, the Constitution allowed Congress to organize itself according to the wishes of its members. Then as now, members were torn between the objective of effective lawmaking and the suspicion of concentrated power. For the most part, despite the unhappy and only recently concluded experience with the Articles of Confederation, suspicion won out. The farmers, state legislators, and other local politicians who constituted the membership of the early Congresses were unwilling to delegate power either to presiding officers or to small groups of members.

In the House, most business was conducted in the Committee of the Whole. There, policy was articulated and debated, even in fine-grained detail. After agreement was reached on general principles and many details, a select committee was appointed to translate the "will of the House" into a formal bill. This committee, normally chaired by the person introducing the measure and composed of the bill's supporters, had a limited charge and a limited life. It was to refine the consensus, making suggestions for changes, and report back. It was a committee in the modern sense in only a very limited way, possessing little in the form of agenda power or veto power that we have come to associate with modern committees. Aside from

[8] Charles O. Jones, *The United States Congress: People, Place, and Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1982).

[9] Morris P. Fiorina, "The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," *Daedalus* 109 (Summer 1980): 44.

[10] Details on the House may be found in numerous sources, including Richard Bolling, *Power in the House* (New York: Capricorn, 1968); Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy* (New York: McKay, 1963); Joseph Cooper, *The Origins of the Standing Committee System and the Development of the Modern House* (Houston: Rice University Studies, 1970); George B. Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1961); and Alvin Josephy, *On the Hill* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). The Senate is portrayed in George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States*, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1938).

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a standing committee on elections, most of the business of the House was conducted in this committee-of-the-whole/select committee format.

Political leaders in late eighteenth-century America were children of the Scottish Enlightenment. If the division- and specialization-of-labor enhanced the productivity of Adam Smith's famous pin factory, then surely it would serve political organizations to advantage as well. This lesson was probably appreciated by legislative leaders, but it did little to allay their suspicion of concentrations of power; so the early Congress remained formally unspecialized. Adam Smith's lesson, however, was seized upon by the executive branch which, with the consent and participation of Congress, instituted specialized organization in the form of cabinet departments. The resulting disparity between the specialized executive and the unspecialized legislature was most apparent in financial affairs, and was impressively exploited by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. By 1795, on matters of debt, finance, currency, and expenditures, the Congress was outmaneuvered at every turn by Hamilton's operation at Treasury. In that year the House established a more permanent panel on Ways and Means so that Congress could counter the expertise and experience that until that time had been monopolized by the executive branch. In the next two decades, a number of standing committees were created.[11]

Standing committees differed from select committees in important ways: they were permanent institutional fixtures; they had defined jurisdictions; their membership lasted beyond any particular bill; they could effectively originate legislation; they were not required to report legislation. In effect, they possessed both agenda and veto power. Mind you, these powers were severely truncated in comparison to their modern counterparts. For one thing, committee memberships lasted only for one session of each Congress and, with no tradition of seniority or committee membership as a "property right," committee compositions were not at all stable. For another, the select committee procedure of the early Congresses remained a significant part of legislative operations, and so the legislature remained only partially specialized. In the Tenth Congress (1807–1809), for example, 53 percent of all bills were still referred to select committees.[12] This was to change during the years of Henry Clay's speakership.

During the early nineteenth century the nation was growing. Its boundaries were being extended by exploration, conquest, purchase, and settlement. New states were admitted to the Union. And the Congress was growing. In November 1810, the constituents of Lexington, Kentucky sent to Washington a freshman representative named Henry Clay. The Twelfth Congress convened on 4 November 1811, and promptly selected this frontier legislator as its Speaker, a position he was never to relinquish while sitting in the House. Except for three years that Clay was out

[11] Galloway, *History*.

[12] Kenneth A. Shepsle and Brian Humes, "Legislative Leadership: Organizational Entrepreneurs as Agents," paper prepared for Conference on Adaptive Institutions, Stanford, Calif., 1984.

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of Congress, he served in the House as its Speaker from 1811 to 1825. No man until Sam Rayburn served longer in that position.

Clay was the principal spokesman for the frontier around whom other like-minded legislators unified. In early nineteenth-century America, the frontier stretched from New Hampshire and western New York in the north, along the western periphery, down to Georgia in the south. In late 1811 what linked these legislators together was the common fate—the economic and physical well-being—of their constituents at the hands of the Indians and the British. They clamored for war with Great Britain, and Henry Clay became the leading voice of the War Hawk cause. During his first term—the so-called War Congress—Clay, emboldened by a large, consensual coalition of supporters, manipulated the system of select committees and a rather weak President in the cause of war. In his first two months as Speaker, he hand-picked "fire breathing nationalists" for various select committees, descended to the well of the House on numerous occasions to participate in debate, and saw to it that war legislation was put on a fast track.[13] By spring 1812 he had managed to entrepreneur legislation through the House that rearmed the army and navy and allowed for calling up reserves. He was masterful in silencing critics (the most vocal of whom was John Randolph of Virginia), in rewarding his supporters (Peter Porter of New York and John Calhoun and Langdon Cheves of South Carolina chaired important select committees) and, as a *coup de grace*, in egging and cajoling a cautious, reluctant President James Madison into submitting a declaration of war.

During the War Congress and the first session of the succeeding Congress, the nation was at war, and Clay was at his peak of power, popularity, and policy success. After the first session of the Thirteenth Congress, the war ended and Clay resigned from the House to accept a presidential appointment to the Peace Commission at Ghent. After returning to the United States and Lexington, Kentucky, he was reelected to the Fourteenth Congress and to the speakership.

What makes Clay an especially interesting subject is not only his brilliant leadership in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses, but his relative lack of comparable policy success in subsequent Congresses. The war with Great Britain was *the* great distinguishing issue of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congresses. It defined Clay's coalition and it directed his political energies. With war's end Clay's once homogeneous and single-minded coalition separated into factions. Clay, the ambitious politician (he probably had his eye on the presidency), could not lead as he once had because no single issue could serve as a nucleus around which to reassemble his coalition. He certainly cast about for substitute issues—internal improvements, the National Bank, diplomatic recognition and support for Greece, Turkey, and the Latin American republics—but none seemed to do the trick.

In a world of heterogeneous preferences, legislative leadership, animated as it is by a desire to retain office and position or to advance, must seek out instru-

[13] Josephy, *On the Hill*, chap. 4.

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ments other than policy initiatives. And this Clay did. During the Clay years the House was transformed from an institution that principally did its business in the Committee of the Whole and by select committee to one in which government by standing committee became the norm. As noted above, before Clay came to the House there were ten standing committees which were responsible for less than half of the bills. During the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses, Clay created ten more standing committees; an additional seven were created during his remaining years as Speaker. In 1825, Clay's last in the House, fully 93 percent of all bills were referred to twenty-seven standing committees. Clay was returned to the speakership time after time by large majorities, not because he led the House toward particular policy objectives (as he had in the Twelfth Congress), but rather because he "gave away the store." He decentralized the operation of the House, established the division- and specialization-of-labor that has come to characterize the contemporary Congress, and gave individual legislators separate stakes in policy jurisdictions in place of a grand platform of issues.[14]

During the thirty-five years between the end of the Clay speakership and the Civil War, the nation and the Congress was preoccupied with the slavery issue and everything it touched. Since standing committees now dominated the House, and the Speaker appointed its members, speakership elections became highly charged affairs. In 1839, 1849, 1855, and 1859, elections took many ballots and many months. In 1855, for example, Speaker Nathaniel Banks was elected on the 133rd ballot. In 1859, a freshman, William Pennington of New Jersey, was elected on the 44th ballot, principally because he was a freshman and not known to be strongly committed on the slavery issue. Because standing committees were so important (especially the Committees on Territories and the District of Columbia, which dealt directly with slavery), the success or failure of issues and policies depended on who appointed their members.

During the Civil War and the gilded age of the Grant and Hayes administrations that followed, Republicans in the House dominated the standing committees, led by Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens from the chairmanship of a newly created Appropriations Committee. Indeed, a whole slew of new standing committees were created during and after the war. By this time the division- and specialization-of-labor were virtually complete. There were more than forty standing committees with finely-partitioned jurisdictions. But, perhaps more importantly, authorizing, appropriating, and revenue-raising were now wholly separate. *Only under pervasive, across-the-board, landslide conditions, and with long coattails, could a new administration, by sweeping in its supporters to cover all the power bases, hope to dominate the many functions of Congress.* This was becoming more difficult, even with close party competition and party-line voting (in which narrow

[14] During this period and throughout the nineteenth century, the Speaker retained control of committee assignments. For details, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), chap. 2.

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vote swings could produce large seat swings). In short, its division-of-labor was insulating the Congress from the executive.

The growing reliance on the notion of a property right to committee positions (the idea that a member had a claim on a committee slot once appointed to it) and a seniority criterion for chairmanships began to insulate the Congress not only from the executive, but more generally from popular control through elections. A sitting committee chair, or any other committee member for that matter, could be removed effectively only by *his own constituents*. Landslide or not at the presidential level, a district could nevertheless preserve a committee chair's tenure (and its own political leverage) by returning him to office.[15] Failing to gain favor with a committee chair and committee majority, a policy coalition—whether led by the executive, "gentlemen of the lobby," or whomever—could hope to get its way only by inducing the Speaker not to observe seniority or the property rights norm. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, violations of seniority or property rights were infrequent but certainly not unprecedented.[16] The overzealousness with which Speaker Joseph Cannon (1903–1911) used his committee assignment powers sowed the seeds of revolt, resulting in a vast reduction in the Speaker's control of committees. For the next half century, seniority and the property-rights norm became fixtures in the House.

Properties of the Mature Standing Committee System

By 1911, if not earlier, the system of standing committees instituted by Clay and perfected over the remaining years of the nineteenth century had become a mature division-of-labor arrangement.[17] The separation of policy jurisdictions; functional

[15] Inasmuch as votes for president and Congress in the late nineteenth century were tightly connected, this form of insulation was not of much consequence. See Walter Dean Burnham, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Fall 1975): 411–435. With the erosion of partisan and coattail voting in the twentieth century, however, it became an important source of legislative insulation from the executive. See John A. Ferejohn, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 71 (March 1977): 166–176; and John A. Ferejohn and Randall Calvert, "Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 127–146. Thus, to take an historically important example, a young activist Democrat could be elected President in 1960 along with a conservative chairman of the House Rules Committee committed to oppose the executive's program.

[16] See Chang-wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 787–807; Michael Abram and Joseph Cooper, "The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives," *Polity* 1 (Fall 1968): 53–86.

[17] Woodrow Wilson, after all, wrote of "government by standing committee" nearly thirty years earlier in *Congressional Government* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1885). Ironically, in partially recanting, Wilson later approvingly viewed the Speaker generally, and Speaker Cannon in particular, as a centralizing mechanism to control the centrifugal forces of committee government in *Constitutional Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908).

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division into authorizing, appropriating, revenue-raising (and later budgeting); the seniority rule for chairmen; the property-right norm for committee membership; and the attenuation of linked electoral fates for executive and legislators all provided insulation for standing committees—insulation from the president, the Speaker, even chamber and popular electoral majorities. In effect, the committee system constituted an "institutional bargain" in which each individual legislator secured disproportionate benefits in the institutional subunits of which he was a part in exchange for limiting his activity and intrusiveness in those subunits of which he was not a part. His political career, though obviously dependent upon the partisan coloration of the chamber, depended mostly on what went on inside those "little legislatures."[18]

The properties of this institutional arrangement entailed both advantages and risks. One thing, however, is clear: the arrangement possessed durability, surviving essentially intact from the accession to the speakership of Champ Clark in 1911 until the post-World War II Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Even after the adjustment and streamlining of committees and jurisdictions required by this act, the institutional bargain did not change much until the 1970s. Indeed, it would not be an abuse of terms to refer to the committee system of the House for most of this century as an *institution in equilibrium.*

With rare exception the arrangement was insulated, so that congressional committees possessed genuine independence. An occasional electoral landslide tied congressional committees closely to a presidential agenda (the 73rd Congress and Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal; the 89th Congress and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society), but even this did not persist for long. On the whole, congressional committees were forces to be reckoned with. They were forces to be reckoned with not only by presidents, but by Speakers as well. From Champ Clark to John McCormack, Speakers of the House were, among their committee chairmen, often no more than *primus inter pares.* And while Speakers of an earlier era—Thomas Reed and Joseph Cannon—could emphasize *primus,* contemporary Speakers had to concede that they were located more toward the *inter pares* end of the spectrum. Even Sam Rayburn, one of the most respected and honored Speakers in the history of the House, dealt successfully with committee barons less from a position of institutional strength than from a reservoir of personal loyalty and bargaining skill. And he too found the insulation of the committee system impenetrable at times.

The larger claim of this article is that this independence, this insulation, this force-to-be-reckoned-with quality of committees is precisely what allows the Congress to be Neustadt's "separated institution sharing powers." Divided partisan government is not the legislature's only protection against an overreaching executive.

There are other concomitants of this arrangement as well. In the first place, the division-of-labor encourages specialized expertise. Albert Rains of Alabama

[18] George Goodwin, *The Little Legislatures* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).

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was known as Mr. Housing in the 1950s House, Paul Rogers of Florida as Mr. Health in the 1960s House, and George Mahon of Texas as Mr. Defense Procurement in the 1970s House, because each labored long and hard in a specific policy vineyard, acquired policy expertise, assembled an expert staff, and established a reputation for probity, integrity, and knowledgeability among his colleagues. The institutional bargain alluded to above provides individuals with incentives to make intensive investment in specialized human capital. Partisan and institutional colleagues benefit from this organizational capacity, much as their counterparts benefited from a Ways and Means Committee independent of Secretary Alexander Hamilton back in 1795.

A relatively wide distribution of this kind of expertise, effected by approximately twenty committees in each chamber, allows for enhanced productivity, multiple activities, an ability to "walk and chew gum" at the same time. The Committee-of-the-Whole procedure of the early Congresses made the floor the place where all the important decisions, and all the activities necessary to those decisions, took place. The division-of-labor of the mature standing committee system alleviates floor logjams and bottlenecks (not completely, as any current legislative participant will tell you), allows work to proceed in multiple directions in-house, and therefore renders the House less dependent on outside sources.

The pecking order quality of the seniority system, for all its warts, assures a modicum of continuity and institutional memory. Positions of authority are held by those who have waited in the queue for an extended period, are familiar both with the players and the plays, current and past, and have long-term relationships with those above and below them in the queue.[19] To the extent that a committee establishes an institutional existence separate from the individual legislators in its queue at any one time, especially in terms of stability of jurisdiction and staff, seniority contributes to continuity in decision making and to the development of an institutional memory that economizes on wheel-reinventing activity.

There is no need to belabor these contributions to an independent legislature. I believe, however, that there is an especially important property of a mature division-of-labor arrangement that often goes underappreciated. Committees provide many opportunities for political ambitions to be realized, and they do so in a manner that encourages members to invest in their committee careers. In an undifferentiated legislature or in a committee-based legislature whose committee members and leaders are dependent on the wishes of others (Speaker, caucus, president), individual legislators have less incentive to invest in their committee activities. Such investments are put at risk every time there is a change in the political environment. Careerism, however, is encouraged when rewards depend primarily on individual effort (and fortune), and less on the interests or favors of others. The other side of this coin is that talented men and women are encouraged to come into the legislature and to remain there. The predictability (relatively speaking)

[19] For an elaboration of committees as queues, see Shepsle, *Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*, chap. 5.

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of career development in a mature committee system may repel the impatient, but its inexorability places limits on downside risks by reducing dependence on arbitrary power or unpredictable events. *The attraction of the legislature to talent and ambition is perhaps the most important factor in maintaining its independence; when it begins to lose this sort of allure, it may well be in trouble.*[20]

Risks of the System

The argument that legislative independence is a product of the division and specialization of labor should not be taken as the ruminations of a Pollyanna. There are risks in such a system, and the representational revolt of the 1970s reflected an accumulation of excesses. The jurisdictionally-based committee system creates agenda power; policy and politics will depend on who gets to use it and how it is used.

Legislators arrive in Washington with a stake in geography—their congressional districts. Their places in the committee system gives them a stake in jurisdiction as well. And more times than not there is a connection. Committee assignments in the mature committee system of the 1950s through early 1970s give evidence of a process that matched individual legislators with committee slots that served constituent interests. Committees, as a consequence, are not legislatures writ small; they are not representative of the larger legislature. To the contrary, they are highly unrepresentative, consisting mainly of "interesteds"[21] or "preference outliers."[22]

Thus, the legislature's expert, specialized subunits have built-in biases and conflicts of interest. Farmers have a special interest in crop subsidies; the committee system gives their representatives extraordinary power over these policies by assuring them berths on the Agriculture Committee. Districts with military suppliers and installations have a decided interest in procurement and base operation policies; their representatives find their way onto the Armed Services Committee. With all those civil servants living in their districts, it is no accident that Maryland and Virginia legislators have significant representation on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. And a new subcommittee chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee undoubtedly serves his Cape Cod constituency well. In policy area after policy area, geography is matched up with jurisdiction; committees become the vehicles of constituency agenda control. It suits legislators fine, because this arrangement permits them to specialize and accumulate power in just

[20] Some have speculated in this regard as the 1970s witnessed a substantial increase in the (often midcareer) retirement rate. See Charles S. Bullock, "House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition," *American Political Science Review* 66 (December 1972): 1295–1300; and John R. Hibbings, "Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House of Representatives: Who Quits?" *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (August 1982): 467–485.

[21] Charles S. Bullock, "Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshman of the 92nd Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1 (May 1976): 201–212.

[22] Shepsle, *Giant Jigsaw Puzzle.*

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those areas that are of special interest to those who must renew their contracts every other year. But it also affects policy: it may not be quite the same as foxes guarding chicken houses, but it is uncomfortably close.

Now surely, floor majorities can regulate the maneuverings of committee legislators. True, but part of the institutional bargain constrains noncommittee members in precisely this fashion. Each, in effect, trades off influence in policy areas of less interest to his or her constituents in exchange for extraordinary influence in those areas central to their economic and social life; it is an institutional logroll. And even if the noninterference constraint operates in only a fairly loose way, the ability of interesteds to formulate policy in committee, to manage its passage on the floor, and to repair in conference committee any damage done on the floor assures committee members substantial control. Moreover, once they have preferred policies in place, their control over jurisdiction and their veto power protect those policies from predators.

Specialized committees, composed of members decidedly unrepresentative of the parent chamber and empowered with substantial authority over policy making in their respective jurisdictions, constitute one vertex in policy systems unkindly described as "cozy little triangles."[23] It is only natural for organized interests in agribusiness, defense supply, civil service regulation, and shipbuilding, for example, to link up with those legislators in whose hands their respective fates rest. It is also quite natural for the federal agencies who deliver the services or implement the policies embraced by committees to liaison with them in a variety of ways. Electoral self-interest begets policy self-interest begets bureaucratic-survival self-interest: hence, cozy little triangles, interest-group liberalism, clientelism, policy whirlpools, unholy trinities. It is a neat little arrangement, and it survives because of the insulation provided by the standing committee system.

In either its proactive form (originating and expanding policy benefits for interested parties) or its defensive form (protecting the existing status quo from the forces of change), this neat little arrangement can come to be viewed as excessive at times. And when it does, it provokes reaction.

The Appropriations Committee in the 1950s. Throughout the 1950s the House Appropriations Committee was dominated by Clarence Cannon of Missouri and John Taber of New York, the chairman and ranking minority member, respectively. As Richard F. Fenno's brilliant treatise details, these gentlemen and their committee colleagues saw themselves as the protectors of the Treasury, and they wrote their annual appropriations bills with this in mind.[24] Where they saw waste and fat and sought to cut it, however, the authorizing committees, whose programs were being "victimized," saw benefits being sacrificed. To every assertion of "economy" from Appropriations came the refrain of "false economy" from the programmatic committees. Over a period of years, Appropriations Committee op-

[23] Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969).

[24] Richard F. Fenno, *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1966).

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ponents found several ways around what they felt was heavy-handed economizing. First, in the 1960s more programmatically-oriented liberals were appointed to the committee, loosening the hold of the economizers. Second, on the floor there was an increase in amendment activity on appropriations bills, and more frequent efforts to restrain the Appropriations Committee from "legislating in appropriations bills."[25] But third and most important, the authorizing committees perfected the *entitlement strategy.* An entitlement program *required* the government to pay an entitled individual, or governmental jurisdiction, thereby removing any discretion from the Appropriations Committee. The growth of entitlement programs, (for example, the expansion of social security, Medicare, Medicaid, and myriad income maintenance programs), especially during the 1960s and 1970s, broke the Appropriations Committee's power of the purse. Today, only about one quarter of federal expenditures passes through Appropriations.

The Rules Committee in the 1960s. Judge Howard Smith of Virginia commanded the Rules Committee in the 1950s. He spoke in a conservative southern accent foreign to national Democrats, to the large liberal bloc that came into the House in the 1958 landslide and, after 1960, to a new Democratic administration. After the 1958 election a number of liberals, recently organized into the Democratic Study Group, implored Speaker Rayburn to break the stranglehold on liberal legislation of Smith and his conservative coalition brethren. Speaker Rayburn, however, had once been a committee chairman himself and, throughout his speakership, had sought to accommodate the wishes of chairpeople. He was loathe to act against a sitting chairman and, despite feeling frustrated himself, counseled patience. Besides, it was argued, with President Dwight Eisenhower holding a veto, little progress would be made on a liberal agenda even with a tamer Rules Committee. By 1960 the patience had run out, and the new Democratic administration's program stood vulnerable to Judge Smith's predations. Moderating demands for the removal of Smith from the chairmanship or William Colmer of Mississippi from the committee entirely (because he had not supported the Kennedy-Johnson ticket in the fall election), Rayburn agreed to back a plan to increase the size of the Rules Committee. In an historic 217–212 vote, the House voted to expand the Committee from twelve to fifteen members, allowing Rayburn to convert a 6–6 blocking majority for Smith into a (nominal) 8–7 majority in favor of the national Democratic program.[26]

The Ways and Means Committee in the 1970s. Wilbur Mills of Arkansas had for more than a decade run a tight ship at Ways and Means. His detailed knowledge of the tax code and his uncanny ability to write legislation that could pass

[25] House Rules allow for an objection to be raised against an appropriations bill containing a measure for which there was not a prior authorization. For a general discussion, see Stanley Bach, "Representatives and Committees on the Floor: Amendments to Appropriations Bills in the House of Representatives, 1963–1982," *Congress and the Presidency* 13 (Spring 1986): 40–58.

[26] MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy,* 143ff.

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in the House were legendary.[27] Like Chairmen Cannon and Smith, he was conservative and outside the mainstream of the Democratic Party in the House. And in the opinion of many, he was too cautious, too interested in Republican votes, and too chummy with Ranking Minority Member John Byrnes of Wisconsin. By the early 1970s many important policy debates involved the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee—health, taxes, social security, welfare, trade. Because the committee had no subcommittees, an organizational arrangement that centralized agenda power and committee resources in Mills's hands, it lacked its own division of labor and, therefore, could not act expeditiously on the many hot topics of the day. There was much grousing among the rank and file, partly out of envy of the juicy tidbits in the jurisdiction of Ways and Means, and partly out of impatience with Mills's slow, deliberate pace. The Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, coupled with Mills's personal misfortunes, provided the occasion for a chamber majority to move against the committee. In addition to losing some of its jurisdiction, the committee was required to create subcommittees and to decentralize its operation.

Substantive Committees in the 1960s. The legislative engines were really gunned in the 1960s. Liberated from the slow pace of the Eisenhower years, the Kennedy-Johnson years were legislatively hyperactive. Even the major commitment of fighting a large-scale war in Vietnam did not slow the engines much. Fiscal pressures began to build. Restraint was forestalled by inflation, which made the burdens of spending feel lighter, and by the illusive hope that a "fiscal dividend"—promised by a "light at the end of the tunnel" and an end to the war—would release the fiscal wherewithal to support a level of domestic activity to which the Democrats had become accustomed. Stagflation and the mysterious disappearance of any peace dividend dashed these hopes, and debt began to mount. Although the occasion for reaction found its immediate stimulus in President Richard Nixon's impoundments and his wounded political status, the congressional budget process and other details of the Budget Act of 1974 were principally an institutional response to the imbalance between expenditures and revenues.[28]

What I have tried to suggest in each of these cases is that the jurisdictional dominance and insulation provided by the standing committee system, in addition to the advantages I recounted in the previous section, also entail risks. The risks exist because the committee system simultaneously presents committee members with incentives and opportunities to use their agenda power, and discourages noncommittee members from restricting those opportunities. There comes a point, however, when a reaction occurs: entitlements are employed to end-run a conservative Appropriations Committee; a Rules Committee is packed to break the hold of a conservative coalition; decentralization is imposed on an unresponsive Ways and

[27] John F. Manley, "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence," *American Political Science Review* 63 (June 1969): 442–464; John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1970).

[28] Allen Schick, *Congress and Money* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1980).

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Means Committee; and budgeting constraints are utilized to rein in out-of-control spending.

How the pluses and minuses of a mature standing committee system net out is hard to determine. I have resisted even attempting the calculation. It should be clear, however, that any institutional effort to reduce the minuses may have the (unintended) effect of also reducing the pluses. This is the great tradeoff: making the standing committees more representative or more responsive to majoritarian preferences may at the same time diminish the division of labor, reduce the career attractiveness of the legislature to talent and energy, and ultimately make the legislature more permeable to outside forces, the executive branch in particular.

Representational Revolt

I have argued that the division-of-labor system of standing committees gives the Congress a capacity to participate in governance to an extent unknown by other legislatures. Yet Congress is quintessentially a representative institution, and representational impulses cannot long be denied. The era of reform in the early and mid-1970s was inspired by these representational impulses, in the process transforming Congress from "institutionalized pluralism" to "individualized pluralism."[29]

The seeds of revolt were sown by the elections of 1958, bringing to the House a large class of liberal legislators anxious to get on with an activist agenda after years of relative inactivity. These numbers were on the rise throughout the next decade, with an especially large blip in 1964 (only to fall back substantially in 1966). Even as their numbers were growing, and despite presidential administrations in basic sympathy and a majority party leadership willing to push, the committee system was a considerable drag. I have already referred to Appropriations and Rules at the beginning of the 1960s and Ways and Means at the end. More broadly, however, senior committee leaders tended to be less disposed to activism and more moderate politically than the newer Democrats coming to Congress during that period.

The frustration that was building was not only one of policy pace and direction, but also one of tone. It was a conflict between political generations. Norms of apprenticeship, restricted activity, and deference to senior members grated on the newer breed of junior members of Congress. Legislative specialization—the hallmark of the mature committee system—seemed an unnecessarily and undesirably narrow restriction for legislators who, on the whole, came from heterogeneous districts in which diverse interests needed to be served. Senior members, on the other hand, felt they had not served their own legislative apprenticeship only to be denied the fruits of that service by ambitious youngsters not willing to wait their turn.

[29] Kernell, *Going Public.*

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Political ambition and policy disagreement reinforced one another. As Richard E. Cohen and Burt Solomon describe it:

> When Sam Rayburn and Lyndon B. Johnson charted Congress's course during the 1950s, junior Members understood that they were to keep their mouths closed. The new guys would just have to wait their 20 years to get their say.
>
> Twenty years passed and it was their turn, but something happened: Just as they were primed to take over, a new breed of young Members trashed the seniority system and came quickly to the fore. What did they care if the House and Senate sometimes broke down under the strain?[30]

The representational revolt of the 1970s is a long story, admirably told in several different places.[31] I shall focus on the way reform enabled the rise of two power centers, which competed and continue to compete directly with the standing committees for political influence.

Proliferation of Subcommittees and Decline of Committee Chairpeople. At least since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, subcommittees have been a significant structural element of the committee system in the House. However, until the 1970s they were principally a tool of senior committee members, especially the chairs. The subcommittee structure of a committee was determined by the chair, who named the subcommittees; assigned their respective jurisdictions; appointed their members from the full committee; maintained control of and dispensed at his pleasure various staff and budget resources; assigned bills to them; orchestrated the timing and sequence in which the full committee would take up their products; rearranged jurisdictions and membership idiosyncratically. In short, with some exceptions (for example, Appropriations), the system of standing subcommittees was a division-of-labor arrangement that left authority in the hands of senior, full committee members.

Consequently, there was great variety in subcommittee arrangements across committees. Some, like Ways and Means, had no subcommittees. Others, like Armed Services, had numbered subcommittees with no fixed jurisdictions, permitting the full committee chairman (like Mendel Rivers of South Carolina) to assign a bill to whichever subcommittee he felt would, by his own lights, deal with it appropriately. The Appropriations Committee, with its thirteen standing subcommittees with fixed jurisdictions, membership, and subcommittee seniority practices stood out as an exemplary exception to the rule.

Even before the representational revolt of the 1970s, there were occasional com-

[30] Richard E. Cohen and Burt Solomon, "Congress's Rising Stars," *National Journal* 4 (24 January 1987): 176–189.

[31] Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress Against Itself* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977); Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform*; Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition: Partisanship and Opposition" in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 34–64; James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).

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mittee revolts against overbearing chairs. The Post Office Committee, the Interior Committee, and the Education and Labor Committee rebelled against their chairmen, Tom Murray of Tennessee, Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, and Graham Barden of North Carolina, respectively, toning down their authority as a result. There was a subsequent revolt at Education and Labor against Barden's successor, Adam Clayton Powell of New York, for his arbitrary behavior and frequent absences. But, on the whole, chairs dominanted their committees. Ironically, by the early 1970s, some of these chairs were among the feisty liberals elected in the late 1950s and early 1960s;[32] many of them were not at all keen about the reforms that were to come.[33]

Beginning in 1970, a series of reforms whittled away at the powers of chairs over the operations of their committees. In 1970, they began to lose some of their agenda control. They could not refuse to call committee meetings against the will of a majority of their committees (as Judge Smith so frequently did in the 1950s); a majority could vote to meet anyway with the ranking majority member presiding. Moreover, once a rule was granted that permitted floor consideration of a committee bill, the chair could not delay consideration for more than a week; after seven days, any committee member, with the support of a committee majority, could move floor consideration.

In 1973 the Democratic members of a House committee were designated as the committee caucus and given the power to choose subcommittee chairs and set subcommittee budgets. Over the next two years, committees developed a bidding procedure that allowed members, in order of full committee seniority, to bid for subcommittee chairmanships as they came available. Also in 1973, the Democratic Caucus passed the "Subcommittee Bill of Rights."[34] It mandated that legislation be referred to subcommittees; that subcommittees be allowed to determine when to meet, hold hearings, and report legislation; and that subcommittees be assured of adequate staff and budget. In the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, full committees (Rules and Budget excepted) were required to establish at least four standing subcommittees. In 1976 committee caucuses were given the authority to determine the number of subcommittees and their respective jurisdictions. Finally, in 1977 the selection procedure for subcommittee chairs was changed, allowing the committee caucus to elect chairs by secret ballot. Standing committees and their chairs, once the central organizational and political power centers in the House, had had their wings clipped. A chair was now to be beholden to the

[32] This fact was presciently forecast in Raymond Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 59 (September 1965): 337–349.

[33] I have relied heavily on the appendix of Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform* for the remainder of this section.

[34] David W. Rohde, "Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee Bill of Rights" in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., *Changing Congress: The Committee System* (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), 39–47.

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committee caucus; power had devolved to subcommittees; standing committees were rapidly becoming holding companies for their subunits.

The Rise of the Party Caucus and the Speaker. The 1970s have been something of a puzzle to congressional scholars because, for all the decentralization of committee operations and the enfranchisement and proliferation of subcommittees, something else had been going on. The changes in the congressional landscape have not been all of one piece. In particular the Democratic Caucus has risen, and its rise, like that of subcommittees, came at the expense of committees and chairs.

For most of this century the majority party caucus has been limited to electing a Speaker and majority leader and attending to committee organization. Both of these activities occurred in the first few days of a Congress (and in many respects were pro forma), after which the caucus was rarely heard from. Indeed, until the 1970s, the last time the caucus could even be regarded as a serious force was under Oscar Underwood's leadership in Woodrow Wilson's first Congress. In the 1970s, however, as committees and chairs were being undermined by the growth of subcommittee government, there was also a movement to strengthen the central party leadership and to give the rank and file a larger voice in the affairs of the chamber.

The first breach came in the seniority system. In 1971 the caucus relieved its Committee on Committees of having to rely on seniority in nominating committee chairs, thereby putting obstinate chairs on notice; although no sitting chair was threatened at that time, heads would roll four years later. In that same year it became possible for a small number of caucus members to force a separate vote on nominees for chair, and later to do so by secret ballot. In 1975, the caucus took upon itself the right to vote on subcommittee chairs of the Appropriations Committee.

Next came democratizing reforms. Individuals were limited in the number of committees and subcommittees on which they could serve and the number of subcommittees which they could chair. Power was distributed broadly, limiting the ability of individuals to accumulate inordinate amounts of it. Moreover, House committees became more penetrable. Sunshine mandated more openness in committee meetings and committee votes, and greater access to their proceedings by House members not on the committees, even when they were closed.

But perhaps the most significant reforms were those that strengthened the Speaker and made him accountable to the caucus. In 1973, House party leaders (Speaker, majority leader, and whip) were added to the Committee on Committees, giving them an increased role to play in committee assignments. In that same year the Democrats established the Steering and Policy Committee with the Speaker as chairman. In the next few years the Speaker's position was further enhanced. In 1974 he was empowered to refer bills simultaneously or sequentially to several committees, to create ad hoc committees and, in 1977 to set time limits for their deliberations. Also in 1974 Democratic committee assignments were taken away from the party's complement on Ways and Means and given to the Speaker-dominated

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Steering and Policy Committee. In addition, the Speaker was given the power to appoint (and remove) the members of the Rules Committee.

The Democratic Caucus became powerful in its own right in several respects. I have already recounted its clout in electing committee leaders. More generally, during the 1970s the rules governing the calling of caucus meetings were relaxed so that relatively small numbers could force a meeting. It also became possible for a caucus majority to instruct its members of the Rules Committee to grant a rule allowing a bill to come to the floor and to make certain motions or amendments in order during its delibertions. Finally, the Speaker was implored to make certain that the dominant opinions of the caucus in the consideration of a bill were adequately represented on the conference committee that would resolve differences with the Senate.

To sum up, the representational revolt of the 1970s strengthened subcommittees, restored to the speakership authority it had not known since the days of Joe Cannon, and invigorated the party caucus. Some of the reforms had a decentralizing effect, some a recentralizing effect. Standing committees were caught in the middle.

Consequence of the Revolt

It is my sense that the Congress that has emerged from the reforms of the 1970s has not, even a decade later, settled down into the stable institution it was in the 1950s. Thus, it is hazardous to trace with confidence various properties of the current House to the reforms of the 1970s. It is possible, however, to conjecture about subcommittee government, committee penetrability, party government, and congressional careers.

Subcommittee Government. If Woodrow Wilson could write at the end of the nineteenth century about "government by standing committee," he could do so no more. With the general decentralization of committee operations to the subcommittee level, and the dependency of committee leaders on both committee and chamber party caucuses, subcommittees now possess the energy, authority, and resources to serve as agenda setters in their respective jurisdictions.

The most obvious evidence of this is their sheer numbers. Since the mid-1970s the number of subcommittees in the House has ranged between 100 and 140. On many occasions in the past decade more than one of every two majority party members has held either a party leadership, committee chair, or subcommittee chair post. In general, the number of committee and subcommittee berths has grown to the point that members cannot keep up with all their obligations. Increasingly, the description of a representative is beginning to approach that of a senator—someone a mile wide and an inch deep!

It should be obvious, with so many leadership posts to go around and rules prohibiting individuals from accumulating them, that it is necessary to reach farther and farther down into the seniority ranks to fill them. It is not at all unusual today to find subcommittee chairs who are in their second or third congressional

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terms. While this comports well with the general decline in juniority norms, allowing relatively new members to assume important responsibilities, it has the effect of elevating quite inexperienced politicians to positions of authority. Many lack the basic skills of managing committee staff, drafting legislation, and assembling coalitions that would otherwise come with experience. It is perhaps no accident that more and more legislative business is conducted on the floor with subcommittee products getting amended, often beyond recognition.[35] The lack of experience of subcommittee chairs also means they will possess less expertise than their counterparts of an earlier era. There is today undoubtedly a good deal more wasted energy and a good deal less institutional memory.

Juniority of leadership is accompanied by considerable turnover of both leadership and membership on subcommittees. Whenever there are departures from Congress (by death, defeat, or retirement), they ripple through the committee and subcommittee structure. Since so many members are on so many career ladders, even small perturbations in the membership generate a range of new opportunities for advancement. This is magnified by the rules and regulations limiting the number of chairmanships an individual may hold. Over and above the instability caused by new members moving to the chair or swapping one chair for another, there is a general variability in subcommittee membership as members bid for vacancies that arise. All of this moving about is bound to make subcommittee government less expert, less adept politically, and therefore of less value to the House than the earlier division of labor.

Penetrability. There are real efficiency gains from a division and specialization of labor. At some point, however, subunits can get too specialized and jurisdictions too subdivided. Legislative coherence and legislative management suffer as a consequence. It appears that committees in the modern era spend considerably more of their time than they once did revising the work of their subcommittees;[36] and floor majorities do the same to the handiwork of committees.[37] Subcommittees get rolled by full committees, and full committees get rolled on the floor. Final legislation today is less the result of specialized consideration by experts than it is the product of whomever is skilled at assembling floor majorities. On some occasions, as in olden times, this may in fact be a wily committee or subcommittee chair; but on other occasions it may well be an agent of the Speaker, of the majority party caucus, of external interest groups, or even of the president. Extreme decentralization, in effect, threatens to destroy legislative independence without substituting compensating safeguards. The Congress becomes vulnerable to penetration from outside, much as it was to the ploys of Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s.

[35] Steven Smith, "Revolution in the House: Why Don't We Do It on the Floor," Brookings Discussion Paper in Governmental Studies No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).

[36] Richard Hall and C. Lawrence Evans, "The Role of the Subcommittee in Committee Decisionmaking: An Exploration," paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1985.

[37] Bach, "Representatives and Committees"; Smith, "Revolution in the House."

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Party Government. Many of the 1970s reforms, especially those strengthening the Speaker and the party caucus, sought to revitalize the role of party in the legislature. In doing so, and to the extent the reforms have succeeded, expertise- and interest-based coherence in policy is being superceded by party-based coherence.[38] Thus, Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill was extremely adept at the politics of inclusion, or what Barbara Sinclair refers to as "building coalitions and keeping peace in the [party] family."[39] Contrast this with Clay's division-of-labor solution to maintaining a supporting coalition.

At the committee and subcommittee levels, it has altered incentives. Since, to obtain and maintain their leadership positions, subcommittee chairs must win election from their committee caucus colleagues, and full committee chairs must prevail in the Steering and Policy Committee and then the entire party caucus, these leaders, like the Speaker himself, are beholden to partisan colleagues. The link between a chair and a ranking minority member—Mills and Byrnes, Cannon and Taber—is now much weaker. Recently, Les Aspin of Wisconsin was rather dramatically reminded of the dangers of trying to chart a non- or bipartisan course. He nearly lost his chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee for supporting aid to the Nicaraguan contras and the development of the MX missile.

The whole party government thrust of the reforms holds risks of domination or stalemate. When the House majority has a fellow partisan in the White House, their different electoral bases naturally produce different preferences about the composition of a party program. In 1899, for example, Speaker Thomas B. Reed of Maine, one of the "fathers" of party government, resigned from the House in a dispute with fellow Republican, President William McKinley, over whether the source of party programs should be the Speaker's chair or the White House. No such dramatic difference arose between Speaker O'Neill and President Jimmy Carter, but theirs was hardly a peaceful and harmonious relationship. In the other circumstance, when the party of the White House differs from the majority in the House, partisan conflict risks stalemate and eyeblinking contests. In either partisan configuration, an eviscerated committee system provides no insulation for the House from either a trojan horse strategy (for example, Phil Gramm and Kent Hance of Texas on spending and taxes in 1981) or a going public strategy[40] orchestrated by the occupant of the White House.

Congressional Careers. One of the great benefits for the legislature of Clay's division-of-labor committee system was the regularization of career opportunities *inside* the legislature. As I suggested earlier, it is my belief that the attraction and retention of competent, talented, energetic, ambitious politicians is a key to the independence of the legislature from the executive. The diminished capacity

[38] I would like to thank Nelson Polsby for raising this point and causing me to think about it.

[39] Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

[40] Kernell, *Going Public.*

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of the committee system makes a committee-based career less attractive to today's legislator.

Members today are obviously still active on policy matters and still develop reputations for policy expertise. But they have less inclination to limit themselves to the jurisdictions of the committees on which they serve and, because of this, committee members have less incentive to invest in committee-specific human capital. If non-committee members can, on the floor, take political initiatives—say, lead the opposition to the MX missile—then committee members must wonder what special career opportunities service on the Armed Services Committee provides.

By the same token, the extreme decentralization of subcommittee government and the concomitant difficulty in orchestrating successful coalition-building, both in the full committee and then on the floor, makes even leadership experiences frustrating. The constant refrain of the contemporary Congress is "Nothing gets done around here." And, after a time, members decide to pursue careers elsewhere, either in some other area of government or outside the public sector altogether. It is ironic, indeed, that incumbent legislators have managed better than at any other time to insulate themselves from electoral challenge only to depart the legislature of their own volition because of career frustration—with too many subcommittees; an army of staffers clogging the legislative arteries; savvy, demanding constituents; the painful necessity of fund-raising; and little to show after each election cycle except successful reelection. Beginning in the 1970s, voluntary mid-career retirement began to outpace electoral defeat as the principal source of membership turnover. I should add that a generous pension policy does nothing to discourage this troubling regularity. The inability of the new legislative structure to accommodate the talents and aspirations of these relatively experienced legislators is, in my opinion, a serious cost of the representational revolt.

Representation or Governance?

The argument of this article has been that representative impulses inside the legislature conflict with the legislature's ability to maintain its separateness, its independence, and hence its influence in the larger political system. Two subsidiary theses have elaborated this argument: first, that an effective division of labor insulates the legislature from executive capture and, second, that the representational revolt of the 1970s has weakened the standing committee system.

My claim is *not* that representativeness and influence are inherently incompatible. Without a modicum of representativeness, it is most unlikely that a legislature would enjoy the degree of popular legitimacy necessary to play an independent role in governing. It is, rather, that *at some point* an increase in one may diminish the other—at some point there is a trade-off. It has been my contention that a robust division of labor insulates the legislature from the executive, and that the system of standing committees in the twentieth-century House has played this insulating role. I have suggested that the reforms of the 1970s may have weakened this protective shield.

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Does this mean that the reforms were bad? Not necessarily. Some of the reforms – for example, the War Powers Act – sought to correct something worse than being captured by the executive, *viz.*, being *ignored* by him. Even, however, where the risk of penetration and capture exist, some trade-offs are well worth making. The reining in of an excessively contrary Judge Smith of the 1950s Rules Committee was sufficiently worthwhile to warrant the action taken by Speaker Rayburn and the Democratic majority in 1961. I would only want to emphasize that even so obvious a case as this one involves trading off one good thing for another. As some of the downside excesses of independent committees are reduced, one also risks compromising some of the upside advantages they provide. Whether one concludes that the representational revolt of the 1970s was on net an unwise trade-off is a judgment call. But the judgment call is about the *wisdom* of the trade-off, not on whether or not a trade-off was involved; I think the latter is indisputable.

I need to register a second qualification to my argument. The changes in Congress of the last decade or two cannot all be laid at the doorstep of internal reform. Just as surely there have been other forces at work that have affected the internal operations of Congress. At a very basic level, sustained institutional separateness owes its existence to separate electorates for presidents and legislators, a separateness that parties were last able to bridge in the late nineteenth century. The secure electoral base of legislators in the 1960s, secure not only from opposition candidates but also from the legislator's own congressional or national (*i.e.*, presidential) party, had given them a degree of independence they never enjoyed before. The rise of grassroots politics had in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a different breed of politician being sent to Washington, one much more issue-oriented than in the past. I suspect this combination of issue orientation and electoral independence had much to do with the breakdown of juniority norms in the House, quite independent of the representational revolt of the 1970s.

Is it possible to draw a line in the sand, so to speak, and remain safely on the side that permits the greatest degree of legislative representativeness consistent with maintaining the legislature as a vibrant, independent, "separated institution sharing powers"? A proper answer to this question would provide something of a measuring rod or a standard against which existing institutional arrangements could be assessed and changes in them judged. A proper answer, unfortunately, will not be a very simple one. I suspect, however, that a key part of the answer is related to whether or not there are incentives for talented individuals to invest in legislative careers. Both the representativeness of the distribution of power and effectiveness of the division of labor bear on these incentives. Clarifying these relationships is not merely a matter for future academic research, though it certainly is that; it is, more importantly, a matter for subtle constitutional reflection.*

* This paper was originally prepared for the Constitutional Bicentennial Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1987. The author is grateful for comments on an earlier draft of this paper from former

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Congressman Richard Bolling (D., Mo.), Richard Fenno, Evelyn Fink, Morris Fiorina, Richard Neustadt, Nelson Polsby, Robert Salisbury, and Rise Shepsle. He also acknowledges research support from the Dirksen Congressional Center. Despite these kindnesses, responsibility for the contents of this final version remain with the author. Finally, it should be noted that after completing an early draft of this paper the author had occasion to reread the classic paper on institutionalization by Polsby. Many of the arguments in the present paper are anticipated in his fine paper. Indeed, the present paper may be taken as an elaboration, nearly twenty years later, of some of the themes found there.

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Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace

PAUL F. DIEHL

The problem of war has plagued international society for centuries. As increasing interdependence fostered international organizations, the world community has attempted to respond to violence in a collective manner with a variety of different approaches. Today, international organizations have come to regard preventive diplomacy, or as it is more popularly known, peacekeeping, as their primary alternative in settling international disputes. Nevertheless, international organizations have not always relied on peacekeeping to redress conflict nor was it the intention of their founders to employ such a strategy.

Although there are examples of multilateral intervention in conflict prior to the twentieth century, the first comprehensive effort to address security concerns by an international organization only dates back to the League of Nations in 1920. The League provided for a collective security system, whereby an act of war would bring political, economic, and possibly military sanctions against the aggressor.[1] The failure of the system, culminating in World War II, was foreshadowed by the League's ineffectiveness in Manchuria and Ethiopia.

Although faith in a collective security arrangement was shaken, this strategy for peace was not abandoned by the framers of the United Nations Charter. Article 43 of the Charter provides for members' contributions to supply armed forces in the conduct of collective security actions. Following other attempts at halting conflict, such as economic sanctions, collective security was to be the centerpiece

[1] See especially Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

PAUL F. DIEHL is assistant professor of political science at the University of Georgia, co-editor of *Through the Straits of Armageddon: Arms Control Issues and Prospects,* and editor of *The Politics of International Organizations.*

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of the UN efforts to deal with the problem of war. The agreements necessary to implement the provisions of Article 43, however, were never successfully negotiated. Thus, the lack of available military forces makes UN threats against aggression appear somewhat hollow. Furthermore, the absence of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council virtually precludes any form of military enforcement action.

Only the Korean police action in the early 1950s approximates the kind of collective security operation envisioned by the founders. The Korean action avoided a Security Council veto by virtue of the Soviet boycott of that body. In addition, the General Assembly, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, took on the major responsibilities for authorizing the operation. The recurrence of either of these conditions so as to permit a similar operation is now so unlikely that the Security Council stalemate has effectively signaled an end to collective security as a viable option. In early 1963, Secretary-General U Thant sounded the death toll for collective security:

> The idea that conventional military methods—or to put it bluntly, war—can be used by or on the behalf of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace, seems now to be rather impractical.[2]

The gradual abandonment of a collective security strategy led the UN to seek other means to insure international peace and security. The Suez Crisis presented the United Nations with a difficult problem. Observation forces were insufficient to ensure disengagement, and collective enforcement action would risk a confrontation between four world powers. The solution was to create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to facilitate withdrawal of troops, prevent a recurrence of hostilities, and act as a barrier separating the protagonists. A new strategy of peacekeeping had been created.

Although the creation of a peacekeeping force is not mentioned in the Charter,[3] the UN has relied heavily on this approach since 1956. One reason is that the membership has found it easier to achieve consensus on a peacekeeping operation than on collective security. Peacekeeping brands no state as the aggressor and is *not* designed to influence the military balance in the area. Indeed, consent of the host state is necessary before the peacekeeping unit is deployed. Thus, one side in a dispute does not necessarily benefit from the UN action, and in this respect peacekeeping is less controversial than collective security or any other punitive action.

[2] These remarks are taken from an address by U Thant to the Harvard Alumni Association on 13 June 1963. Quoted in William Bishop, *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 260.

[3] The legal basis for authorizing peacekeeping operations has long been a hotly debated issue in the legal community. An excellent summary and analysis of the various legal positions on the matter can be found in Dan Ciobanu, "The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peacekeeping Operations" in Antonio Cassesse, ed., *United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays* (Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), 15–53.

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In addition, the positive commitment required of UN members is fairly small. Troops are usually drawn from only a few countries (on a voluntary basis) and the mission is relatively safe for those involved.[4] Although it would be a gross overstatement to say that no controversy exists over peacekeeping operations, there is a broader basis of support in international organizations for this technique than other methods for securing international peace.

The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as:

> the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.[5]

The primary goal of a peacekeeping operation is to halt armed conflict or prevent its recurrence. It achieves this goal by acting as a physical barrier between hostile parties and monitoring their military movements. A secondary purpose of peacekeeping is to create a stable environment for negotiations, which could lead to resolution of the underlying conflict. The operation can defuse tensions between the parties by giving each side time to cool-off without fear of imminent attack. In theory, this should make them more willing to negotiate and offer concessions.

If peacekeeping operations are effective, they can help resolve conflict without bloodshed—a valuable accomplishment indeed. Nevertheless, no approach to peace is ideally suited to every situation. One approach may be a complete success under one set of conditions, but a total failure under another. Variations in the implementation of a program can also influence success rates. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the conditions that contribute to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Our initial focus is on the characteristics of the operations themselves; the elements of organization, impartiality, and logistics, among others, are considered. Second, the level of cooperative behavior exhibited by interested parties is assessed, as is its impact on the operations' effectiveness. From an analysis of this multiplicity of factors in a comparative case study, we hope to gain a more complete picture of when and how peacekeeping operations should be used.

Identifying the conditions enabling a peacekeeping operation to be successful has theoretical as well as practical utility. Most studies of international intervention in crises fail to differentiate the various forms that intervention has taken.[6]

[4] Chapter 14 of Inis Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971) provides an authoritative comparison of preventive diplomacy and other approaches to peace available to international organizations.

[5] This definition is quoted in Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 11.

[6] For example, see Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, "International Crises, 1945–1975: The U.N. Dimension," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March 1984): 45–68; and Robert Butterworth, *Moderation From Management* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1978).

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As a result, there is little basis for ascertaining the relative utility of different approaches to peace in different situations. In addition, the numerous volumes on peacekeeping have almost exclusively offered idiographic historical accounts. There have been few efforts to study specific strategies to insure peace and develop generalized conclusions. This study is an initial attempt to fill those theoretical gaps.

Determining the situations appropriate to peacekeeping could help avoid costly mistakes or missed opportunities in the future. Plans formulated under Security Council Resolution 435,[7] but currently in abeyance, provide for a peacekeeping force in Namibia; the troops would police a cease-fire and supervise the elections that would lead to Namibia's independence. In addition, regional or international peacekeeping has been suggested as part of plans to solve instability in Chad and Northern Ireland, and various proposals for a Mideast peace include a peacekeeping component. This study can hopefully offer insights into the appropriateness of these and other proposed peacekeeping operations.

The recent peacekeeping experience in Beirut demonstrates that this approach to peace is no longer exclusively exercised by international or regional organizations. The terrible loss of life in that mission reveals that national decision makers may not fully understand such operations. Our analysis can offer some rough guidelines to policy makers in international organizations and national capitals on peacekeeping and its effectiveness. We begin by specifying the cases of preventive diplomacy to be studied and estimating their overall effectiveness.

Cases

The analysis of preventive diplomacy is inherently limited by the comparatively small number of historical examples. In contrast, scholars studying interstate conflict have the benefit of investigating a large number of incidents in their search for generalized patterns. We, therefore, must be content with comparing a few peacekeeping operations in the hope of discovering common problems and successes. Nevertheless, the cases chosen must be sufficiently similar so as to permit meaningful comparison, yet demonstrate enough variation in order to allow some conclusions about the important factors affecting peacekeeping.

We have decided to concentrate on six peacekeeping operations, including the earliest and most recent examples: The United Nations Emergency Force, with operations conducted after the Suez Crisis (UNEF I) and following the Yom Kippur War (UNEF II); the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC); the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and the Multinational Force of American, British, French, and Italian troops stationed in Beirut (MNF).

The selection of these cases was guided by a number of principles. First, we wished to focus on those operations that were deployed to maintain cease-fires

[7] Security Council Resolution 435, 29 September 1978.

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with military interposition forces. Consequently, we ignore observer and other civilian forces. In those instances, the performance of the missions played only a minor role in the maintenance of peace. Second, we looked only at operations that were sent to conflicts prior to final resolution of the disputes between the parties. Because some significant conflict remains, we are better able to assess the impact of the operations on conflict reduction and peace maintenance. Finally, we purposely ignored operations that resembled occupying forces more than peacekeeping troops and whose purpose was to preserve the hegemony of a regional power. Examples of such operations were the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon following the 1975 civil war. We are then left with the six operations noted above that are consistent with our purposes. Beside confining our analysis to those operations that neatly correspond to the goals of preventive diplomacy, we have chosen our sample so that it has a number of attractive features.

First, the sample enables the analyst to consider international intervention in two different settings: civil and interstate conflict. The sample cases include operations sent into an area wrecked by internal instability, as well as those that concerned themselves primarily with the separation of warring states. Whether preventive diplomacy is more appropriate to one kind of conflict than another can be a subject for inquiry. Another feature of the sample is that different operations within the same geographic area (the Middle East) involving many of the same protagonists can be compared. In effect, the environmental context is held constant to some extent, and the effect of differences in the conduct of the operations can be assessed. Indeed, two different segments of the same operation (UNEF I and UNEF II) make for almost a perfect analysis of this kind.

Finally, comparisons are possible between operations conducted by an international organization and one conducted by a multilateral grouping of nations without international sanction. Whether peacekeeping should become a primary option in national foreign policy or whether such operations should be exclusive to international bodies can be judged. Before considering the factors affecting success in peacekeeping operations, we offer a brief description and evaluation of each sample case.

Estimating a peacekeeping operation's success is a difficult problem. It seems to us, however, that a successful operation should achieve two things in particular. First, the operation should prevent a renewal of armed hostilities between the disputing parties. Maintaining the cease-fire is its primary function and a prerequisite to attempts at reconciling the protagonists. Second, the peacekeeping operation should facilitate a final, peaceful resolution to the dispute. This often can be a monumental task, and the blame for failure cannot always rest solely on the operation itself. Nevertheless, unless the underlying sources of conflict are resolved, the threat of renewed war is always present. Thus, in evaluating each operation, we focus primarily on the first criterion of success, but recognize the importance of the second and devote a section at the conclusion of this study to the problems inherent in attaining final conflict resolution.

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UNEF I

UNEF I was the first real peacekeeping operation, extending its functions beyond those of mere observation. It grew out of the Suez crisis in 1956, when a means was needed to stop the war between Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt. Because of the direct involvement of permanent members of the Security Council, the UN General Assembly took the initiative, using the same technique as it had six years before with respect to Korea, a Uniting for Peace Resolution.[8] A peacekeeping force was set up to separate the combatants and supervise the withdrawal of British and French troops in the area. Finally, the peacekeeping forces acted as a barrier to Arab-Israeli engagement, patrolling parts of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

That the Six Day War occurred in 1967 may be evidence of UNEF's failure. Nevertheless, this ignores that the operation achieved almost eleven years of peace with few violent incidents in a highly volatile area of the world. Despite many terrorist attacks and threats against Israel from other parts of the Middle East, the area patrolled by UNEF I was comparatively calm. To that extent, the operation was quite successful.

That the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, asked UNEF I to withdraw and war soon followed demonstrates that the peacekeeping operation did little to resolve the underlying sources of conflict. UNEF I apparently removed some of the urgency for conflict resolution and perhaps contributed to prolonging the dispute, albeit without armed interaction.[9]

ONUC

As was the case with many African states, the Congo (now Zaire) was ill-prepared for its 1960 independence from colonial domination. Domestic instability soon led to the intervention of its former colonial master, Belgium; the Congolese government requested assistance from the United Nations to redress this infringement of its sovereignty. Fresh from its initial success in the Middle East, the UN created the ONUC force in 1960, giving Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold wide latitude in its use.

Initially, ONUC was designed to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops and help the central government maintain law and order. The situation, however, became more complicated when the province of Katanga sought to secede, and the

[8] See General Assembly Resolutions 998 (ES-I), 4 November 1956; 1000 (ES-I), 5 November 1956; and 1001, 7 November 1956. Most of the relevant documents for this operation can be found in Roselyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967 Documents and Commentary*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[9] For more information on UNEF I, see William Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York: Oceana, 1957); Gabriella Rosner, *The United Nations Emergency Force* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); and Maxwell Cohen, "The Demise of UNEF" *International Journal* 23 (Winter 1967–68): 18–51.

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central government split among factions. The peacekeeping forces were then additionally charged with maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo (that is, stopping the secessionist movement in Katanga) and preventing the outbreak of a full-scale civil war.[10] In 1963, ONUC became part of a military effort, actively engaging in limited military combat, to defeat secessionist forces in Katanga. ONUC forces finally withdrew in 1964 with the outward signs of conflict resolved.

In a certain sense, ONUC was a successful operation. It did prevent Katanga from seceding and managed to avert a full-scale civil war. In addition, the operation helped gain a meeting of Congo's National Assembly, and some sense of political normality was restored. On the other hand, this was far from a textbook operation. There was a great deal of bloodshed during the four years of ONUC's mission, some of it caused by the use of military force by the peacekeeping forces. Thus, while ONUC might be called a success, it is difficult to attribute all of that success to the principles of peacekeeping.[11]

UNFICYP

The next incidence of UN peacekeeping again involved the difficult transition to independence for a new state—Cyprus. At first, British, Turkish, and Greek troops were deployed to keep peace on the island. Their action was far from successful as ethnic rivalries bordered on civil war, and Turkey threatened military intervention. UN sponsored troops were deployed in 1964 to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to supervise the cease-fire in a buffer zone separating the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. The forces were also charged with various law-and-order and humanitarian functions.[12]

UNFICYP remains in place today, evidence of its success in preventing war as well as its failure in promoting a permanent settlement. The presence of peacekeeping troops has helped avert civil war when tensions were high, and there has been a gradual decrease in the number of shooting incidents over the life of the operation. UNFICYP was even able to diffuse a 1974 crisis when Turkey occupied the northern portion of the island. Yet, the hostility between the Greek and Turkish communities lingers, and the necessity for an interposition force has not lessened. Thus, it must be said the UNFICYP has been and is only a qualified success.[13]

[10] See *Security Council Resolutions* 143, 14 July 1960; and 145, 22 July 1960. Also see General Assembly Resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 20 September 1960; 145, 9 August 1960; 161, 21 February 1961; 1600 (XV), 15 April 1961; and 169, 24 November 1961; and Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, vol. 3.

[11] For more information on ONUC, see Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); George Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo* (London: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Arthur House, *The U.N. in the Congo* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978).

[12] See Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964; and Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, vol. 4. The original mandate has been generally renewed at six month intervals.

[13] For more information on UNFICYP, see James Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping," *In-*

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UNEF II

After six years in abeyance, UNEF was reconstituted in 1973 as a part of the cease-fire agreement for the Yom Kippur War. UNEF II was designed to monitor the cease-fire and the disengagement of Arab and Israeli troops much as its predecessor, UNEF I, had in earlier years.[14] The force was again withdrawn, as it had been in 1967, but this time it was because of peace and not war. The Camp David Accords, signaling an end to war between Egypt and Israel, resolved most of the disagreements over the Sinai. The need for a peacekeeping force diminished, although an observer group was still stationed in the area and a comprehensive Middle East peace was as elusive as ever.

In general, UNEF II was as successful as its predecessor in preserving the cease-fire. There were few violent incidents in the patrol area; the primary exception occurred when a UNEF aircraft crashed in Syria after being hit by anti-aircraft fire. Unlike other peacekeeping missions, however, there was an agreement between the parties for resolving the conflict. Although it may be incorrect to give the UNEF any direct credit for the peace treaty, certainly their presence made negotiations between the sides easier.[15]

UNIFIL

Although initial attempts at peacekeeping were, on the whole, quite successful, the most recent operations have yielded different results. The need for UNIFIL began with the persistant terrorist attacks launched against Israel from Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon. Israel sent troops six miles deep into Lebanon (and later extended even further) in response to the hijacking of a bus, with the aim of destroying those terrorist strongholds. The fear of major war in the area prompted the UN to establish a peacekeeping force there in 1978.[16] UNIFIL was supposed to supervise the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing sovereignty over the area. The force patrolled a wide area with the purpose of stopping terrorist activity.

The UNIFIL mission has been a failure. During the first four years of the operation, terrorist activity in the area continued, seemingly unabated; retaliatory strikes by Israel were also commonplace. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and overran

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ternational Organization 20 (Winter 1966): 1–17; and James Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

[14] See Security Council Resolutions 340, 25 October 1973 and 341, 27 October 1973.

[15] For more information on UNEF II, see Nathan Pelcovits, "U.N. Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Orbis* 19 (Spring 1975): 146–165; K.P. Saksena, "Not by Design: Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Its Implications for the Future," *International Studies* 16 (October-December 1977): 459–481; and Surendra Bhutani, *The U.N. and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Delhi: Academic Press, 1977).

[16] See Security Council Resolutions 425, 19 March 1978 and 426, 19 March 1978.

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UNIFIL positions as the Israeli forces advanced all the way to Beirut. Israel cited UNIFIL's unwillingness or inability to perform its mission as partial justification for the invasion. The latest indignity suffered by UNIFIL is the kidnapping of some of its personnel by a local militia. UNIFIL continues its presence in southern Lebanon, but there is no sign that the problems in the area are any closer to resolution than before.[17]

MNF

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, beside all but destroying UNIFIL, created a new opportunity for peacekeeping in Beirut. Israel demanded that all Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters leave the city, but was opposed to UN supervision of the exodus. A multinational force of American, French, and Italian troops were sent in to supervise the withdrawal. The short-term operation was highly successful, and the MNF quickly withdrew. A series of events occurred, however, that precipitated the redeployment of MNF troops. Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, the IDF moved into West Beirut, and a massacre occurred in two Palestinian refugee camps. The MNF was sent back into Beirut to act as an interposition force between competing militias and to aid the central government in establishing control over the country. British forces soon joined the effort.

The MNF mission is by most accounts a complete failure. The civil war escalated during MNF's presence, so much so that the peacekeeping troops had to be withdrawn because their safety could not longer be guaranteed and the political costs were judged to be too great. Many lives were lost in the exchange of fire between the troops and rival militias; suicide terrorist attacks also took their toll on the peacekeeping forces. The problems in Lebanon continue today, and the MNF was apparently little help in alleviating the conflict. Indeed, the MNF was itself a point of contention between various Lebanese factions, and its mere presence was another stumbling block to agreement.[18]

Internal Factors

In this section we look at the internal operations of the peacekeeping mission and determine their effect on its success or failure. It is not our intention to focus on all aspects of a peacekeeping operation, but rather to concentrate on the important elements that could affect whether the mission's purpose is achieved or not.

[17] For more information on UNIFIL, see Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon, 1978–1982," *International Journal* 38 (Autumn 1983): 613–634; Nathan Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab/Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); and Naomi Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," *The Middle East Journal* 37 (Summer 1983): 341–369.

[18] For more information on MNF, see Richard Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model," *International Affairs* 61 (Winter 1984–85): 67–89.

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The five factors below are those most frequently cited in reports, debates, and scholarly works on preventive diplomacy. In addition, our analysis of the six cases indicates that these factors deserve consideration, if only to dispel or confirm some of the conventional wisdom surrounding peacekeeping.

Financing

Peacekeeping operations can be quite expensive; money is needed for supplies, equipment, salaries, and various administrative costs. In the United Nations system, peacekeeping operations are not funded from the regular budget. They require a special authorization from the organization or rely on voluntary contributions. When groups of nations form a peacekeeping mission, appropriations are dependent upon each national contribution, subject to the constraint of domestic political forces. Financing is a problem for any collective action, particularly when the coercive mechanism to enforce contributions is weak.[19] A peacekeeping operation could be terminated prematurely if its source of funding were cut off. Its area of operation or its efficiency could also be severely limited if funds were insufficient.

Almost all of the UN operations studied here had difficulties with financing. Operating expenses exceeded expectations, and there was a persistent problem with nations refusing to contribute their assessed share. At the end of 1983, the debt from peacekeeping was approximately $205 million, or 68 percent of total UN indebtedness. Attempts to rectify the problem have failed. In 1964 the United States attempted to suspend noncontributing members under Article 19 of the Charter. When the United States withdrew its effort, the only legal means of pressuring recalcitrant members was effectively abandoned for political considerations. The MNF endured threats of a cutoff of funds by the Congress of the United States, but was apparently unaffected by the financial actions of other countries in the consortium.

Although the operations experienced financial difficulties, these did not seem to adversely affect the conduct of missions. Large deficits did not prevent the UN from continuing the operations, and the consequences of the financial problems were minor. For example, UNEF II was unable to purchase certain mine-sweeping equipment because of financial constraints. The UN operations benefitted from large voluntary contributions from some nations. These tended to hold down the deficits and allowed the operations to continue. A notable exception among the operations was ONUC. It was a very expensive operation, and the high cost produced constant pressure to complete the mission. It may be that this pressure encouraged the UN to use military force against Katanga and thereby complete its mission. Financial considerations were certainly important in the decision to with-

[19] The classic analysis of this problem is given in Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

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draw from the Congo, even though some analysts thought it wise to continue the mission for a little while longer.

Overall, finances were an irritating problem for peacekeeping missions, but in no case were any of the operations seriously hampered by the difficulty. Financial support of a peacekeeping operation is to some degree a barometer of the political support for the operation. Financial problems themselves apparently will not jeopardize the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, but they could be the official cause of death were enough political support withdrawn.

Geography

Another consideration in the success or failure of preventive diplomacy is the locus of deployment. Where the operation is located can influence the effectiveness of its patrols. If the size of the area is great, the monitoring of conflicting parties' action could be problematic; the margin for error in detection and verification would increase. The vulnerability of the peacekeeping forces to hostile fire also could damage their effectiveness and possibly draw them into the military struggle.

In our six cases, geographic considerations were important in the success or failure of each operation. The most successful operations had certain geographic advantages. The two UNEF missions were located in mostly desert terrain in sparsely populated areas. This allowed for easy observation of military movements and infiltration attempts. This advantage clearly outweighed the minor problems encountered with desert transportation. UNFICYP was fortunate to be located on an island separated from Greece and Turkey, who might have more easily instigated trouble had they been contiguous by land to Cyprus. In these three instances, geography assisted in the prevention of conflict.

A number of general rules can be derived by looking at those missions that were less than successful. First, when the peacekeeping troops did not separate the combatants by a significant distance, the results were adverse. The French troops in the MNF were stationed at the so-called Green Line separating East and West Beirut. Their presence was not enough to halt sniper fire or artillery attack over their heads. The buffer zone was much too narrow to effectively separate the rival militias. UNIFIL encountered a similar problem over a larger geographic area as political considerations prevented it from taking its desired positions. They were unable to prevent rocket attacks or retaliatory raids by either the Israelis or the Palestinians, as each side was still close enough to do damage to the other.

Another geographic problem concerned logistics. If the area of deployment did not permit easy observation of the combatants, problems could arise. UNIFIL had to patrol a very rural portion of Lebanon, and it was rather easy for guerrilla fighters to infiltrate the area. ONUC operated in such a large geographic area that it was difficult to monitor all the activities around them, much less supply their own troops in an orderly fashion. A final rule is that the vulnerability of peacekeeping positions to attack can undermine their neutrality and complicate their

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mission. The MNF forces of the Americans and French were located in areas open to attack. The American position was at the Beirut airport on low ground and subject to attack from the surrounding hills. The attacks on French and American positions led them to take an active role in combat, contrary to the basic principles of preventive diplomacy.

In general, geographic considerations were important to the success of peacekeeping missions. It appears that the peacekeeping forces ideally should be placed in an area that is relatively invulnerable, yet is easy to patrol and separates the combatants at a distance capable of preventing armed exchanges. Nevertheless, a favorable location is no guarantee that the mission will turn out well. At best, one might hope that a particular deployment will prevent violent incidents that could escalate and renew the warfare.

Clarity of the Mandate

A frequently cited problem, especially in light of the truck-bomb tragedy in Lebanon, is the absence of a clear mandate for a peacekeeping mission.[20] A clearly defined mandate restricts the latitude of action given the mission, thereby limiting both the controversy over possible actions and the potential manipulation of the force by interested parties. A clear mandate also may generate greater public support in that the populace can identify and understand the purpose of the operation.

In practice, the most successful missions have begun with clear mandates. Nevertheless, the causal links between mandate clarity and operation success are not clear. Some missions had problems emanating from their mandates, but it is not evident whether these were sufficient to do serious damage. The MNF had very few guidelines to follow in its second deployment.[21] American forces had no clear idea of what to do beyond holding down positions around the airport.[22] This not only undermined public and congressional support, but perhaps led the force to undertake military actions that were inconsistent with the concept of peacekeeping. ONUC also experienced some problems because of its mandate. The

[20] For example, both Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options" and Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping" give primary importance to this factor.

[21] Unlike a UN operation, there is no authorizing resolution stating the mandate of MNF's operation. The closest one comes to a statement of the mandate came from Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes: "The MNF is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the MNF presence requested by the Government of Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon's armed forces in the Beirut area" (quote taken from *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan*, book II, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, 1202). This is still vague and quite in contrast to the first deployment of MNF, when the guidelines for supervising PLO withdrawal were fairly specific.

[22] Problems with the mandate were complicated by the lack of training in peacekeeping measures for the military personnel. MNF troops were primarily combat personnel, unaccustomed to holding down a defensive position without firing at an enemy force. For a description of peacekeeping training, see Richard Swift, "United Nations Military Training for Peace," *International Organization* 28 (Spring 1974): 267–280.

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secretary-general was granted enormous power in the conduct of that operation, and his actions led to an erosion of support for the mission among UN members. Furthermore, the ONUC mandate was modified several times, leading to confusion and additional erosion of support.

It is evident from these six cases that a clear mandate is useful for a peacekeeping operation. Yet, that clarity is often only a reflection of the underlying political consensus on the mission. A clear mandate often can generate little support in the deliberative bodies that authorize such operations. In controversial situations some operations would never have taken place without a vague mandate. The operations that had a vague mandate can attribute their major problems to something other than the mandate itself. In short, the importance of a clear mandate is probably overestimated, for it is merely a surrogate for the political consensus underlying it.

Command and Control

Any organizational program needs to have a smooth method of operation. A peacekeeping mission can be jeopardized if it makes mistakes, cannot carry out its duties effectively, or lacks coordination. The most common command and control problem in over six cases was language. By organizing forces from many different nations, it was often difficult for commanders to communicate on a one-to-one basis (much less in any larger aggregation) with their subordinates.

A central command can solve coordination problems, and four of our sample operations were set up on this fashion. ONUC was somewhat disorganized because it lacked a central command.[23] It did, however, have a coordinating body to ensure that the forces were not working at cross purposes. ONUC's only problem occurred when it was unclear who gave orders for a particular maneuver during the operation. The MNF was linked only through liaison officers. The sharing of intelligence and the mapping of joint strategy correspondingly suffered.

Most peacekeeping operations have run smoothly, with command and control problems affecting the efficiency, but not the overall success, of the missions. Language problems can be cumbersome, but there is an inherent tradeoff in making a peacekeeping force representative versus making it efficient. Most of the command and control problems should dissipate in the future.[24] From the benefits of experience, the UN can now send trained personnel into the field and choose from among many experienced individuals to direct the peacekeeping units. Should

[23] An elaboration on ONUC's problem in this regard is given by Lincoln Bloomfield, "Political Control of International Forces in Dealing with Problems of Local Instability" in Arthur Waskow, *Quis Custodiet? Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World* (Washington, D.C.: Peace Research Institute, 1963), appendix E.

[24] An excellent operations manual detailing the mechanics of setting up and conducting a peacekeeping operation is International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).

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any collective effort be launched by a group of nations, they too should learn from the mistakes of the MNF. Other than an unprecedented case of complete incompetence, command and control problems are unlikely to ruin a peacekeeping operation.

Neutrality

An essential component of the preventive diplomacy strategy is that the forces should not work to the benefit of either side. Historically, military personnel from nonaligned countries were used to guarantee this neutrality. Two informal rules have arisen in choosing troops for the peacekeeping force. The first is to never allow forces from a state involved in the conflict to participate in the operation. A second rule is to bar troop contributions from major power nations or their allies. In these ways it was hoped that the conflicting parties would regard the peacekeeping forces as unbiased and disinterested. Because the host state's consent is necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces, the failure of the host state to approve a particular force composition prevents that operation from taking place.

In our sample those operations that were staffed almost entirely from disinterested, nonaligned nations had the least difficulty. Nevertheless, we found the Cyprus operation was equally effective, despite being composed primarily of troops from NATO countries, including those of ex-colonial power Britain. This seems to indicate that troops from nonaligned countries are not a prerequisite for success. Nevertheless, they are no guarantee of it either; Israel claimed UNIFIL was guilty of aiding the Palestinian cause and took violent action. The MNF operation had terrible difficulties arising from the perceived unfairness of the troops. Many of the factions in Lebanon regarded U.S. troops as supporters of their two principal enemies in the dispute, the Gemayel government and Israel. This immediately subjected the forces to distrust and later to hostile fire. These suspicions seemed to be confirmed when the United States helped to train Lebanese government troops and shelled surrounding villages. The French encountered a similar response from the militias. The Italian contingent was regarded as neutral by all sides, owing to its behavior during the operation (which included numerous humanitarian acts) and the political stance of its government. As a result, they generally were not the subject of protest or attack.

Overall, drawing peacekeeping personnel from nonaligned countries is desirable, but is not a necessary condition for successful completion of the mission. Neutrality in peacekeeping is determined more by behavior and situation than by force composition. To the extent that the troops' behavior is perceived as biased and that it undermines the cooperation between conflicting parties, the peacekeeping mission could be ruined. Furthermore, troops supplied by a given country may be regarded as neutral in one situation (for example, Tanzanian troops in Latin America), but not necessarily under a different scenario (the same troops in Namibia). All things being equal, however, a nonaligned force is more desirable than any other. The nonaligned force is more likely to be accepted by all sides

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and will be less likely to take actions that may be interpreted as unfair by one or more of the parties.

Relevant Actors

Common sense and the previous analysis tell us that the manner in which a peacekeeping operation is conducted is not the sole determinant of success or failure. In this section, we consider the behavior of a number of relevant actors with an eye to estimating their impact on peacekeeping operations. First, we investigate the actions of the primary disputants or host state(s) in the conflict. We then consider other states, which may be regional powers or neighboring countries that take an active role in the conflict. Because peacekeeping operations often deal with instability in the host state(s), we also analyze the behavior of subnational groups. Finally, the policies of the superpowers are weighed. They have the global power, not to mention a dominant role in the Security Council, to dramatically influence a peacekeeping mission.

Primary Disputants

Before peacekeeping troops are deployed on a nation's territory, they must have the consent of that nation's government. If it is an interstate conflict, the other disputant(s) must usually agree to refrain from military force. A successful peacekeeping operation, however, depends on more than this initial level of cooperation. It would seem that the conflicting states also must not try to exploit the peacekeeping troops for their own advantage and refrain from incidents that could lead to a return of open warfare. If one side is not sincere in its support of peacekeeping or changes its policy over the course of the operation, the mission could be doomed.[25]

In practice, the maintenance of cooperation between the primary disputants has not been a severe problem. In both UNEF operations Egypt was generally cooperative with the peacekeeping forces. Israel demonstrated a less cooperative attitude, but at no time did it initiate violent opposition. The disagreements were minor disputes concerning the use of troops from nations that did not recognize the Israeli state. The other operations had similar results, as the host state(s) usually did little to hinder the mission. In one instance, the Cyprus National Guard blocked access to certain areas, but this problem was short-lived. The major exception to this pattern of cooperative behavior was Israel's actions toward UNIFIL. Israel

[25] Of course, if the host state formally withdraws consent, the peace operation is terminated. This occurred in 1967 as Egypt asked UNEF I forces to leave. Despite some suggestions to the contrary by members of the international community, U Thant complied with this request. See Jack Garvey, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent," *American Journal of International Law* 64 (April 1970): 241–269.

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initially refused to turn over territory where the UNIFIL forces would patrol. Its subsequent behavior, including the 1982 invasion, showed a complete disregard of the force and its mission.

We tend to agree with David Wainhouse that "where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain."[26] Nevertheless, the initial level of agreement needed to establish the force has usually persisted; problems from the primary disputants have not been empirically important in the failure of the missions. Our analysis has discovered that while cooperation from the disputants is a necessary condition for success, it is not a sufficient one. This is particularly relevant when the host state has a very weak government. Although the Congolese government supported ONUC, the split among factions prevented it from fully aiding the operation. The Lebanese government support for UNIFIL and MNF had little impact because that government did not have *de facto* control over the areas where the troops were deployed.

Third Party States

Third party intervention can play a prominent role in international conflict. Allies of the conflicting parties may take certain actions (for example, supplying arms, diplomatic pressure) that may assist or hinder resolution of the conflict. Peacekeeping operations are subject to these same benefits and constraints. Neighboring states or regional powers may have a stake in the outcome of the conflict and consequently may take actions in support of or contrary to the goals of the peacekeeping mission.

Among our sample cases, five involved significant intervention by third party states. UNEF II was the only operation that was not significantly affected by the actions of a third party state. It may be coincidental, but this mission not only kept the peace, the conflict was resolved by treaty. The other operations all experienced negative effects from the actions of other states. UNEF I was terminated after Syria and Jordon pressured Egypt into joining their military action against Israel. It is unlikely that without that pressure Egypt would have expelled the peacekeeping force and gone to war with Israel at that time. In the Congo, Belgium encouraged the secessionist movement, and Belgian mercenaries joined in the armed struggle. A similar situation occurred in Cyprus as Turkey promoted the founding of a secessionist Turkish-Cypriot state on the island. On various occasions Turkey also made threats against the Greek majority there. The peacekeeping operations were severely jeopardized or complicated in each case.

Not surprisingly, the failed missions (MNF and UNIFIL) faced strong opposition from neighboring states. Syria played a critical role in each operation's downfall. Syria supplied weapons and other support to PLO fighters in southern Leb-

[26] David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 557.

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anon, helping them to infiltrate UNIFIL lines and attack Israeli positions. Syria opposed MNF through its allies among the factions in Beirut. It supplied weapons and pressured the Shi'ite and Druse factions not to accept a solution involving the MNF. There is also some indication that Syria, Iran, and possibly Libya had a hand in supporting terrorist attacks against the peacekeeping forces. Given its influence in Lebanon, Syria could have been a positive influence for MNF, but its actions were a major factor in the mission's failure.

It was difficult to detect any positive pressure in support of peacekeeping from this kind of analysis. Third party intervention was primarily negative and proved critical in damaging certain operations. Yet, this noncooperation from third party states is not automatically fatal to a mission. For example, UNFICYP survived despite the actions of Turkey. A peacekeeping operation can be destroyed if the third party state encourages violence from another state of subnational group and/or undertakes violence itself. A large portion of the blame for the UNIFIL and MNF failures must be borne not by the primary disputants, but rather by hostile third states.

Subnational Groups

Just as other states might influence peacekeeping operations, so too might subnational groups in the host or neighboring states. The behavior of these groups could be particularly important when peacekeeping forces are thrust into areas of internal instability. Preventive diplomacy may be viewed unfavorably by groups seeking to topple the government of the host state; preservation of peace and the status quo favor the established government.

Subnational groups played little role in either UNEF operation, but were detrimental in the other operations. The PLO never really accepted UNIFIL, claiming that Palestinians had a right to operate in the disputed area. Consequently, they smuggled weapons into UNIFIL's patrol area and launched attacks against Israeli targets. Following the 1982 invasion, UNIFIL has continued to have difficulty dealing with uncooperative local militias, particularly the South Lebanese Army. ONUC faced problems from the Katanga independence movement and various tribal groups that supported factional leaders in the central government.

Perhaps the best example of how subnational groups can destroy a peacekeeping operation is the tragedy of the MNF. Lebanon consisted of a large number of competing factions, none of which actually supported the MNF presence. Even the Christian Phalangists were less than enthusiastic about the operation, as they continued battles with Moslem factions. The Shi'ite and Druse factions opposed the MNF; they felt it was a shield for the Gemayel government. Part of their demands for a resolution to the conflict was a withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces. Terrorist groups were at times just as damaging as those of third party states. When those states and subnational groups acted in unison to undermine the operation, not even the support of the host state could save the operation.

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Superpowers

An analysis of peacekeeping success should not ignore the behavior of another group of third parties – the superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union (along with the other three permanent members of the Security Council) have the power to veto a resolution that initially authorizes a UN peacekeeping operation. Because the initial authorization is usually for a specified time period, the operation and its mandate will again be subject to that power if renewal is necessary. Beyond their powers in the United Nations, the superpowers can use their political, economic, and military power to influence the actors in the area of conflict. In these ways the superpowers have the potential to rescue or destroy peacekeeping operations.

The United States has proved quite helpful to the cause of preventive diplomacy. Its political support was often the driving force behind the creation of peacekeeping operations. Later, the United States provided logistical support and other voluntary contributions to keep the operations running smoothly. Its support of the MNF troops, through the bombing of suspected terrorist bases, proved counterproductive, because it increased hostility against the operation. The Soviet Union was reluctant to offer political and financial support for ONUC and other operations, but demonstrated little active opposition in the way of military action or vetoing resolutions. It did resupply Syria during the MNF's operation and vetoed a resolution authorizing a UN force to replace MNF. Yet, the MNF was too badly damaged already to say that the Soviets' actions were decisive.

It is easy to attribute a great deal of influence to the superpowers in any area of world politics. Nevertheless, in the UN peacekeeping operations studied here, their actual influence was less than conventional wisdom might predict. The superpowers clearly played an important role in setting up some of these operations.[27] Of particular note was their ability to halt the 1973 Mideast war and install UNEF II forces. The success of the operations once in place, however, was only marginally affected by superpower behavior. At best, they helped supply the operations and gave them some political support. At worst, they complicated an operation's efficiency and increased its controversy. The superpowers have a great potential to do good or harm to peacekeeping. While their behavior must be considered in any evaluation of peacekeeping, we have found that thus far, their actual influence has been overrated.

Conclusions

International peacekeeping has had a mixed record of success over the past thirty years. The main reason for the failure of peacekeeping operations has been the

[27] Nathan Pelcovits and Kevin Kramer, "Local Conflict and U.N. Peacekeeping: The Uses of Computerized Data," *International Studies Quarterly* 20 (December 1976): 533–552, reports a strong correlation between superpower intervention in a conflict and the use of peacekeeping. This demonstrates

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opposition of third party states and subnational groups. By refusing to stop violent activity and in some cases attacking the peacekeeping forces, these two sets of actors can undermine a whole operation. The failure of UNIFIL and MNF can be attributed to this as can many of the problems encountered by other operations. This leaves us with something of a tautology: peacekeeping is succesful only when all parties wish to stop fighting. Peacekeeping forces can do certain things (remain neutral) to ensure that desire for peace continues. Nevertheless, peacekeeping will fail or be severely damaged if peace is not initially desired by all parties.

Although the primary disputants and the superpowers each had a great deal of power to destroy a peacekeeping operation, our study revealed that neither group generally took strong action in opposition to the operation. To set up a peacekeeping force, the host state(s) must grant its (their) approval, indicating some desire to stop fighting. If the peacekeeping force was organized by the United Nations, the Security Council would likely have to approve it; superpower acquiescence is the minimum requirement for this. Therefore, once a peacekeeping operation is authorized, there is already confirmation that it is not opposed by the primary disputants or the superpowers. Operations opposed by either of these two groups will likely never come into being.

The internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation were generally found to have a relatively minor impact on the mission's success. A clear mandate was useful, but hardly critical in determining the outcome. When the mandate was vague, the underlying political consensus was already shaky, and the mission experienced support problems with the various interested parties. The same conclusion is appropriate with respect to the financing and organization of the peacekeeping force. Problems with funding and command structure served to make the operation less efficient, but not necessarily less successful. Budget deficits were ameliorated by voluntary contributions or ignored. Command and control difficulties were never serious enough to jeopardize any of the operations.

Two aspects of the operations did have an impact on their success: geography and neutrality. Peacekeeping operations performed best when their areas of deployment adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and permitted easy observation. The absence of these conditions undermined confidence in the operation and allowed minor incidents to escalate. The neutrality of the peacekeeping forces was also significant. If the peacekeeping force is perceived as biased, support from interested parties was likely to be withheld or withdrawn. As we have seen, this is enough to ruin the operation. Neutral behavior is not always linked with nonaligned force composition. The likelihood, however, that a force composed from nonaligned countries will take action favoring one party (or be perceived as doing so) is much less.

From these findings, we can draw a few guidelines regarding the use of a preven-

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that the superpowers are also an indirect stimulus for peacekeeping operations, beyond their more direct role in the UN Security Council.

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tive diplomacy strategy.[28] Peacekeeping is most appropriate in a conflict in which all parties are willing to halt hostilities and accept a peacekeeping force. Consideration must be given to more than just the primary disputants; other interested states and subnational groups deserve attention. If these latter two actors oppose the operation, then the peacekeeping option might be reconsidered unless the opposition is minor or would not involve violent activity. This criterion may confine peacekeeping operations to conflicts that involve relatively few actors, for the probability of consensus will decrease as the number of interested parties increases.

Implementation by an international organization is to be preferred to a multilateral grouping of nations. The UN in particular now has extensive experience with peacekeeping and is more likely to conduct an efficient operation. More importantly, however, an international organization will be better able to acquire consent from the host state(s) and approval from interested parties.[29] It is not that a multinational peacekeeping force cannot suceed, but rather problems with perceived bias (justified or otherwise) will be more likely and its moral authority will not be as great.

Once it has been established that the relevant actors will support a peacekeeping operation, the UN command should give special attention to taking a proper geographic position, as well as continuing its policy of neutral force composition. Although the issues of mandate, financing, and command should not be ignored, neither should problems with them hold up the operation.

The findings of this study do more than confirm conventional wisdom about peacekeeping, although in some cases they do that too. The importance of the mandate and the role of the superpowers is considerably less than has been assumed. Analysts have also probably overestimated the importance of the primary disputants and the operation's command structure once there is an agreed-upon cease-fire. Yet, as is prominent in the literature on conflict and peacekeeping, the importance of third parties, neutrality, and geography is reaffirmed. Regardless of whether the guidelines laid down here conform to prior expectations about peacekeeping, they bear repetition. We know that policy makers too often ignore or forget these guidelines, with the MNF being the most recent example of neglect. According to these guidelines, the number of peacekeeping operations would be limited, but the rate of success should be positively affected.

[28] Although we look at peacekeeping operations as presently constituted, there have been many proposals for improvement. Representative of these efforts and ideas are Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); and Alastair Taylor, "Peacekeeping: The International Context" in Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response* (Ontario: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 1–40.

[29] Certain nations, such as Israel and South Africa, may object to peacekeeping operations directed by the United Nations, because of the perceived bias of that institution toward their interests. In that event, a multinational force may be more appropriate. In general, however, its advantages over a UN force are minimal. See Frank Gregory, *The Multinational Force: Aid or Obstacle to Conflict Resolution*, Conflict Study, no. 170, Institute for the Study of Conflict (London: Eastern Press, 1984).

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Is Peacekeeping Appropriate for Civil Instability?

It is clear that "peacekeeping has been less problematic and generally operated more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to the peace by external aggression."[30] For two reasons, peacekeeping is most successful when two nation-states are the only protagonists. First, it is much easier to gain agreement between two sets of interests than among many more. Second, peacekeeping forces are better able to monitor the behavior of only two parties separated by identifiable boundaries. Civil instability may involve many groups operating freely within their own country. In this way, the peacekeeping strategy is best applied to interstate conflict involving two nations.

Peacekeeping is not impossible in civil conflict, but there are certain hurdles to its successful use under those conditions. Peacekeeping tends to favor the challenged government. A cease-fire halts pressure on the government and may win it political capital with a populace longing for stability. Peace means continued domination by the status quo elites in the eyes of rebel groups. Unless that perception can be changed, subnational groups will view the peacekeeping operation as hostile to their interests. Unfortunately, some operations (ONUC and MNF) have included provisions for strengthing the central government in their mandate. Before a peacekeeping force is sent to an area of civil internal unrest, it must have at least the tacit acceptance of relevant subnational groups there. To do this, its mandate should not include functions that give any advantage to the challenged government. This will be quite difficult without losing the approval of the central government. Agreement will also be complicated as the number of contending parties increases. Sometimes, it may be almost impossible to patrol areas where many different groups operate, much less balance competing interests among them.

Peacekeeping encounters certain problems when applied to civil strife. Success is still possible, but it will be much more difficult. Under these guidelines, the number of civil conflicts appropriate to preventive diplomacy will be few. The alternative, however, is the certainty of problems and the high probability of failure.

Does Peacekeeping Promote Conflict Resolution?

Some of the peacekeeping operations studied here prevented violence successfully, but only one facilitated the peaceful resolution of the underlying conflict; UNEF II was terminated after the implementation of the Camp David Accords. The breakthrough between Egypt and Israel can be explained by reference to the leadership of Anwar Sadat and the intervention of the United States, rather than the efforts of UNEF II. UNEF II surely aided the process by helping prevent military conflict, but overall its role was comparatively small.

[30] Azinna Nwafor, *United Nations Use of Armed Forces in Internal War Conditions for the Maintenance of International Stability,* Ph.D diss., University of Michigan, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1970), 47.

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Other evidence suggests that peacekeeping may have a detrimental impact on negotiations for resolution of the conflict. Peacekeeping removes much of the pressure from a conflict situation. This may allow each side to cool off, but more often it has taken away the immediate need for a resolution. Parties no longer feel compelled to solve the conflict in a rapid fashion. As a result, they may harden their positions and refuse to make the concessions that often come with a need to resolve a crisis.[31] The status quo under peacekeeping also may become a desirable outcome itself for the parties; it offers a halt to the fighting without loss of face. Nations can still hold out the hope that the international environment will change and their goals will be achieved. UNEF I lasted eleven years under just such a hope. UNFICYP is now in its twenty-fourth year, and there are no signs that negotiations will soon lead to an agreement.

Peacekeeping can apparently do little beyond offering a halt to the fighting. Attempts to tie the peacekeeping operation to the negotiation process may be proven to be counterproductive. Focus on the peacekeeping operation may overshadow the mediation efforts.[32] Controversy over the conduct of the operation could also poison the negotiations.[33] On the other hand, a failure at mediation might adversely affect the peacekeeping component.

There are no easy solutions to this apparent dilemma. As long as preventing bloodshed is a top priority, peacekeeping will continue to be a viable means of international intervention. Scholars and diplomats must devise new means of resolving underlying conflict once the violence is stopped.

Some Final Notes

We offer a few caveats and considerations on this analysis of preventive diplomacy. We are limited in anticipating how and where the peacekeeping strategy might be applied next. The superpowers did not play a critical role in the five UN operations studied here, but this is not to say that they can not or will not in the future. In addition, a multinational operation sponsored by nonaligned countries (such

[31] Time pressure is positively associated with coming to an agreement as can be seen in David Brookmire and Frank Sistrunk, "The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (June 1980): 311–327; see also Samuel Komorita and Marc Barnes, "Effects of Pressures to Reach Agreement in Bargaining," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13 (November 1969): 245–252; and Dean Pruitt and Douglas Johnson, "Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 14 (March 1970): 239–246.

[32] Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation*, argues that the mediation and peacekeeping functions are best combined where the general principles of a political settlement have already been agreed upon and the chief problem is implementation.

[33] The agreement to station peacekeeping troops can be an important building block to an overall agreement. Yet, if one nation believes that the other is not living up to the peacekeeping agreement or is in some way manipulating the peacekeeping force, it may refuse to seriously negotiate on the other issues; see Fred Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

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as Finland or Sweden) may offer a more desirable alternative than those offered here. Without empirical referents, such a judgment is premature. The future may breed new variations of peacekeeping that overcome the difficulties cited. It is our sincere hope that it does.

Finally, we have seemed to imply that no peacekeeping operation is better than an unsuccessful one. But, is this really correct? If peacekeeping can halt fighting and stop bloodshed, even for a short time, is this enough to justify a peacekeeping operation? The answer requires a value judgement. How a failed mission affects future operations is an empirical question. Both deserve serious consideration.*

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Misguided Morality: Ethics And The Reagan Doctrine

ROBERT H. JOHNSON

The Iran-contra affair demonstrates once more how strong moral convictions can lead to foreign policies of questionable legality and morality. In particular, it raises larger questions about the morality of the so-called Reagan Doctrine, of which aid to the contras is one expression.

The Reagan Doctrine principle that the United States should support "freedom-fighters" attempting to overthrow "Marxist-Leninist" regimes in the Third World was first enunciated in President Ronald Reagan's 1985 State of the Union address:

> Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy. . . . [W]e must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth . . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense . . . . [1]

This presidential statement of principle was elaborated in an important speech by Secretary of State George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club of California the same month and has been reaffirmed in various presidential and other statements in the period since.[2]

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 21, no. 6, 1985, 145-146.

[2] George Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom," address before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, California, 22 February 1985, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, *Current Policy*, no. 659; also President Reagan's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 24 October 1985, *New York Times*, 25 October 1985; President Reagan's State of the Union Address for 1986, *New York Times*, 5 February 1986.

ROBERT H. JOHNSON is visiting fellow at the Overseas Development Council and Harvey Picker Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Colgate University. He has been a member of the National Security Council staff and of the State's Department's Policy Planning Council. He prepared earlier drafts of this article while a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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The administration, unlike its supporters however, has avoided applying a Reagan Doctrine label to the policy, fearing that to commit itself to a doctrine would reduce its freedom of action in dealing with particular conflicts. Nonetheless, having committed itself to a general policy stance, it has been vulnerable to pressures to be true to its own principles. At present the United States supports four such anti-Marxist insurgencies – in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Kampuchea (Cambodia). The last two were added after enunciation of Reagan Doctrine principles. There has been heavy pressure from some conservatives, CIA, and some Pentagon officials to aid the South African-supported insurgency in Mozambique (RENAMO), but those pressures have so far been successfully resisted by the State Department.[3] There have also been periodic suggestions that the United States should support insurgent forces in Ethiopia, though they are Marxist and separatist.

Following the U.S. diplomatic interventions against Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1985-1986, the administration released a presidential message in March 1986 that seemingly broadened U.S. goals to include support for all opposition to tyranny, whether of the right or the left. However, subsequent administration statements and actions made it clear that, as the President's national security assistant, John Poindexter, said when the statement was promulgated, there was "nothing new" about it.[4] The United States, as in the past, continues to be willing to exert diplomatic pressures on right-wing dictators like Duvalier or Marcos, especially when they are losing their grip on power, but certainly not to support guerrilla wars directed against them. In this article, when I refer to the Reagan Doctrine, I accordingly mean the narrower policy of supporting guerrillas battling self-described or U.S.-labelled Marxist-Leninist regimes.

Moral Claims of the Reagan Doctrine

In common with other American foreign policy doctrines, the Reagan Doctrine represents both continuity and change. It reflects a continuity of values, embodying ideological themes that Cecil Crabb has identified as generally characteristic of all American foreign policy doctrines: belief in American uniqueness, faith in the virtues of self-government, convictions about the power of the American example, a sense of mission, a millenial orientation, and the tradition of American unilateralism.[5] Somewhat more specifically, it incorporates the same Wilsonian values as

[3] *New York Times*, 16 March 1987; ibid., 13 July 1987. The policy has very recently been referred to as a doctrine (though not as the Reagan Doctrine) in the administration's second annual statement of national security strategy. See *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988), 10.

[4] "Freedom, Regional Security and Global Peace," Message from President Reagan to Congress, *New York Times*, 15 March 1986. See also the accompanying article by Bernard Weinraub, "The U.S. and Dictators."

[5] On continuity and change as a characteristic of foreign policy doctrines, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.,

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the Truman Doctrine, the same reliance upon local forces to fight local wars as the Nixon Doctrine, and the same emphasis upon human rights (though with a different focus) as the policies of President Jimmy Carter.

The Reagan Doctrine, however, also represents change. Crabb found that all the prior doctrines that he examined embodied a defensive orientation.[6] But conservatives have never been comfortable with the defensive, reactive stance of postwar containment policies and have sought to regain the initiative. Consequently, Reagan, like President Dwight Eisenhower, has sought to roll back Soviet power. However, because the Eisenhower rollback policy was applied to East Europe where the use of U.S. military power would have carried very high risks, it was, in a reality, a form of psychological warfare and can even be seen as an instrument of a policy of "asymmetrical containment"—of applying U.S. strengths against Soviet weaknesses. It was a means of "scoring points" and putting the Soviets on the psychological defensive, but it did not involve serious efforts to overturn unfriendly governments.[7]

While Reagan has continued postwar containment policies, the Reagan Doctrine represents a basic departure from such policies; some of the doctrine's supporters call this combination "containment plus." The Reagan Doctrine, like Eisenhower's rollback rhetoric, endeavors to score points in the U.S. competition with the Soviets and to increase Soviet costs, but it also seeks the overthrow of pro-Soviet regimes through the use of U.S. military power. It seeks, as administration spokesmen have regularly said, to demonstrate that the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine is dead—that seizure of power by Marxist movements can, in fact, be reversed. I have critiqued such security rationales for the Reagan Doctrine elsewhere; here I will focus upon the administration's moral case.[8]

It is evident that the moral case for the doctrine is important to the President and to his conservative supporters. For example, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams has said that the fight of the Nicaraguan contras "certainly matters" to the United States "for moral reasons." Our "moral right to help people free themselves from oppressive rule . . . . is a central underpinning of our foreign policy."[9] Since it is justified in part on moral grounds, it is appropriate that the Reagan Doctrine should be critiqued on such grounds.

The underlying oft-reiterated moral purpose of the Reagan policy is to advance

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The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role and Future (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 403–408. On the ideological themes embodied in such doctrines see ibid., 378–386.

[6] Ibid., 408–409.

[7] This is the interpretation of John Lewis Gaddis in *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 155–157.

[8] Robert H. Johnson, *"Rollback" Revisited—A Reagan Doctrine for Insurgent Wars*? (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, Policy Focus, no. 1, January 1986).

[9] "The Fight for Freedom in Nicaragua," remarks of the Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to the Minnesota Meeting, St. Paul, 10 February 1987.

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the cause of democracy, freedom, and independence. These long-standing American values, Secretary Shultz has said, "compel us to support those struggling against the imposition of Communist tyranny."[10] A major source of confusion in the administration's moral case is its tendency to conflate "democracy" and "freedom" or "independence." Thus, one administration spokesman referred to these insurgencies as reflecting "democratic demands for national independence."[11] National self-determination—the right of a people that considers itself a nation to determine its own future free of international interference—is in this way confused with, and equated to, domestic self-determination or democracy. This has been a common confusion throughout the cold war, partly because the United States has seen the Soviet Union as a simultaneous threat to both democracy and independence and partly because many of the regimes or movements it has supported in the name of freedom have hardly been democratic. The consequence of this fallacious equating of independence and democracy is that the problematic claims that insurgent forces are fighting for national independence, which is clearly true only in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, are translated into untrue claims that they are also fighting for democracy. Their struggles are thereby invested with more moral content than they deserve.

The fact that neither democracy nor, with the two exceptions noted, national self-determination is clearly at stake in these struggles suggests that the Reagan Doctrine may include an important element of rationalization of security interests. Comparison of the origins of the Reagan Doctrine with the parallel origins of the earlier Truman Doctrine provides strong support for this view.

In both cases policy makers were strongly motivated by national security concerns. When Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the case privately to congressional leaders for aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, he emphasized such concerns. They were also mentioned, if less explicitly, in the presidential speech to Congress that articulated what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. In that speech, however, the emphasis was upon defense of the broad principles of self-determination and peaceful change, because those who drafted it did not believe that the public in 1947 would accept a power-political rationale.[12] Similarly, the Reagan administration, which had emphasized security arguments in its case for aid to the Nicaraguan contras, shifted to an emphasis upon the principles of the Reagan Doctrine in 1985 as part of an effort to rescue such aid when it came under increasing attack in Congress. In both cases the emphasis on principle was successful in mobilizing domestic political support. That has, in fact, been a major function of foreign policy doctrines throughout American history.[13]

I do not mean to suggest that appeal to principle was in either case merely a

[10] Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom."

[11] Donald R. Fortier, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Regional Security: Trends and Tools," remarks to the Dean Witter Reynolds Annual Metals and Mining Forum, 25 February 1985, 14.

[12] Joseph M. Jones, *Fifteen Days* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), 151–162.

[13] Crabb, *Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, 414–415.

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cynical tactic. Principles were genuinely seen to be at stake. Moreover, such principles particularly matter to an ideological President like Ronald Reagan. What I am suggesting is that there is strong evidence that the appeal to principle in both cases included an important element of rationalization for domestic political reasons of underlying security concerns.

A second kind of major ethical claim made for the Reagan Doctrine is based on the proposition that democracy promotes peace. As President Reagan has put the general point:

> Freedom and democracy are the best guarantors of peace. History has shown that democratic nations do not start wars. The rights of the individual and the rule of law are as fundamental to peace as arms control. A government which does not respect its citizens' rights and its international commitments to protect those rights is not likely to respect other international undertakings.[14]

Reagan is correct in the sense that democracies (liberal states) have been remarkably peaceful in their relations with each other, but as Michael Doyle has demonstrated, he is not correct in assuming that the peaceful behavior of democracies extends to their relations with non-democratic states.[15] The Reagan Doctrine itself is evidence to the contrary. And, more generally, the United States has engaged in forceful interventions in the Third World in the postwar era much more frequently than the Soviet Union.[16] The most basic problem with the administration's moral case for the Reagan Doctrine, however, is that it is not well grounded in Third World reality.

The Reagan Doctrine and Third World Reality

Valid moral judgments require a good grasp of international reality—of the facts and of the way things work. In the words of Hans Morgenthau, "universal moral principles cannot be applied to states in their abstract formulation, but . . . must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."[17] A central source of error of the Reagan Doctrine is that its moral perspective is based upon a substantially fictional, ideological view of the Third World.[18]

[14] President Reagan's Address to the Nation, 14 November 1985, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy*, no. 765. See also the President's address to the British parliament on 8 June 1982, *Public Papers of the Presidents—Ronald Reagan*, 1982, vol. I, 742–748.

[15] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, (December 1986): 1151–1169.

[16] The United States intervened somewhat more than twice as often in the period 1946–1976 as did the USSR in the period 1946–1979. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Superpowers and the Third World: Aborted Ideals and Wasted Assets" in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Pat McGowan, eds., *Foreign Policy USA/USSR* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982), 117–118.

[17] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 10.

[18] Charles Krauthammer's argument, the most thorough effort to make the moral case for the Reagan

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The Reagan Doctrine view of the world is the Manichean view. The world is seen as divided between the forces of light (democracy) and the forces of darkness (Marxism-Leninism). In this familiar cold war perspective there is a presumption that any action that supports the forces of freedom is moral because, as Secretary Shultz has put it, "There is a self-evident difference between those fighting to impose tyranny and those fighting to resist it."[19] And the "freedom fighters" are genuinely seen as the "moral equivalents of the Founding Fathers" since, like the Founding Fathers, they are perceived as fighting for freedom from an imperial power.

The administration is saying that so-called Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third World are totalitarian dictatorships imposed from outside; that they are opposed by their own people; and that since the people are battling alien regimes dominated by the Soviet Union, the insurgent movements are by definition popular and, therefore, "democratic." But in reality, the movements that the United States supports are not nearly so democratic and the regimes it opposes, so totalitarian, so clearly Marxist-Leninist or (except for Afghanistan) so Soviet-dominated as the administration's perspective assumes.

The Reagan administration takes the Marxist-Leninist political label too much at face value. Regimes so labelled vary widely and have characteristically departed very far from Marxist-Leninist norms as represented by either the Soviet or Chinese systems. Reasons for these departures include the strength and resistance of traditional cultures, institutions, and loyalties; the limited understanding by Marxist leaders of the Soviet and other Communist models and the irrelevance of those models to their problems; and the very limited resources, organizational capabilities, and power available to political leaders in poor, badly fractured societies.[20] Moreover, the meaning to political leaders of Marxism as an ideology is also diverse, depending upon the social, political, and cultural backgrounds of particular political elites.

Nor is the new Soviet emphasis upon pressuring radical leaders to create vanguard Leninist political parties and to rely upon East Bloc security advisers likely to change this situation.[21] Much historical experience with the efforts of Third World Marxist leaders to create disciplined, centrally controlled parties suggests

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Doctrine, suffers from this basic defect. Charles Krauthammer, "Morality and the Reagan Doctrine," *The New Republic*, 8 September 1986, 17–24.

[19] Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom."

[20] "Introduction" and essay by Kenneth Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance and Unawareness" in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1979).

[21] On the Soviet strategy and some of its problems, see Alexander R. Alexiev, *The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, June 1983); and Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 65–72. On the problems of party building see also Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The One-Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966).

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that such parties are more likely to be political facades than effective instruments of political control. They are typically riven by ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, family, and other similar particularistic loyalties. The efforts of outside security advisers cannot overcome the divisive effects of such parochial groups and loyalties.

Take two cases, Mozambique and Nicaragua. The regime in Mozambique calls itself Marxist-Leninist, but after disastrous efforts to impose "socialist" controls that were beyond its capacity to administer, it has been moving away from government control of the economy, has been encouraging domestic and foreign private investment, and has actively sought openings to the West. The regime has shifted wholly from collectivized to smallholder agriculture, and after having sought membership in the East Bloc's Comecon in the mid-1970s, has now joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The administration itself has recently recognized publicly that the Marxist-Leninist label has little meaning in this case and has, indeed, been attempting for some time to influence the regime through foreign aid rather than seeking its overthrow.[22]

The situation in Nicaragua is more complex and mixed. The regime has regularly demonstrated, in the words of one expert observer, a "realism and flexibility that so frequently transcends Marxist-Leninist received wisdom that it has been characterized as a triumph of 'Machiavelians' over radicals." For example, though the Sandinistas favored a gradual collectivization of agriculture, rural demands have moved the regime at an accelerating pace toward land redistribution to cooperative and private holders.[23] On the other hand, ideological rigidity, along with corruption and incompetence, has typified the activities of the Ministry of Internal Commerce, which is responsible for domestic distribution of commodities.

While there is much room for debate on the future direction of politics under the Sandinista regime, it is hardly the totalitarian system of Reagan administration rhetoric. Nor is it clear that it will move in such a direction. The Sandinistas "have not achieved anything approaching the level of social control evident in Cuba and other Soviet bloc countries," and opposition parties "openly organize, proselytize and criticize the regime."[24] The human rights situation has oscillated over time. During the period of elections and adoption of the constitution in 1984-1985, there was a relatively high degree of freedom, which was followed by a period in 1985-1986 when freedoms were sharply curtailed as the civil war heated up. More recently, under pressures to meet the goals of the Arias (or Guatemala) peace plan,

[22] *New York Times*, 16 March 1987. Recently Angola has begun to move in a parallel direction. It is planning to denationalize state enterprises, is breaking up some state farms, and has sought openings to the West. Ironically, the United States opposes an Angolan application for membership in the International Monetary Fund. See James Brooke, "Adam Smith Crowds Marx in Angola," *New York Times*, 29 December 1987.

[23] The quotation and the example are from John A. Booth, "Nicaragua," a paper prepared for the Central America Task Force, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1987. My discussion here draws mainly upon this paper.

[24] The first quotation is from *The New York Times*, 20 March 1986; the second is from Booth, "Nicaragua." See also *The New York Times*, 11 August 1987.

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the regime has once more loosened controls on freedom of expression. These changes were characterized in one recent report as "remarkable." The Sandinista military undoubtedly commits abuses, but overall it appears to be well-disciplined, and, it is said, is "vastly superior to . . . either the contras or the armies of El Salvador and Guatemala" on human rights.[25]

Because civil wars produce repression in all states in which they occur, it is difficult to estimate in the midst of such a war how the regime will ultimately resolve the tension between its commitment to eliminate the civil rights abuses of the Somoza regime and its efforts to transform Nicaraguan society.[26] But experience in Nicaragua to date and with Marxist regimes elsewhere strongly suggests that the outcome is likely to be an authoritarian, but hardly "totalitarian," political system.

With the exceptions of Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and Vietnamese-occupied Kampuchea, none of the Reagan Doctrine regimes was imposed from outside upon these societies. Apart from Afghanistan, these countries are presently very far from being under the control of Moscow. And with the withdrawal of their forces, the long-term ability of the Soviets to dominate the government in Kabul—even in the unlikely event that it remains under Marxist control—is in serious question. The United States has regularly made the mistake of equating a Soviet presence or a Soviet connection with Soviet control. As much historical experience has demonstrated, Soviet influence over even "Marxist" regimes has been limited at best. The high-level Soviet defector, Arkady Shevchenko, has confirmed this reality with respect to Soviet influence in Vietnam.[27] The fact that the Soviets have regularly changed their political strategies for gaining influence in the Third World itself reflects their lack of success.[28]

This is obviously not to say that the Soviets do not sometimes exercise significant influence in these societies. It is to deny that the independence of these countries has been, or is likely to be, undermined. Moreover, in the longer term several powerful factors operate against Soviet dominance. The most important is the overwhelming desire of all Third World regimes, of whatever political coloration, to preserve their autonomy. A second is the resistance of all Third World societies to rapid change and the very considerable strength of anti-Communism among Third World elites. As Robert Packenham has said, a powerful inhibitor of Com-

[25] On freedom of expression see Stephen Kinzer, "Is Managua Redrawing the Party Line?" *New York Times*, 24 April 1988. The appraisal of the Sandinista military is from Booth, "Nicaragua."

[26] See Booth, "Nicaragua" on this tension. For a presentation of alternative views on the political direction of Nicaragua see "The Nicaragua Debate," *Tikkun* 1 (Fall 1986): 46ff.

[27] Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 199. See also Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), chap. 21; and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1975), chap. 10.

[28] On the evolution of Soviet views and policies, see, Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), esp. chaps. 7–8.

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munist success has been "the pervasiveness and strength of conservative (in the classic sense of change-resisting) political values, attitudes, and behavior patterns among almost all social strata in underdeveloped countries."[29] The United States, with its "liberal tradition," has when defining the Communist threat, regularly underestimated this characteristic of traditional cultures and social structures. A third factor is the desire of Third World leaders for economic development and their dependence upon a global economy dominated by the western industrial countries and Japan for needed technology and resources. The final reason is the limited capacity of the Soviets for long-term influence: they have little to offer economically, are physically remote from much of the Third World, and frequently are very inept in their in-country dealings with individual Third World societies.[30]

The other side of the coin is that none of the insurgent forces fighting Marxist-Leninist regimes is unambiguously democratic. Jonas Savimbi, the rebel leader in Angola, is a self-proclaimed Marxist, and while receiving aid from China called himself a Maoist. He has been unable to explain in what respects the program of his regime, should he come to power, would differ from that of the present ruling group. Fundamentally, Savimbi is a politically effective leader of the largest tribal group opposing a regime dominated by the second largest tribal group, by mestizos, and by urban Marxist intellectuals. His interest is in power. In the pursuit of power he has been willing to ally himself to South Africa, although he rejects the apartheid system.

While the Nicaraguan contras have included some democratic elements, they are a very mixed bag. The organized core of the resistance was built by the CIA and Argentine military officers around a nucleus of former National Guard officers, Somocista exile figures in Miami, and conservative members of the economic elite. Any future government led by the contras would survive only on the sufference of this conservative-military coalition and would be very unlikely to be a progressive democratic regime.

The strongest single element in the Kampuchean insurgency is the genocidal and highly unpopular Khmer Rouge Communists. Prince Sihanouk, who leads one of the two non-Communist elements of the resistance, was a relatively moderate, if erratic, authoritarian leader during his period of rule. The other non-Communist guerrilla resistance force is the deeply divided group led by Son Sann, a member of the Cambodian elite who was briefly prime minister under Sihanouk and frequently in conflict with him. If Sihanouk and Son Sann should dominate a future government—a far from certain possibility—it would be an improvement over the

[29] Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 184. Packenham characterizes such resistance as "massive."

[30] For some examples of ineptness in Angola see John A. Marcum, "United States Options in Angola," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 52 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic International Studies, 20 December 1985), 7. The general argument here repeats my argument in Robert H. Johnson, "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts," *International Security* 10 (Winter 1985/86): 50–51.

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present Vietnamese-imposed regime, though unlikely to be democratic in a meaningful sense. Leaders of other insurgent groups have no pretensions to democratic credentials.

In sum, there are three general sources of discrepancy between the adminstration's assumptions and Third World reality. One is that authoritarianism is a very strong strand in political cultures of all these societies, many of which are still close to their authoritarian traditional and colonial roots. This tendency is often reinforced by the substantial political role of local military forces. Second, the administration view exaggerates the extent of and potential for Soviet dominance. And third, to force the complexities of political conflicts rooted in ethnic and similar parochial differences into the procrustean bed of western ideologies grossly distorts reality.

A major flaw of U.S. Third World policy in the cold war has been its failure to differentiate between situations—its tendency to see every conflict in the global context of the U.S.-Soviet competition and to fail to distinguish the degree of the threat and the extent of the U.S. stakes in each particular situation. The least important conflicts or areas are associated with the most important and acquire the significance of the most important by invoking the domino theory or other such notions.[31] Robert W. Tucker has pointed out that the Reagan Doctrine threatens to make the same error on moral grounds. Freedom is seen as the same issue in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and, therefore, deserving of defense in both places equally.[32]

Ends, Means, and Consequences

The Reagan Doctrine raises a number of more specific moral difficulties that I will consider under three broad headings: the morality of U.S. ends, of U.S. means, and of the consequences of U.S. actions.[33] In making overall moral judgments it is necessary to weigh all three kinds of consideration together. If, for example, the means employed in implementing a policy (for example, guerrilla war) raise serious moral objections, but the purposes of policy and its probable consequences are morally supportable, those objections might be overridden in a comprehensive moral calculus. What is distinctive about the Reagan Doctrine, however, is that it fails moral tests on all three sets of grounds, except in a qualified sense in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

[31] Johnson, "Exaggerating America's Stakes," 32–33.

[32] Robert W. Tucker, *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine* (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1985), 12–14.

[33] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Ethics and Foreign Policy* (Wye Plantation, Md: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985), chap. II.

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The Morality of Ends

The Reagan Doctrine is undoubtedly rooted in long-standing, fundamental American liberal values – in commitment to democracy and national self-determination. In fact, the doctrine reflects a kind of conservative Wilsonianism. But, as I have already suggested, neither self-determination nor democracy is at stake in these conflicts except in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, where self-determination has been violated by outright invasions. This is not to suggest that self-determination may not also be violated by indirect aggression and that such aggression may not provide moral justification for U.S. intervention. But none of the regimes falling under the Reagan Doctrine was clearly the product of such aggression. The regime in Angola emerged out of the civil war that accompanied the breakup of the Portuguese empire. It is controlled by a faction that was supported by the Soviet Union, but other factions were supported by other external powers, including the United States and South Africa. In such a situation of civil conflict with multiple external interventionism where the question of who intervened first is a matter of definition and dispute, the concept of aggression has no clear meaning.[34]

In Mozambique the Soviets provided assistance to the established government when it was attacked by a guerrilla force supported initially by white Rhodesia, later by South Africa. Similarly, in Ethiopia the Soviets responded to a request for help from the revolutionary regime that overthrew the emperor when the regime was hard pressed by internal separatist insurgencies and by Somalia's military intervention in the Ogaden. To characterize these various Soviet interventions as indirect aggression would be to stretch that elastic concept beyond its outer limits. Nor did the Soviets impose Marxist-Leninist ideologies on these societies. In the judgment of David and Marina Ottaway, the choice of Marxism-Leninism as their official ideology by African states has "without exception . . . been made . . . by independent nationalist or military leaders."[35] The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was likewise not imposed from outside. It was the product of an independent indigenous Marxist movement with broad popular support.

In civil wars of the kind that fall under the Reagan Doctrine, the principle of self-determination is, in any event, often a difficult standard to apply, because the issue at stake is precisely which "self" is the legitimate self – which tribal, regional, religious, or other group has the more legitimate right to rule. That is a question to which there is no objective answer.

Apparently recognizing that democracy is not the real issue, more sophisticated defenders of the Reagan Doctrine, such as the conservative columnist, Charles Krauthammer, have proposed a modified rationale. Krauthammer argues that aid

[34] On the tangled history of external intervention in Angola see Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa" in Stephen S. Kaplan, ed., *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), esp. 580–590.

[35] David and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981), 30.

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to the insurgents is morally justified if they represent the "popular will."[36] How is the popular will to be determined? On the basis of whether "large sectors of the nation are engaged in resistance." It is far from clear, however, how such a large sector is to be defined. Does the principle mean that the Ovimbindu tribe, led by Jonas Savimbi and constituting the core of the resistance in Angola, should have the right to rule because it is the largest tribal group, though not a majority? If the contras in Nicaragua represent a large sector as Krauthammer believes, that is in some important measure the consequence of the U.S. role in organizing them. Can we help create such a large sector and then claim that it represents the popular will?

The basic underlying problem is that the whole concept of the popular will has no clear meaning in pre-modern societies with little or no democratic tradition. Political issues are not decided by votes, but by interactions within a complex web of particularistic social relationships of generally elitist character or they are settled by force. There is often no way to determine what the "real" popular will may be. It is partly for such reasons that those who are politically excluded take to arms. Fighting becomes the method for determining the popular will.

A kind of case can be made for the proposition that guerrilla wars are a way of getting at the popular will on the grounds that success in such wars depends upon popular support.[37] But to determine the popular will by a test of arms contradicts the very liberal values that are supposedly at stake in such conflicts from the perspective of supporters of the Reagan Doctrine. As Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker point out,". . . in guerrilla warfare no less than in great international wars, victory is ultimately determined by relative military strength and coercion remains the primary instrument for obtaining consent. To equate the outcome of such contests with justice may therefore prove no less objectionable than to equate the outcome of traditional interstate violence with justice."[38] Moreover, such a criterion provides no moral guide or justification for policy until the insurgency succeeds.[39]

The Morality of Means

The means used to implement the Reagan Doctrine is guerrilla war. The most distinctive characteristic of guerrilla war and its morally most troubling aspect is that it denies the distinction between soldiers and civilians.[40] The strategies and tactics

[36] Krauthammer, "Morality and Reagan Doctrine," 21.

[37] Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 232. Osgood and Tucker attribute this view to Walter Millis.

[38] Ibid.

[39] At present, in the view of one knowledgeable analyst, "Despite their numerical growth, the contras have been unable to elicit significant political support within Nicaragua even with declining Sandinista popularity." Viron P. Vaky, "Positive Containment in Nicaragua," *Foreign Policy* 68 (Fall 1987): 44.

[40] For a discussion of the morality of guerrilla warfare see Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 11.

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of guerrilla war are, to a much greater extent than conventional war, dominated on a day-to-day basis by politics. Such war takes place in the midst of the civilian population and is directed at influencing that population.

Guerrillas, for example, often kill local government officials and other "oppressors" such as land owners. Such action is designed to punish unpopular officials and intimidate their colleagues, to destroy the effectiveness of the government, to provoke the government into repressive counteraction, to demonstrate summary social justice, and most generally to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and to mobilize the population against it.

In order to justify guerrilla war on moral grounds, therefore, one must be prepared to accept the validity of the idea of such "just assassinations." While there is a moral case for just assassination when applied to a moral monster like Hitler, it is difficult to accept the moral validity of such summary justice when it is employed against ordinary government officials—even officials of an unjust and repressive regime. The United States itself reacted with moral outrage to just such insurgent actions in South Vietnam.

For assassinations to be just, it must at least be true, as Michael Walzer argues, that the government is genuinely repressive and that assassination is confined to those who are directly implicated in such repression as government agents.[41] The latter is a condition that ironically is more likely to be observed by strongly disciplined, ideologically-indoctrinated Communist guerrilla forces than by the less disciplined anti-Communist rebels the United States supports under the Reagan Doctrine.

Confronting this issue, Krauthammer suggests that we must draw the line at terrorism and torture and that the United States must hold "its" insurgents to prescribed standards of behavior.[42] These are certainly desirable goals, but as U.S. experience with the contras demonstrates, they are very difficult to maintain in the midst of an insurgent war. The selective violence of the guerrilla war ideal easily slips into the nonselective violence of generalized terror. If guerrillas are to act selectively, they must be well embedded in the society so that they can pick their targets on the basis of a thorough knowledge of local situations. This is also a condition unlikely to be met by many of the insurgent forces supported under the Reagan Doctrine (for example, in Nicaragua and Angola).

Krauthammer recognizes that it is difficult to assure that insurgents the United States supports will behave in the manner the United States might desire when they are in the field and beyond central control. Aware of the many difficulties that attend the effort to justify support for guerrilla war in moral terms, in the end Krauthammer falls back on the argument that we have to choose "the lesser of two evils." We must accept the evils of guerrilla war in order to eliminate the greater evil of tyrannical Marxist-Leninist regimes. As Krauthammer suggests, the results can justify the means. But do they in these particular cases?

[41] Ibid., 198–203; see also Krauthammer, "Morality and Reagan Doctrine," 22.

[42] Krauthammer, "Morality and Reagan Doctrine," 23.

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The Morality of Consequences

As the Iran scandal has once more reminded us, good purposes or intentions are not enough. Freeing American hostages was a morally worthy purpose, but the unfolding consequences of trading arms for those hostages have been morally negative. The consequences of implementing the Reagan Doctrine, so far as they can be estimated, are also likely to be very negative.

Consequences for Peace and Order. Peace is a moral good, though war may be morally justifiable in particular situations. We tend to think of "order," on the other hand, as ethically neutral. But there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that order is a basic human need.[43] Without order our environment lacks predictability and without some measure of predictability neither individuals nor states can act in ways that will be effective in achieving their intended goals. If order is important to human existence, it must be something to which we attach value; it is a moral good. But even if peace and order were not moral goods in themselves, they are clearly essential means to the end of freedom—the goal of the Reagan Doctrine.

Guerrilla wars, of course, undermine peace and order, both domestic and international. It is partly for this reason that the United States has so long opposed Soviet support for so-called wars of national liberation—particularly guerrilla wars in which Marxist forces seek to overturn non-Marxist governments. U.S. policies in Vietnam in the 1960s were justified partly on the grounds that the United States must demonstrate that such wars could not succeed. Under the Reagan Doctrine the United States has reversed this position, promoting rather than seeking to minimize conflict and disorder.[44]

To the argument that guerrilla wars are immoral because they upset peace and order, supporters of the Reagan Doctrine make three responses. The issue of peace, they say, is moot, since by definition the United States is dealing with situations where there is already a condition of war. Second, there can be values higher than peace and order in particular situations; in these guerrilla wars, freedom is such a value. Finally, since the Soviets have regularly violated the principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and nonintervention, on which the present international order rests, the United States is no longer bound to observe them.[45] There is some limited truth in these arguments, but each has been falsified by being absolutized and exaggerated.

While the existence of internal war is a condition necessary to bring the Reagan Doctrine into play, that fact does not make the issue of disrupting the peace irrele-

[43] See Jeanne N. Knutson, *The Human Basis of the Polity: A Psychological Study of Political Man* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 28–35; Osgood and Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice*, 32; also Thomas W. Milburn and Kenneth H. Watman, *On the Nature of Threat: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1981), 31.

[44] Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Intervention: America and the Soviets in the Third World," *The National Interest* 7 (Spring 1987): 40.

[45] Krauthammer, "Morality and Reagan Doctrine," 19–22.

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vant. U.S. actions are relevant because they can affect the intensity and duration of the conflict and, therefore, the magnitude of the disruption, as they have very probably done in Central America. Clearly, in particular circumstances there can be values higher than peace and order, and it may sometimes be necessary to sacrifice them temporarily to the goal of freedom. The question is whether the cause of freedom is served by the policies that implement the Reagan Doctrine. I have already argued that in most cases U.S. policies will not serve the cause of freedom.

It is true that international order rests upon reciprocity in observing certain principles and that the Soviets and others, including the United States, have often violated those principles. But to claim that as a consequence international order no longer exists is to take a perfectionist view of order. The existence of even quite pervasive interventionism is not incompatible with a significant degree of international order. As Tucker has said:

> *It is simply not the case that this principle of reciprocity has gone and goes today unobserved in our dealings with Communist powers. What is true is that this principle has periodically been observed in the breach, and this partial observance has made and continues to make our relationship with these powers—and above all the Soviet Union—very difficult. Even so, observance has been partial and from this partial observance a postwar order has been fashioned. This order has been far from ideal . . . . Still as international orders go . . . there is a good deal to be said for it. We have prospered under it, as have our friends.*[46]

Consequences in the Countries Involved. Supporters of the Reagan Doctrine assume, rather than attempt to demonstrate, that the consequences of implementing the doctrine will be morally favorable within the countries directly involved. The most obvious reason for this assumption is the belief that the United States is supporting the forces of freedom. This assumption in turn is grounded in the broader belief that the doctrine is moving with the forces of history. Thus, Secretary Shultz claims that a "democratic revolution" is "sweeping the world."[47] By supporting insurgencies we are, therefore, simply giving a push to the dominant democratic forces of our age. But the recent shifts to democracy in the Third World, except in the Philippines and South Korea, have occurred in Latin America, and none have been the result of the overthrow of Marxist-Leninist regimes by anti-Communist insurgents. If there is a democratic trend in the world—a proposition that is very questionable[48]—it has little or no relevance to the question of whether the Reagan Doctrine will bring democracy to societies now ruled by Marxist-Leninist regimes.

Admittedly, the consequences of U.S. action under the Reagan Doctrine are par-

[46] Tucker, *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine*, 15, 14–16.

[47] Shultz, "America and the Struggle for Freedom." Also testimony of Richard L. Armitage in "U.S. Policy Toward Anti-Communist Insurgencies," *Hearings*, Subcommittee of Foreign Operations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 8 May 1985.

[48] Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 9 (Summer 1984): 218.

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ticularly difficult to estimate, because they take place at the intersection of domestic Third World politics and international politics and because the U.S. impact will, in most cases, be marginal. But some predictions can be made with reasonable assurance.

First, it seems quite unlikely that with the probable exception of Afghanistan any of the insurgent forces the United States is supporting will win. Apart from Afghanistan, the insurgency that has had the best – but still uncertain – prospects is probably that in Mozambique, but South Africa rather than the United States has provided external support for the guerrilla movement there and it has served South Africa's interests to preserve the present stalemate rather than to help the insurgents achieve victory. South Africa has recently been negotiating to provide military aid to the government of Mozambique. If that represents a genuine decision to switch sides rather than merely the latest twist in the dual policy of overt conciliation of and covert opposition to the Mozambican government, it could have a very negative effect on the rebels' prospects.

Second, if one or another of the guerrilla groups should win, it is most unlikely that they would bring domestic freedom. If they succeed, they will very probably bring domination by the largest tribal group (Angola), the military (Nicaragua), Islamic fundamentalists and tribal leaders who will probably be involved in continuing military conflict among themselves (Afghanistan), the Khmer Rouge Communists or a coalition including them (Kampuchea), or a group of highly uncertain political orientation closely tied to South Africa (Mozambique). In Ethiopia, insurgent success would produce a partial break-up of the nation with irredentist Marxists ruling the fragments that are broken off. Although internal political settlements of guerrilla wars are very different to achieve, the administration has talked of such possibilities in Angola and elsewhere. If they occur, however, they are most unlikely to produce a democratic outcome.[49]

As Samuel Huntington has observed, "All revolutionary opponents of authoritarian regimes claim to be democrats; once they achieve power through violence, almost all turn out to be authoritarian themselves, often imposing an even more repressive regime than the one they overthrew."[50]

Third, whether or not the United States supports these insurgencies, it can have confidence that these countries, whatever their political orientation, will maintain their national independence though their policies may be sometimes influenced by outside powers. The exceptions, of course, are those cases where there has been an outright invasion by an external power.

If these estimates are correct, the United States will incur responsibility for many

[49] One reporter has characterized the conflict in Angola as follows: "A deep gulf of bitterness, now hardening into hatred, divides the two rival movements, making prospects for peace remote." Michael Parks, "Angola Appears Locked Into An Endless War", *Los Angeles Times*, 4 January 1988. By investing American policy with strong moral content, the administration makes it more difficult for the United States to accept compromise political settlements.

[50] Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 213.

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of the moral costs of the Reagan Doctrine without reaping any of the supposed moral benefits. The human and economic costs of the war in Angola, for example, were capsulized in September 1986 in *The New York Times*: "It has strangled the economy . . . , created about 600,000 displaced people, caused countless deaths and ravaged the countryside."[51] Angola has the highest amputee rate in the world. A report prepared for UNICEF estimates that in 1986 alone about 140,000 child deaths in Angola and Mozambique could be attributed to the effects of their civil wars and to the destabilization efforts of South Africa, which are furthered by those wars. Moreover, the wars have contributed substantially to the fact that the two countries have the highest infant mortality rates in the world.[52] Angola spends over $1 billion per year for Soviet weaponry and for the maintenance of Cuban troops, which it requires mainly to deal with the insurgent threat. Savimbi's activities and periodic South African raids have destroyed over $10 billion of Angolan infrastructure in the past ten years. An April 1988 State Department-sponsored and endorsed study based on refugee interviews concludes that at least 100,000 civilians have been murdered by RENAMO in Mozambique; that RENAMO makes no effort to gain the positive support of villagers or to explain its goals; and that its principal interaction with the population takes the form of terror to extract food and labor.[53]

There is another important potential moral cost of U.S. involvement in these insurgent wars. When the United States provides aid to the guerrillas, it implicitly or explicitly commits itself to their cause. They make their calculations and bet their lives on continuing American support. But given the vagaries of international politics, the poor prospects for success of these insurgencies in the foreseeable future, and the controversial or potentially controversial character of U.S. policy within the United States, sustained long-term U.S. support is unlikely. In the end, the United States is likely to abandon guerrilla fighters as it did the mountain peoples in Indochina and other guerrillas elsewhere. The potential human costs of such action are considerable, and America cannot escape responsibility for them simply on the grounds that it was their war and their decision to fight.[54]

Consequences for Third Countries. U.S. actions under the Reagan Doctrine are contributing to the regional destabilization of the areas in which the insurgencies are taking place. In southern Africa, South Africa has been engaged in a deliberate regional destabilization policy designed to keep the black nations of the area weak,

[51] Sheila Rule, "As War Takes its Toll, the Angolan Mire Deepens," *New York Times*, 19 September 1986.

[52] Reginald H. Green, Dereje Asrat, Marta Mauras, and Richard Morgan, *Children on the Front Line*, a report prepared for UNICEF, January 1987.

[53] Marcum, "U.S. Options in Angola," 2–4; *Washington Post*, 3 February 1986; *Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique*, report by Robert Gersony, consultant to Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State, April 1988; New York Times, 21 April 1988 and 11 May 1988.

[54] David Atlee Phillips, "Why CIA Leaves its Contras Hanging," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1986.

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off balance, and dependent upon Pretoria and to squeeze as much out of their economies as it can.

South Africa's support for the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique is designed to further these objectives. Those wars have been used to destroy port and transport facilities in the two countries in order to increase the dependence of all countries of the area upon South Africa. In Angola the war also keeps the regime dependent upon Cuban forces and thereby preserves a major roadblock to a settlement of the Namibia independence issue. All of this has as its ultimate purpose the preservation of the apartheid system in South Africa itself. A double moral objection can therefore be raised to U.S. support for the insurgents in Angola and to proposals that it support those in Mozambique. Such support contributes to the disruption of international order in the region and to South Africa's strategy for the maintenance of apartheid.

In Central America, U.S. activities in support of the contras in Nicaragua threaten to remilitarize the region. The fragile democracies of the area depend very heavily upon the sufferance of the military for survival. As one writer has put it, "The struggle faced by Central America's elected presidents is . . . to broaden the civilian authority as far as possible without exceeding the limits set by the military's idea of its own welfare."[55] The injection of a large U.S. military presence in Honduras, the heavy involvement of Honduras and El Salvador in the contra war in Nicaragua, and the large increases in U.S. military assistance to countries of the region have strengthened the hand of the military within these societies. In Honduras and El Salvador, the trend in favor of the civilian leadership has been reversed. Old international antagonisms in the region have also been exacerbated. In the longer run the substantial U.S. presence in Honduras, which is already producing growing public resentment, could have a socially disruptive effect with unforeseeable consequences.

Overall, the predictable moral consequences in Central America are negative. Internal and international order are being disrupted, and the weak forces of democracy are being further weakened. In response, it could be argued by a Reagan Doctrine supporter that if the Sandinistas fasten an unbreakable grip on Nicaragua, their capacity for mischief making in the region could have even more negative moral effects than present U.S. policy.

Such arguments are based in part upon misrepresentation of past Sandinista behavior in the region. They are also often based upon exaggerated claims about Nicaraguan military capabilities.[56] But the principal response to these arguments is that it should be possible to contain any Sandinista impulses toward external

[55] Edward Cody, "The Generals Still Run Latin 'Democracies'," *Washington Post*, 10 November 1985; James LeMoyne, "Central America's Arms Buildup: The Risks of Guns Without Butter," *New York Times*, 19 April 1987.

[56] Wayne S. Smith, "Lies About Nicaragua," *Foreign Policy* 67 (Summer 1987): 87–103, esp. 90–92. On Nicaragua's military capabilities, Edward L. King, "Analysis of the Military Situation in Nicaragua," April 1985, a report prepared for the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee.

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adventurism through a combination of the Arias (Guatemala) plan and a bilateral U.S.–Nicaraguan agreement within the framework of that plan covering U.S. security concerns not dealt with by the plan. Such agreements should be supplemented by U.S. declarations on what kinds of Cuban and Soviet military power would be unacceptable in Nicaragua and, perhaps, on the U.S. willingness to use force to enforce the agreements.[57] Even if Nicaragua does not achieve compliance with the domestic political requirements of the Arias plan, these arrangements should provide adequately for regional security needs.

Consequences in the United States. We are coming to understand as a result of the Iran-contra scandal that activity under the Reagan Doctrine can have negative moral consequences for American society. Three conditions in particular have produced such consequences: the lack of support for the contra-aid policy in the American public and Congress; the covert or quasi-covert character of the aid operation; and the very strong ideological commitments of the officials charged with implementation of the policy.

It was the opposition of Congress that led to the covert program for collecting and channelling private and other international aid to the contras. It was the ideological commitments of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and others that led to the creation of a secret government within the U.S. government to manage this aid program. There were at least two immoral consequences: the breaking of U.S. laws and the undercutting of the American system of democratic responsibility.

It is evident that, at best, the moral claims of Reagan Doctrine supporters relating to consequences are extremely problematic and provide an inadequate moral justification for the policy. And, as Joseph Nye suggests, "The more tenuous or uncertain the causal reasoning about consequences, the more cautious one should be about departing from the rules against intervention. The costs to the system of rules, local autonomy, and human lives from a military intervention [are] likely to be more immediate and certain than the hypothesized benefits and dangers averted."[58]

Conclusions

Democracy and self-determination are important American values widely shared by others. The problem with democracy as a goal in the countries covered by the Reagan Doctrine, however, is that it is not a realistic objective. Not only are the insurgents lacking in democratic credentials and not only are these societies devoid of significant democratic traditions, but also the civil wars in which they are

[57] For the outline of such an approach see Vaky, "Positive Containment in Nicaragua," 51–58. The set of issues here is very complex and can hardly be treated in this article. It is important, however, to understand that the Arias plan would initiate a *process* of domestic and international conciliation in the region; it should not be seen as a scheme for bringing instant democracy to societies which have in most cases had little experience with such a system.

[58] Nye, *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, 21.

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embroiled are generating levels of bitterness and hostility that make it very unlikely that they will emerge with the kind of civic cultures that would encourage the development of democratic polities.

The problem with the goal of self-determination is that it is not clearly at issue in the conflicts covered by the Reagan Doctrine except in the two cases where regimes were imposed by invading armies. And in one of those cases, Kampuchea, the moral validity of support for the resistance is doubtful, because its strongest component is the Khmer Rouge, a very unpopular, genocidal movement.

If U.S. moral purposes under the Reagan Doctrine are substantially irrelevant, the consequences of supporting these insurgencies is in almost all respects morally negative. Guerrilla wars at best teeter on the moral brink between "just" assassinations and terror. And, in these particular guerrilla wars, domestic and regional order are being badly disrupted and millions of human beings are being killed, crippled, displaced, or impoverished. The use of force against another people can be justified ethically only when there is a reasonable chance of achieving the moral purposes sought. Where those purposes are unachievable by the means employed and the consequences of military action are morally destructive, the ethical case against such action is decisive.[59]

The tendency of Reagan Doctrine supporters to focus upon unattainable ideal ends and to ignore the immorality of means and consequences has contributed to and been reflected in what may be the most fundamental moral flaw of U.S. policy—the strong tendency toward moral hubris. That hubris was dramatized, for example, in the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North in the Iran-contra hearings.

To some extent there is no escaping a posture of moral arrogance in international affairs, because there is no way that the United States can avoid intervening in the internal affairs of other countries or avoid using other people for its own ends. Foreign aid, private investment, educational exchange, diplomatic pressures, and many other forms of action involve some degree, sometimes a substantial degree, of intervention. But under the Reagan Doctrine the United States goes much further. It decides what the priority goals of other societies should be and judges which regimes are legitimate, enforcing its judgments by supporting the use of violence against regimes it considers illegitimate.[60]

Such a posture is rooted in ideological zealotry and reflects what the theologian and ethicist, Reinhold Niebuhr, called the "sin of pride." As Niebuhr recognized, the sin of pride is a particular danger in international affairs, where the strong identification of the individual with the national community and its values and interests is especially likely to distort moral judgments.[61]

[59] It was this kind of moral argument that was most persuasive for those within the U.S. government who opposed, initially on national interest grounds, the decision to bomb North Vietnam in 1964–1965. See Robert H. Johnson, "Escalation Then and Now," *Foreign Policy* 60 (Fall 1985): 146–47.

[60] Tucker argues that the Reagan Doctrine denies the legitimacy of any government that is not democratic and thereby justifies its overthrow in *Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine*, 5–6. In his 14 March 1986 statement to Congress (see fn. 4), Reagan also denies the legitimacy of regimes that "cannot live in peace with either their own people or their neighbors."

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As my argument has implied, however, there is one kind of situation in which support for insurgents can be justified. It is the case that has nothing to do with the ideology of the regime under attack and everything to do with how it came to power. In cases where the regime was clearly imposed upon a society by outside force, the principle of national self-determination has been violated and the insurgent movement is very likely to be popular and nationalist. That minimizes the element of moral hubris involved in U.S. intervention and makes it more likely that the moral costs of guerrilla warfare will be proportionate to the moral benefits—the reestablishment of national independence and the preservation of the national community.

As Stanley Hoffman argues, outside intervention against a "legitimate revoluntary movement," in, or not quite in, power is not morally supportable. But military intervention confined to military assistance for a movement that is clearly fighting for national self-determination against an outside power is morally legitimate.[62]

Even in this situation, however, we cannot ignore the character of the insurgent movement. The guerrillas need not be Lockean liberals, but at the other extreme they should not be political mass murderers. For such reasons, support for the insurgents in Afghanistan seems morally supportable, but support for the Kampuchean insurgents is ethically questionable. Assistance to the latter can be justified only if it is quite certain that U.S. aid will not help bring the Khmer Rouge to power.[63]

It is easy to understand the appeal of the Manichean view of the world that underlies the Reagan Doctrine. It simplifies understanding of a complex international political and moral reality, and by equating U.S. security interests in the cold war with U.S. moral purposes, it simplifies policy choices and makes policy makers feel good about their decisions. It also facilitates the task of selling policy to the public and Congress. But in doing so it contributes to moral arrogance, to an excessive preoccupation with the global competition with the Soviet Union, and to the neglect of the moral consequences of actions in particular local situations.*

[61] See Reinhold Niebuhr, *Beyond Tragedy* (New York: Scribner's, 1937), 29–30, 84–86, 100, 140–141.

[62] Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 33, 58, 66–72.

[63] Security arguments for and against intervention have not, of course, been weighed in this discussion. Since international morality is inescapably contextual, every general principle may admit of exceptions in particular situations. The national self-determination standard, while not free of ambiguity in application to particular cases, does avoid the necessity of making more-or-less judgments about the totalitarianism of regimes or the democratic credentials of insurgent movements—judgments that are extremely likely to be self-serving. Cutler's effort to specify legal criteria for intervention seems to me to suffer from this disability. See Lloyd N. Cutler, "The Right to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Fall 1985): 96–112.

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Who Talked to the President When? A Study Of Lyndon B. Johnson

JAMES J. BEST

Some of the most important decisions that a president makes involve choosing the people with whom he surrounds himself and with whom he talks on a regular basis. Hugh Heclo notes, "Apart from matters of style, the president's main area of discretion is the choice as to what personalities he will deal with directly in the everyday running of the office."[1] Certainly the choice of Cabinet members and White House staff are among the first and most important decisions that a newly-elected president makes. The president's interaction with these people and others, official and unofficial, determine the ". . . meaning [that] is given to the world and creates the reality toward which persons act."[2] For that reason the president's choices of whom to interact with are important: they structure his view of reality and help shape his response to that real world.

If presidential choices of interaction partners are important, those choices must be studied so we can better understand how a president structures his environment. Much of the writing on whom presidents talk with has been unsystematic, often impressionistic. For example, James Anderson provides insider vignettes about presidential staff members across a number of administrations, while Robert E. Denton and Dan F. Hahn provide data-free analysis of the manipulative relational

[1] Hugh Heclo, "The Changing Presidential Office" in Arnold Meltsner, ed., *Politics and the Oval Office: Towards Presidential Governance* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), 165.

[2] Robert E. Denton and Gary C. Woodward, *Political Communication in America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).

JAMES J. BEST is associate professor of political science at Kent State University. This article is based on his on-going research on persons with whom the president interacts, using the president's daily diaries.

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styles of presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan.[3] More frequently, memoirs of staff members or presidential autobiographies give us impressions of the interaction patterns of particular presidents.

There has been very little systematic empirical research to validate these impressions, even though George Edwards argues, "The time is ripe for the application of quantitative analysis to the study of the presidency. Professional standards call for it, our desire to explain relationships demands it, and the relevant data await to be exploited."[4] John Kessel's studies of issue groups, communication structures, and influence structures in the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations is one of the few works on presidential interactions. Kessel's research, based on interviews with staff members, is staff-centered; it is sociometric analysis of whom the staff interact with and provides an interesting picture of the organizational matrix of the White House outside the Oval Office, but with virtually no empirical evidence of presidential interactions. Because the research is based on interviews, the data are temporally static; there is no way of knowing whether and how the organizational matrix of the White House changes over time. And time is important to an understanding of the presidency, since executive politics is governed by at least three temporal patterns: "the electoral pattern, the annual pattern, and the patterns of the several policy areas."[5] From the Kessel research we know a great deal about how the staff interact with each other and the outside world at some point in time, but very little about whom the president interacts with over time.

Lee Sigelman and Dixie Mercer McNeil have examined White House interactions from an Oval Office perspective, focusing on which foreign policy advisers Lyndon Johnson interacted with in the periods before, during, and after the 1968 Tet Offensive in Indochina. Since their purpose was to study the impact of stress on presidential interactions, the time period and types of interaction partners were severely limited. Although a step in the right direction, by being Oval Office centered, neither the length of time studied nor the numbers of persons allow for much understanding of how Johnson interacted with a whole range of people during a longer time frame.

Despite these two studies we do not yet have a comprehensive picture of with whom the president interacts. While the question of whom the president chooses to interact with is important, we must also ask what form the interactions take (interaction medium) and when they occur (interaction timing), since these are all components of presidents' interactional choice environments.[6]

[3] Patrick Anderson, *The President's Men* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); and Robert E. Denton and Dan F. Hahn, *Presidential Communications* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986).

[4] George C. Edwards III, "Quantitative Analysis" in George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, eds., *Studying the Presidency* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1983).

[5] John Kessel, *Presidential Parties* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1984).

[6] Howard Goldstein, *Social Learning and Change: A Cognitive Approach to Human Services* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981).

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Research Questions

By looking at interaction partners, medium, and timing as important presidential choices, a number of interesting questions are suggested. The most obvious is with whom does the president interact? Given an infinite variety of potential interaction partners whom does the president choose and why? Does the choice of interaction partner determine interaction medium? Are there some interaction partners that the president sees only face-to-face and others whom he talks to over the phone? What differentiates between them? Is the choice of interaction partners stable over time? Personnel turnover would dictate changes in partners over time, but do interaction levels with the same partners vary over time, and why? Do interaction levels and medium vary over time? Is the president more likely to favor telephone communications at one time rather than another?

Who to Study?

There are a number of approaches that could be used to answer these research questions. One could compare two or more presidents in terms of interaction partners, medium, and timing.[7] Or one can study one president in depth, exchanging the comparative dimension for more depth. This research has taken the second approach.

President Lyndon B. Johnson was chosen for several reasons. The availability of his daily diaries on microfilm made accessible an enormous and rich data base—one that will provide useful comparisons with other presidents as their daily diaries become available.[8] The availability of the Johnson data on microfilm made it possible to work straight from the microfilm to enter and analyze the data. Even so, it took approximately 250 hours to enter and verify the data on computer.

There are other reasons for choosing President Johnson. After John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963, he became actively involved in policy making, but with a staff and Cabinet largely inherited from his predecessor; the Kennedy people stayed on because of Johnson's personal plea for continuity in government. Thus Johnson found himself in office with a small coterie of White House staff people personally loyal to him—Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Walter Jenkins, Horace Busby, Marvin Watson, and George Reedy—but forced to rely on former Kennedy people about whose loyalty he was unsure. Could they be trusted? Although "Johnson's ability to retain the services of top Kennedy-appointed aides was impressive," the amalgamation of the two staffs was not as smooth as Emmette S. Redford and Richard

[7] James J. Best, "Presidential Learning: A Comparative Study of the Interactions of Presidents Carter and Reagan," paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, 10 April 1987.

[8] The daily diaries of President Gerald Ford are available only at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan; the daily diaries of President Jimmy Carter are available only at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia; the daily diaries of President Lyndon Johnson are available at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas (hereafter referred to as the LBJ Library) and by microfilm.

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T. McCulley suggest.[9] John Macy, director of the Civil Service and later Johnson's adviser on appointments, felt there was some friction between the two groups. "It was difficult going, and I think that the Johnson people performed with great skill in keeping the relationship from becoming too irritating."[10] Lee White, one of Johnson's White House staff, wondered if Johnson wasn't concerned about the Kennedy people's reaction to his "style, . . . whether or not they would understand or could take it. You know, being a bunch of damned prima donnas they might just up and quit or do some other stupid thing."[11]

Johnson's need to deal with the Kennedy people, to rely on them, and to trust them from the beginning of his administration produces an interesting set of questions regarding how a president interacts with staff and advisers whom he did not initially appoint and whom he may not trust as much as his own people. The interaction data presented here permits the examination of how Johnson dealt with this problem.

Another interesting reason for focusing on Johnson is his intensive use of the telephone for interacting with people. As Charles Roberts succinctly notes, "Of course, this guy was on the phone more than any other president in history. He made the phone an instrument of national policy."[12] Johnson's use of the telephone allows the comparison between two different interaction media—telephone and face-to-face.

The Data Base

Each president since Dwight Eisenhower has kept some sort of daily diary of his activities; beginning with Lyndon Johnson the format has become standardized. These diaries provide detailed minute-by-minute information about whom the president talked with, when, how, and occasionally about what. The daily diaries of President Johnson are among the most complete. This is a significant help, since in the first twenty-five months of the Johnson administration (November 1963 through December 1965), President Johnson was involved in more than 28,000 interactions with over 2,000 different people.

How reliable are the Johnson diaries? A brief review of how the Johnson diaries were recorded provides an answer. An elaborate procedure was established in the Johnson White House to record his daily activities.[13] The secretaries outside the Oval Office prepared the presidential diary on a daily basis. People entering

[9] Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCully, *White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).

[10] John Macy, Oral History Collection, LBJ Library, 1969, 23.

[11] Lee C. White, Oral History Collection, LBJ Library, 1971, 19.

[12] Charles Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), 414.

[13] The following information regarding how the data were recorded comes from the description in *The Daily Diaries of Lyndon B. Johnson,* LBJ Library.

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the Oval Office through the outer office or from the foyer and through the Little Lounge were routinely noted by the secretary, with time of entry and departure. Phone calls to and from the President, which went through the secretary, were routinely recorded as to source and time of placement; unfortunately there is no indication of how long the phone calls lasted. In-house phone calls between the President and staff were also recorded, although if the secretaries were busy some of these phone calls might not have been recorded. If the President left the White House, detailed information was kept about where he went and with whom. The President's entire day was covered from arising to going to sleep, wherever the President was—in the Oval Office, the mansion, or elsewhere. Interactions at the ranch in Texas were monitored in exactly the same way as at the White House. The resultant diaries are remarkably complete; only three days from the first twenty-five months of the Johnson Administration are missing.

From the microfilm of the Johnson diaries every meeting and phone call was coded as to date, times interactions began and ended (if known),[14] interaction partner, medium of interaction (telephone, face-to-face meeting, or public ceremony), and content of the interaction, if known. Each interaction partner has a separate record; if the President had a Cabinet meeting with twenty people there are twenty interaction partners and twenty interaction records. All presidential interactions recorded in the daily diary, with the exception of dinners, were coded.[15] For the analysis discussed here only nonceremonial interactions will be included.

The daily diaries provide an important data base for studying presidential interactions, but they provide information only on the President's verbal interactions. Also important are the written interactions that the President has with those around him, particularly the memoranda sent to and read by the President. President Johnson's staff gathered the most important memos each day for him to read at night and early the next morning. This night reading was an important source of information for Johnson, and people wanting to get material before the President worked assiduously to get their memos in his night reading.[16]

Unfortunately, the lists of night reading memos have not yet been indexed and cataloged by the LBJ Library. When that is done, the Johnson interactional data base will be as complete as can be expected and it will be possible to analyze President Johnson's verbal interactions, his written interactions, the relationship between the two types of interactions, and the total set of interactions. The research reported here will focus only on the nonceremonial verbal interactions President Johnson engaged in during his first twenty-five months of office.

The first twenty-five months were chosen because Richard Neustadt and others

[14] The duration of phone calls is unknown and the endpoints of many meetings are not clear from the daily diaries. For that reason data regarding the amount of interaction time are not complete.

[15] Since Johnson frequently had working lunches, his interaction partners for this meal are also coded. It is more difficult to code evening meals, which were frequently eaten with friends and family; to avoid problems, dinners were not coded as meetings.

[16] Redford and McCulley, *White House Operations,* 66.

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TABLE 1

Total Number of Interactions, by Month

12/63	*1/64*	*2/64*	*3/64*	*4/64*	*5/64*	*6/64*	*7/64*	*8/64*	*9/64*	*10/64*	*11/64*	*12/64*
1030	1250	927	1099	1342	1075	1621	1556	1805	1164	698	693	880
1/65	*2/65*	*3/65*	*4/65*	*5/65*	*6/65*	*7/65*	*8/65*	*9/65*	*10/65*	*11/65*	*12/65*	*Total*
888	1219	1585	1234	1383	1059	1191	1461	1252	738	595	785	28,530

feel that is the most crucial time for the president to establish his presidency.[17] By the president's third year one normally sees a mature administration.[18] In the Johnson administration the first twenty-five months sees the transition from the Kennedy/Johnson administration to the Johnson administration after the 1964 election. As a result we can examine interaction partners and medium from the Kennedy assassination to the point one year after his own election.

The Analysis

With Whom Did The President Talk?

Viewed in the aggregate, President Johnson had 28,530 interactions during the first twenty-five months of his administration, an average of 1,141.6 interactions per month or 37.5 per day. (See Table 1.) The numbers of interactions range from a low of 595 in November 1965, which Johnson spent largely at his Texas ranch recovering from surgery, to a high of 1,805 interactions in August 1964, when Johnson had to deal with the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the subsequent congressional resolution, and the first bombing of targets in North Vietnam; racial riots in Jersey City, New Jersey, and the discovery of the bodies of three civil rights workers in Mississippi; and the Democratic presidential nominating convention in Atlantic City. The data indicate substantial variation in presidential interactions from month to month, with the lowest levels during October, November, and December each year. During these six months Johnson spent much of his time at his Texas ranch, resting after an arduous presidential campaign or recovering from his operation, and at home for Christmas with family and long-time Texas friends.

In order to more coherently deal with the enormous volume of interactions and interaction partners, those partners with whom President Johnson had at least five interactions during any one of the twenty-five months were chosen to repre-

[17] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 198; John Kessel, *The Domestic Presidency: Decision-Making in the White House* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1975), 10; William F. Mullen, *Presidential Power and Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 214; and Paul C. Light, *The President's Agenda* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), 40–1.

[18] Kessel, *Presidential Parties*, 71.

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TABLE 2

Total Number of "Elite" Interactions, by Group

Group	N	No. of Interactions	% of all Interactions	% of elite Interactions
Congress	22	1,832	6.4	8.6
White House Staff	29	11,319	39.7	53.2
Kennedy appts.	15	2,985		
Johnson appts.	14	8,334		
Executive Office of the President	17	1,269	4.4	6.0
Executive Branch	18	1,120	3.9	5.3
Cabinet	15	2,532	9.9	11.9
Inner Cabinet	6	1,949		
Other	57	3,205	11.2	15.1
Total Elite	158	21,277	74.6	100.1
Total Interactions		28,530		

sent Johnson interaction elite, numbering 158 people.[19] While this group comprised less than 10 percent of all interaction partners, they participated in three-quarters of Johnson's interactions. (See Table 2.)

This elite was composed of: twenty-one members of Congress, including the leadership of both houses, important committee chairs, and old friends from the Senate; thirty-three White House staff members, including Kennedy appointees, the original Johnson appointees, and people subsequently appointed by Johnson; seventeen members of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), including the directors of the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisors; eighteen sub-Cabinet members of Executive Branch departments, such as the director of the FBI, under secretaries of state, and several ambassadors; fifteen members of the Cabinet, including all ten of Kennedy's appointees and five Johnson replacement appointees; and fifty-seven others—former government officials, friends, and members of independent regulatory commissions.[20]

The data in Table 2 show that the White House staff participated in almost 40 percent of all interactions and 53 percent of elite interactions, by far the most active group. Although Johnson inherited Kennedy's White House staff, 73 percent of his staff interactions during the twenty-five month period were with his own appointees, most notably Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, George Reedy, and Walter

[19] This definition of elite includes everyone with whom Johnson interacted on a regular basis and a few with whom he interacted intensely during only one or two of the twenty-five months, and excludes no one with whom Johnson interacted on a regular basis, but less than five times in any month.

[20] Also included in this category are the interactions of Hubert Humphrey, who served as majority whip for half the time under study and vice president for the remainder, and Mrs. Johnson, whose interactions with the President ranged from phone calls to remind him of the dinner hour to discussions of policy questions.

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TABLE 3

Total Number of "Elite" Interactions, by Group and Medium

Group	Phone Interactions	% all Interactions	Face-to-face Interactions	% all Interactions
Congress	1,133	7.6	(699)	5.1
White House Staff	7,166	48.1	4,153	30.4
Executive Office of the President	475	3.2	794	5.8
Executive Branch	403	2.7	717	5.3
Cabinet	1,383	9.3	1,149	8.4
(Inner Cabinet)	(1,096)		(853)	
Other	1,764	11.8	1,441	10.6
Total Elites	12,324	82.8	8,953	65.6

Jenkins. The Cabinet was another major source of interaction partners, producing almost 9 percent of all interactions and 12 percent of all elite interactions. But not everyone in the Cabinet was equally likely to talk to President Johnson; over three-fourths of the Cabinet interactions came from the secretaries of state, treasury defense, and the attorney general—the inner Cabinet. Even within this group 76 percent of Johnson's interactions were with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. It is interesting to note that in the nine months Robert Kennedy was attorney general he had sixty-one interactions with Johnson, while his replacement, Nicholas Katzenbach, had 193 interactions in sixteen months. Even the Katzenbach interactions are lower than might have been the case. President Johnson, concerned about Katzenbach's loyalty, initially appointed him as acting attorney general for six months. "While his [Katzenbach's] heart and guts were with Kennedy, his mind was with Johnson and he maintained a consistent loyalty."[21] Members of the EOP and sub-Cabinet officers of the executive branch interacted comparatively infrequently with Johnson, but there were a small number of people who interacted more frequently, notably the directors of the CIA, the FBI, the Bureau of the Budget, and the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. Among the ubiquitous "others," the Johnson family members, Abe Fortas, Donald Cook, John Connally, Homer Thornberry, Albert Moursund, and Edwin Weisl, Sr.,—all personal friends or "outside insiders"— were the primary interaction partners.[22]

What Medium Did the President Use?

The data make it clear how extensively Johnson relied on the telephone to keep in touch with people; 52 percent of his interactions were over the telephone. His

[21] Macy, Oral History Collection, 26.
[22] Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle.*

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use of the telephone becomes even more obvious when you remember that many of his face-to-face interactions were multiperson interactions, while his telephone interactions were one-on-one. Hubert Humphrey noted, "He had to have people around him. Very much so. He was like a plant reaching out for water. Like a tree. And his whole demeanor was one great big long reach. And if you weren't there, he'd just reach a little further to get you. And if he couldn't get you physically, he'd pick up the phone and get you."[23]

But he didn't use the telephone to interact with everyone. Although 55 percent or more of his interactions with members of Congress, the White House staff, the Cabinet, and others were by telephone, only 37 percent of his interactions with members of the EOP and sub-Cabinet members were. On the comparatively few occasions when Johnson interacted with these policy people, he did so in person. They were not part of his usual telephone network centered in the Oval Office.

The White House staff, on the other hand, were an instrinsic part of the telephone network, just as they were a central part of his total interaction environment. Almost half of Johnson's telephone interactions were with White House staff members, who had to be available day and night for consultation with him. Johnson also made extensive use of the telephone to keep in touch with members of Congress, particularly when an important piece of legislation was pending. Aside from congressional breakfasts with the leadership, Johnson talked on the phone with members who wouldn't want to be seen talking with him (Everett Dirksen) or with whom he wouldn't want to be seen talking (Wayne Morse). At the same time, old Senate friends (Richard Russell and George Smathers) were able to talk with the President when they wanted. Total interactions by Cabinet members were dominated by members of the inner Cabinet, whether by telephone or in face-to-face meetings; and one person, Robert McNamara, was the preponderant interaction partner in this group, with almost 50 percent of the inner Cabinet's telephone interactions and 41 percent of the face-to-face interactions. Dean Rusk, the next most frequent interaction partner, had 26 percent of the inner Cabinet telphone interactions and 21 percent of the face-to-face interactions. Thus, the two foreign policy Cabinet officers interacted far more frequently with President Johnson than did the other Cabinet members. The reliance on McNamara and Rusk reflected in these interaction data was the result of several factors. Although Johnson was confident of his knowledge of domestic policy, in foreign affairs "he was insecure, fearful, his touch unsure."[24] During his first year in office he wanted to focus on domestic policy, leaving foreign policy—particularly Vietnam—to Secretary of Defense McNamara and the military.[25] After entering office President Johnson quickly

[23] Hubert Humphrey in Merle Miller, *Lyndon: An Oral Biography* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 312.

[24] Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 250.

[25] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1969), 401; and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966), 532.

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TABLE 4

Total Number of Interactions for Troika and Foreign Policy Trio

Group	Phone Interactions	% all Interactions	Face-to-face Interactions	% all Interactions
Troika (Council of Economic Advisers, Bureau of Budget, Treasury)	272	1.8	326	2.3
Foreign Policy Trio (McNamara, Rusk, McGeorge Bundy)	1,785	12.0	1,252	9.2
Total Interactions	14,884		13,646	

established rapport with Rusk and McNamara. According to Halberstam, Rusk was more comfortable under Johnson than he had been under Kennedy, and Johnson was in awe of McNamara.[26]

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, along with McGeorge Bundy in his role as National Security Adviser, were Johnson's principal foreign policy advisers and this is reflected in their interaction levels. These levels are high when compared with Johnson's interactions with his economic policy troika-chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, director of the Bureau of the Budget, and secretary of the Treasury. (See Table 4.) President Johnson had five times more interactions with his trio of foreign policy advisers than with his economic policy trio. The disparity in interactions was not due to a lack of interest in economic policy. "In his role as economic manager, Johnson was personally much interested in and actively involved with the formation of macroeconomic policy."[27] His personal involvement in economic policy making is reflected in the number of face-to-face interactions Johnson had with troika members.

Johnson's comparatively high level of interactions with his three foreign policy advisers reflects his lack of familiarity with foreign policy issues and, as we shall see in more detail shortly, a series of unanticipated foreign policy events—unrest in Panama and the Dominican Republic, as well as the Gulf of Tonkin incident and growing military involvement in Vietnam—that forced Johnson to consult with his foreign policy advisers even when he wanted to put foreign policy questions in abeyance.

When Did the President Interact With his Advisers?

When the total interaction data are disaggregated into monthly interaction levels, it becomes clear there are substantial variations from month to month. Congressional interactions, for example, range from a low of six interactions in November

[26] Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*, 346.

[27] James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazleton, *Managing Macroeconomic Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 227.

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1965 to a high of 142 interactions in April 1964. Johnson's congressional interactions were clearly tied to the legislative calendar, with the lowest interaction levels occuring during the last three months of each year as Congress approached adjournment. There were also differences in interaction levels between 1964 and 1965. There were 1,010 congressional interactions in 1964, when Johnson was pushing the Kennedy/Johnson legislative program—including the Economic Opportunity Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Bill. There were 693 interactions in 1965, when Johnson focused on his Great Society legislation but began encountering congressional opposition. The disparity in interaction levels between the two years reflects either Johnson's recognition in 1964 that he had an unparalleled opportunity to push the Kennedy/Johnson program through Congress; the recognition in 1965 that his resources were diminishing and his legislative window of opportunity was closing; or the increased efficiency of Larry O'Brien's congressional liaison office and Johnson's growing trust in their efforts, which required less personal involvement by the President after 1964. Within each year there were variations in congressional interaction levels that corresponded to the rhythm of the congressional calendar, with the lowest levels in November, December, and January.

After December 1963, Johnson's interaction levels with his White House staff vary around 40 percent of all interactions, with the exception of November 1964.[28] With people he had to rely on, like the White House staff, Johnson quickly established interaction levels that he maintained thoughout the time period. There are interesting variations in intrastaff interactions, however; during December 1963 Johnson relied heavily on his Kennedy-appointed staff, but thereafter he relied more and more on his own appointees; in December 1963 two-thirds of his staff interactions were with Kennedy appointees; in January and February 1964 the Kennedy appointees accounted for one-half of his staff interactions; but by December 1964 Kennedy appointees were involved in only one-fourth of his staff interactions. This is particularly evident in Johnson's telephone interactions; by May 1964 three-quarters of his telephone interactions with his staff were with his own appointees. Although only a few of the Kennedy staff resigned during 1964 (most notably Pierre Salinger and Ted Sorensen), the remaining Kennedy appointees were replaced interactionally by Johnson appointees. Over time only three of the carry-over Kennedy appointees continued to interact frequently with Johnson: McGeorge Bundy, Lee White, and Larry O'Brien. It is interesting that the Kennedy holdovers on the staff were in two important areas: national security (Bundy) and congressional relations (O'Brien and White).[29] Johnson's reliance on Kennedy appointees for foreign policy advice is even more striking when the influence of Rusk and McNamara (both Kennedy appointees) is taken into account. This foreign policy trio sustains its influence with Johnson throughout the period, even after

[28] One major reason for the decline in White House staff interactions in November 1964 is the decline in Johnson's interactions with Walter Jenkins, his chief of staff—from 118 interactions in September to 32 in October and 1 in November, as a result of Jenkin's arrest in October 1964.

[29] Redford and McCully, *White House Operations*, 21.

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Johnson staff people have assumed more prominent roles in other policy areas. Reliance on Kennedy people for foreign policy advice and congressional liaison assistance should not obscure the fact, however, that during 1965, 70 to 80 percent of Johnson's White House staff interactions were with his own appointees. Even the loss of Walter Jenkins, his chief of staff, in October 1964 was quickly remedied by the hiring of Marvin Watson. The high level of interactions between Johnson and his appointees and the small amount of variance suggests that by 1965 Johnson achieved, ". . . by attrition and replacement, a staff line-up that pleased him."[30] It was not only a staff that "pleased" him but one which he could "trust"—whose loyalty was to him and his programs. By that time he had learned whom to trust among the Kennedy appointees as well as his own people.

One sees the same reliance on trusted advisers when looking at the Cabinet interactions; the inner Cabinet, particularly Rusk and McNamara, became increasingly important to Johnson after the 1964 election, as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated and Johnson began to devote more time and energy to the consideration of his military options.[31] During the five-month period, March-July 1965, when Johnson debated with his advisers about the use of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam, approximately 80 percent of Johnson's Cabinet interactions were with members of the inner Cabinet, particularly Rusk and McNamara. This period also marked the change in Johnson's test of personal loyalty: loyalty defined in terms of support for his position on Vietnam. Vice-President Humphrey failed this test in February 1965 by writing Johnson a memo opposing further military escalation, resulting in ". . . the vice-president's banishment from future foreign policy meetings, a position he later described as being 'in limbo.' "[32] Humphrey's state of limbo can be seen in the interaction data: during the first four months of 1965 he had 46 interactions with Johnson; during the last eight months he had only 64 and few of those with Rusk and McNamara.

The Dominican Republic crisis of April-May 1965 also forced Johnson to heed external events. While entrusting the lead responsibility for the problem to McNamara and General Earle Wheeler, Johnson kept abreast of developments, concerned that the Dominican Republic would become a "second Cuba."[33] Even Abe Fortas played a covert mediating role from Puerto Rico, keeping Johnson informed.[34]

[30] Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle*, 38.

[31] Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982); Robert L. Gallucci, *Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975); Leslie Gelb with Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979); Halberstam, *Best and the Brightest*; and George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986).

[32] Hubert H. Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 323.

[33] Abraham Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 26.

[34] Abe Fortas, Oral History Collection, LBJ Library, 1969, 30.

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Given the turmoil of external events, it is important to note that Johnson did not interact with his foreign policy advisers, particularly Rusk and McNamara, to the exclusion of everyone else. Using the Johnson daily dairies to study Johnson interactions before, during, and after the 1968 Tet Offensive, Sigelman and McNeil found a similar pattern.[35] One possible explanation is that by early 1965 President Johnson had learned whose foreign policy advice he could trust, and he interacted with those people during times of crisis or calm. When confronted by unanticipated foreign policy events, Johnson turned for advice to trusted friends, not a legion of strangers.

If we look at the elite interactions in the aggregate, month by month, a fascinating picture emerges. Over time Johnson's interactions were increasingly concentrated in an increasingly close circle of friends; in December 1965 only 72 people accounted for 81 percent of Johnson's interactions compared with 106 people who accounted for 68 percent of his interactions in December 1963. By the end of 1965, fewer and fewer people were accounting for an even larger share of Johnson's interactions. The President was beginning to withdraw, to concentrate his interactions more and more with those people whom he felt he could trust and with whom he felt comfortable.

The data show an interesting pattern of media use by Johnson over time. Initially his total interactions were more likely to be face-to-face instead of by telephone, a pattern that persisted for his first eight months in office. Beginning with August 1964, however, the pattern reversed; except for two months, phone calls became Johnson's predominant interaction medium. The pattern of elite interactions is even more stark. For twenty-three of the twenty-five months, Johnson's principal interaction medium with his primary partners was the telephone.

Johnson's reliance on the telephone was not uniform for all groups of interaction partners. He used the phone to keep in touch with members of Congress and the White House staff. Before crucial votes on important legislation Johnson would be on the phone to legislative leaders and to key members of Congress. Although he met regularly in person with legislative leaders, he was in frequent contact by phone with other members, particularly old friends from the Senate or those members that Larry O'Brien felt needed the Johnson treatment prior to key votes. The telephone was an important link between Johnson and his staff; for twenty-four of the twenty-five months telephone interactions with staff members far outnumbered face-to-face interactions. Describing an average day Jack Valenti states, "He would be on the phone during these early morning hours, always to Rusk and McNamara. Within an hour or so, he would sweep the West Wing clean, calling each of his top aides with an opening line 'What do you know?' which meant he wanted to dredge them for information."[36] Johnson wanted his staff to be available by phone anytime, in case he wanted to "reach out and touch someone." He

[35] Lee Sigelman and Dixie Mercer McNeil, "White House Decision-Making Under Stress," *American Journal of Politicial Science* 24 (November 1980): 652–73.

[36] Jack Valenti, *A Very Human President* (New York: Norton, 1975), 163.

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used the telephone not only for informational purposes but as an instrument of staff control; staff members could never be too far from their phones.

It should be noted that the people he interacted with more in person than by phone were policy advisers from the EOP or the executive branch. In working up the annual budget Johnson met frequently with advisers from the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers, particularly in December and January of each year. He also met with them to formulate tax legislation and to evaluate the fiscal impact of impending legislation. "In making economic decisions Johnson preferred face-to-face meetings with groups of his advisors in which differences could be worked out and resolved."[37]

Johnson's face-to-face interactions with executive branch personnel were most frequently with sub-Cabinet people from the Departments of State (George Ball, William Bundy) or Defense (Generals Wheeler and William Westmoreland). Not surprisingly, the executive branch face-to-face interactions were greatest during foreign policy crises – unrest in Panama, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Dominican Republic, and planning for increased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam – but were the more common form of presidential interaction in periods of calm as well.

Although President Johnson was continually busy in the Oval Office, there was comparatively little diminution of activity during the period September-November 1964, the height of the 1964 presidential election campaign. A memo from one of Johnson's key campaign advisers provides the clue: "This schedule is designed to create the appearances of a hard-working President in the White House, busy with the real problems of the nation and the world, and using only his weekends to campaign."[38]

Conclusion

This analysis of the daily diaries of President Lyndon B. Johnson shows a president choosing with whom he wants to interact, how, and when. Not surprisingly, his interaction partners were people he inherited from the Kennedy administration whom he learned to trust, people with whom he had prior experience in the Senate or as vice-president, and his own later appointees who, after a trial period, he came to trust. Over time, this trusted elite increasingly dominated his non-ceremonial interaction life, for "Presidents lean hard on the men they trust."[39] After 1965, however, trust increasingly was earned (or lost) by support (or lack of support) for Johnson's Vietnam policies rather than by performance.[40]

[37] Anderson and Hazleton, *Managing Microeconomic Policy*, 228.

[38] James H. Rowe Jr. Folder (10/7-10/12/64), Box 10, The President's Appointment File "Diary Back-Up," LBJ Library.

[39] Henry R. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 23.

[40] James E. Anderson, "Presidential Management of the Bureaucracy and the Johnson Presidency: A Preliminary Exploration," *Congress and the Presidency* 1 (Autumn 1984): 137-66; Richard L. Schott and Dagmar S. Hamilton, *People, Politics, and Power: The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 29; and William Bundy, Oral History Collection, LBJ Library, 1969, 25.

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Johnson's extensive use of the telephone as an interaction medium is clearly evident from the data. He used the phone not only to solicit opinions and advice but to supervise, oversee, and control. His reliance on the telephone meant that people with whom he interacted knew if they couldn't get into the Oval Office with an appointment, they could probably reach him by phone. But when faced with difficult or complex policy decisions Johnson preferred to meet face-to-face with his people. Regardless of whether he interacted with people in person or on the phone, "His talk was a safety valve . . . . The sound of his voice was reassuring. He was thinking out loud, testing reactions, sculpting concepts, forming policy."[41]

There was also a temporal dimension to Johnson's interactions. His interactions with members of Congress were geared to the legislative calendar; when his personal intervention on a bill was needed, Larry O'Brien asked him to call friends on the Hill. In like manner, his meetings with members of the economic troika were geared to the budgetary and economic message cycle. Johnson frequently subjected new appointees to a trial period, during which he determined how good they were and whether he could trust them. Once they had established a trust relationship, Johnson would interact with them as needed. Thus Johnson was continually learning, over and over again, whom he could trust. Nonetheless, the core cadre of his interactional elite was well established within six months of his 1964 inauguration.*

[41] Hugh Sidey, *A Very Personal Presidency: Lyndon Johnson in the White House* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 46.

* The author would like to thank Bryan S. Best and Adrienne Arnone for their assistance in entering and analyzing the data for this study, and the staff of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library for their help.

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Book Reviews

Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance *by David P. Calleo. New York, Basic Books, 1987. 288 pp. $20.95.*

David Calleo's book is a powerful plea for a radical transformation of the Atlantic Alliance. He has been a champion of devolution—the transfer of the main responsibility for the defense of West Europe from the United States to the Europeans—for many years. His new book can be read as a skillful synthesis of his previous works on the alliance, on the difficulties of United States foreign economic policy, on France, and on Germany. His main argument is simple: "under NATO's present arrangements, the Europeans have been militarily underdeveloped while the United States has been militarily overextended" (p. 217). The United States is a hegemon in decay, and Calleo gives a "cosmopolitan" rather than a "nationalist" reading of this decline: it results less from America's failings than from the irreversible revival or rise of the rest of the world. (He also offers a challenging interpretation of the interwar period, which he describes as another period of hegemony in decay—Britain's.) Throughout, he argues that "it is not pluralistic systems that are instable, but hegemonic systems," because decaying hegemons "try to convert their slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony" (p. 142). In this respect, Calleo's book is a contribution not only to the literature on the alliance but to the theoretical debate about the virtues of hegemony and the possibilities of cooperation "after hegemony," around the works of Robert Gilpin and Robert Keohane. Calleo buttresses his position with a sharp analysis of the different monetary strategies adopted by U.S. policy makers in order to run balance of payments deficits—the Bretton Woods formula, the Nixon floating formula, and the Reagan one of using "America's swelling fiscal debt as a magnet to attract the exported dollars back home" (p. 104)—strategies that have all created major headaches for the Europeans and exploited the international economy.

He believes that no comparable formula will be found, because "the economic difficulties of the 1980s do seem to have a cumulative and accelerating quality" (p. 104). "Restoring American fiscal equilibrium through military savings" (p. 125) becomes the only solution for a country whose middle class is less heavily taxed

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but also receives far fewer social benefits than the French and West German middle classes and rejects higher taxes precisely because these benefits are scant. Thus, the United States ought to take advantage of "today's emerging strategic pluralism," cut its contribution to Europe's defense, and concentrate "America's own military effort on intercontinental deterrence and global balance" (p. 124), thus leaving to West Europe the primary responsibility for its defense.

This, of course, raises a formidable set of questions. Are the West European nations capable of balancing the Soviets in Europe and willing to play the role Calleo assigns to them? A negative answer has been given by Josef Joffe in his incisive set of essays, *The Limited Partnership* (1987). Joffe believes that a strong American presence is needed to deter the Soviets, to prevent discord among the European allies, and to prevent the Soviets from exploiting such discord. Calleo is much more optimistic. The United States would still participate in Europe's defense, but NATO would be "Europeanized" around French and German conventional armies, and the French and British nuclear forces. The Franco-German coalition within the European Community, whose purpose has been "balancing the Americans in the economic sphere," should "acquire the new purpose of balancing the Soviets in the military sphere" (p. 183). The Franco-German "minuet," disappointing as long as American protection is certain, will become more intense when the protectorate vanishes. Moreover, a European nuclear deterrent should facilitate rather than complicate superpower arms control, because it is "the needs for extended deterrence" that have driven the arms race (p. 214).

Calleo indicts America's elites for their obstinate attachment to a bipolar world. But even persons sympathetic to his call for a more pluralistic one and to his analysis of Soviet policy in Europe (which he deems essentially conservative) may find that he doesn't take the obstacles to an effective European nuclear deterrent and to a cohesive European Community seriously enough. Is a secure second-strike capability sufficient to deter a Soviet conventional attack? Given the reluctance of both France and Germany to increase their conventional forces, wouldn't "balancing the Soviets" require drastic Soviet cuts? Would it be prudent for the United States to reduce its conventional presence in Europe and, in order to roll back its military budget, to demobilize some of its divisions currently stationed there before the Soviets have either made cuts unilaterally or negotiated mutual reductions with the United States? Given the stability of NATO and the uncertainty of the West European reaction to the policy Calleo calls for, doesn't the United States also—not just the Soviet Union—have a stake in the status quo in Europe? Just as it is the Soviet threat that has saved NATO from dislocation several times, doesn't the possibility of devolution depend above all on the course of the new Soviet policy, which it is too early to predict, but which seems as hostile to a West European nuclear and conventional entity as before? These are the questions that remain at the end of Calleo's brilliant but perhaps a bit too sweeping argument.

STANLEY HOFFMANN
Harvard University

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The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 *by Paul Kennedy. New York, Random House, 1988. 677 pp. $24.95.*

This book has deservedly attracted an enormous amount of public attention and will undoubtedly be remembered as one of the most influential history books of the 1980s. It is an example—unfortunately too rare now—of the historian's ability to address major current issues. The public has been made to think about the United States's place in the world and of the significance of historical processes. Kennedy offers a lucid distillation of a large secondary literature to tell the story of how Great Powers rise and decline. Individual sections, even when a long way removed from Kennedy's research interests, are quite compelling: for instance, the account of English foreign policy in the 1650s is better than anything else on the subject, simply because it takes into account the impressive foreign language literature on the subject.

It is Kennedy's broad argument that has drawn the most interest. Economics matters in power politics—he quotes Nixon to this effect. Then he uses Lenin's Law of Unequal Development to demonstrate how the distribution of economic and political power throughout the world is in constant flux. If economic power allows for political expansion, the corollary is that Great Power politics are costly and involve "over-extension" and the eventual sapping of the material base. Spain, the Netherlands, the French *ancien regime*, nineteenth-century Britain, and now the United States have all suffered from this inexorable logic.

It is not a completely determinist argument in the Leninist mold, but for the United States it is a pessimistic one. States can only command disproportionate shares of material and political power for a brief while: and the United States share of world GNP has fallen, the United States has become a net debtor, and its military commitments are too expensive. There is a danger of following Britain's path to decline; and the future will lie in the Pacific, with Japan and the People's Republic of China.

The analytical impact depends on the analogy between nineteenth-century Britain and the post-1945 United States. Kennedy is aware that the discrepancy between Britain's small share of world population and its effective power in the mid-nineteenth century is far greater than has been the case for the United States. In addition, it may be misplaced to see early twentieth-century Britain as being in terminal decline: the British position as an overseas investor was so strong that it was able to stand the strain of four years of unprecedentedly costly war without major social strain—unlike the powers on the European continent. It was simply a world war that made for the end of the *pax britannica*: the crumbling of the *pax americana* is obviously not a cataclysmic process of this kind, and there is less reason to doubt the ability of the United States to maintain its (relatively cheap) defense commitments than Kennedy supposes.

As to the popular reaction to the book, is worry about the future not a characteristic response to an unprecedentedly long period of prosperity (such as the sus-

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tained recovery of the U.S. economy in the 1980s)? There was something of this in the 1920s boom, before the United States even achieved a secure position in world politics. *The Great Gatsby* offers a curious literary parallel in terms of *Rezeptionsgeschichte*:

> "Civilization's going to pieces," broke out Tom violently. "I've gotten to be a terrible pessimist about things. Have you read *The Rise of the Coloured Empires* by this man Goddard?"
> "Why no," I answered, rather surprised by his tone.
> "Well, it's a fine book, and everybody ought to read it. The idea is that if we don't look out the white race will be—will be utterly submerged. It's all scientific stuff; it's been proved."
> "Tom's getting very profound," said Daisy, with an expression of unthoughtful sadness. "He reads deep books with long words in them."

HAROLD JAMES
Princeton University

Cold War or Détente in the 1980s: The International Politics of American-Soviet Relations *by Peter Savigear. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987. 196 pp. $29.95.*

The publisher's blurb describes this book as a "major new work," thought-provoking and controversial. In fact it is confused, vague, and awkward. It is not clear why the years 1980–1985 constitute an organic phase to be studied; many of the trends ostensibly discovered therein have already been contradicted by events of the past few years. There is no indication of any methodology the author, a senior lecturer in Politics at the University of Leicester, uses to arrive at such conclusions as "the USA and the USSR became less important in international politics in the 1980s" (p. 5). At the same time he posits the "declining importance of Europe" (p. 84)—measured how? importance to whom? for what?—as well as confusion in the Third World.

While there are sensible comments on the western alliance, on trends in the arms race and in international economics, the book suffers from a stylistic imprecision that seems to reflect a vagueness on the part of the analyst. A few samples will illustrate the point. "Uncertainty became the hallmark of the years 1980–1985" (p. 29). As between politics and economics "it was never clear what their relative importance was" (p. 110). The place of alliances was becoming more fluid, and "the relations between the USA and the USSR were therefore affected by this dynamism" (p. 61). On Africa "the issues were confused and the precise details difficult to elucidate" (p. 47). In superpower relations "the conditions which had existed since the end of the Second World War vanished" (p. 162), and "it was no longer easy to establish gains and losses" for the superpowers in the Third World (p. 168). In the end "we all wait to see what will happen next" (p. 183).

In addition to repeated infelicities of expression, there are also questionable state-

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ments. We are told that the VW Beetle disappeared "largely due to the political intervention of the government of the United States" (p. 110). The author asserts that the United States offered the Soviet Union not only military but also political parity in the 1970s (p. 45), when in fact it refused to do so. Elsewhere it is not clear what he means. "Convergence has a long history. However, the political consequences became sharper in the 1980s" (p. 62). "In many respects these hopes were illusory, but they were not necessarily so" (p. 99).

The major beneficiary of this analysis appears to be the Reagan administration, at least in its first term. From Grenada to Strategic Defense Initiative, from the state of the American economy to the reassertion of the theme of freedom, the United States—after earlier descending to moral parity with the Soviet Union—can apparently do no wrong. How the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship and all it implies could be fitted into this account is another question. In general, little attention is paid to alternatives of, or changes in, Soviet policy. Perhaps more fundamentally, in this story things somehow just happen. We are not provided any discussion of the evolution of either American or Soviet policy, nor more generally, the author's view of what makes international relations tick.

Savigear argues that the superpowers are trapped in a contest from which they cannot escape; hence there is little scope for freedom of choice. One might posit precisely the opposite—namely, that unlike the earlier cold war era, at present, political will in the two capitals is the critical ingredient in shaping the relationship. One of the author's central arguments is presumably the assertion that the superpowers' centrality to world affairs is "deceptive"; yet this reader failed to learn why this is so. We are then offered the less than astonishing conclusion that the 1980s "were no simple continuation of détente" (p. 56).

ALEXANDER DALLIN
Stanford University

Extended Deterrence: The United States and NATO Europe *by Stephen J. Cimbala. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1987. 229 pp. $32.00.*

This book is very impressive and profoundly disappointing. Its most impressive feature is its comprehensiveness. Cimbala considers a variety of relevant issues including Soviet strategy; the conventional defense of Europe; the role, if any, of theater nuclear weapons; American strategic policies and weapons systems, including Star Wars; U.S. maritime strategy; and the political significance of NATO. He examines various arguments that have been made for differing positions in recent years and offers clear and coherent criticisms of some of them. His footnotes are a mine of information, suggesting that the author has read widely and deeply in the literature in this area over the last six or seven years on all sides of the major debates. His prose is not bad, certainly understandable to people fa-

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miliar with the field, but perhaps containing too many "real times" and "force multipliers" for most undergraduates with whom I am familiar.

His arguments and perspectives fall well within mainline American strategic thinking, and his recommendations are relatively modest, involving mostly a slight rearrangement of the deck chairs. For instance, he advocates the building of fortified positions on the inter-German border, improving the quality and numbers of operational reserves, exploiting new technologies to improve target acquisition, increasing capabilities for mobilization, and preserving strategic nuclear parity. Since all of these measures will only cost more money on top of the almost two trillion dollars that the Reagan administration has already pumped into the defense sinkhole, there is no reason to imagine many people in the defense community objecting to "improvements" of this kind.

The disappointing nature of the book can already be inferred from what has been said. It is essentially a business-as-usual book that sees for the future only a continuation of the past, with the two armed camps devoting endless resources to deterring the other from doing what both consider the least likely eventuality. This is certainly not a book that would help Mikhail Gorbachev in his effort to redefine the world and the East-West confrontation in terms that might help both participants begin to face the real problems of the twenty-first century rather than to continue living in the shadow of World War II. In a brief section called "Soviet Objectives," which seems to bear very little relation to the rest of his argument, Cimbala admits that for the Soviets "a premeditated attack on the West may be less likely than a fearful lunge in anticipation of being attacked" (p. 200). It is hard to see how the author's recommendations, all of which are designed to augment NATO's war-fighting capabilities, will assuage Soviet fears of being attacked. In fact, since the additional expenditures associated with his proposals might certainly contribute to the economic crisis in the West that the author believes could signal to the Soviets that attack is imminent, then his suggested improvements for NATO may be more destabilizing than stabilizing. Wasn't it Dwight Eisenhower, almost thirty years ago, who recognized that the greatest threat to the West was in not keeping its own economic house in order?

As Cimbala notes, "Soviet strategy is predicated upon the assumption that they will be attacked first unless they are sufficiently vigilant enough to anticipate that attack, and to deflect it" (p. 202). We know that NATO is essentially defensive and we know that the Soviets are essentially defensive, so what are all the armaments about? If the situation is as Cimbala indicates and the Soviets do not want to conquer Europe or the world, (and it seems to me that is an accurate portrayal, since it is difficult to see any conditions in which the Soviets would welcome a reunited Germany, even if initially it were under Soviet control), then the major problem is to assure the Soviets that there is no fear of attack from the West as a result of economic or political crises in Europe or the United States. It is difficult to see how this book or many of the others in this field are addressing that problem by offering simply additional remedies for improving NATO's ability to conduct war.

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The author might respond by saying: "wars do not always break out for rational reasons: nor are they fought according to cost-benefit calculations alone" (p. 91). But if we factor out rational actors, then what does all the argument about deterrence amount to? Deterrence depends upon rational actors. If the Soviet Union (or the West) submits to the leadership of a lunatic, then all bets are off. War will occur despite the "correlation of forces," and the earth will revert to a simpler condition where cockroaches will become the most complex life form. Such an argument does not lead to a more robust defense; it simply stresses the futility of any form of rational action.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance *by Josef Joffe. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1987. 225 pp. $29.95.*

As Josef Joffe reminds us, "the history of NATO is the history of its crises" (p. xi). A number of different schools of thought now offer prescriptions for dealing with the present one, and this book is a considerable, if not entirely imaginative, contribution to the often heated debate. Some alliance critics would abandon NATO as anachronistic, expensive, or even dangerous; others sympathize with the alliance's basic function but urge radical reform in order that it survive change; still others are impressed with the past forty years of European peace and believe NATO a huge success that can be tampered with only at great risk. Joffe falls squarely into the last category, and his book is an impassioned plea for continuity and the maintenance of a structure—American leadership, U.S. troops in Europe, and continued extended nuclear deterrence—that in his opinion has worked very well.

After examining several different phases of the alliance's history and underlining the built-in transatlantic conflict, Joffe studies the populist manifestation of the latest and most severe of the resultant crises—the European peace movement of the early 1980s. In what is arguably the most valuable part of the book, Joffe analyses the eruption of antinuclear sentiment in the north of Europe and the cooptation of that sentiment by leftist political parties; he rejects some of the purely sociological explanations of the wave of protest. The parties of the northern democratic Left adopted the peace movement not primarily because of their members' Protestant traditions, the priority they accorded to security issues (unemployment was consistently a greater concern of voters), or their youthful demographic makeup, but largely because of the political structures of the northern societies themselves: the absence of large Communist parties, the Center-Left's interest in avoiding East-West tension that only helps the defense-oriented Right, and the political need for the Left to adopt a foreign policy issue while its economic policies were failing.

The final chapters, which deal in some detail with the various military alterna-

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tives open to NATO and their implications for the alliance, are no less impressive in their setting forth of the problems at hand, but can leave the reader disappointed by their conclusions. The author methodically examines many of the proposals for non-nuclear military solutions to NATO's present crisis, and rightly points out their numerous pitfalls. A pledge of "No First Use" would be vacuous at best, and at worst would perilously assure the conventionally stronger Soviets that "the Alliance will not even use the [nuclear] threat to deter a conventional attack (p. 138). Schemes for "defensive defense" or "defense in depth" would promise the Warsaw Pact that its own territory risked nothing, and would invite an aggressor into Germany with no reasonable basis to hope it could then be repulsed. On the other side of the spectrum, NATO plans for "deep strike" offensive capabilities depend on unproven and expensive technological nostrums and would distract from the true security interest of Western Europe—halting an attack at the front.

While these reservations are certainly legitimate, Joffe fails to address the very compelling reasons that alternatives to present strategy have become imperative in the first place. Few deny that the United States continues to have a major stake in Europe's security, but the eroding credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and the United States's budgetary disaster may make necessary some strategic reconsideration. Joffe's reference to "lightly abandoning the system" (p. 166) is an inappropriate description of a serious debate that has gone on for decades and must be cooperatively pursued within the alliance. Finally, European members of NATO must keep in mind not only what they believe the United States *should* do, but what the U.S. *might* do—and the present climate does not preclude some reduction of American support for present NATO structure.

Joffe's book is stimulating and in many ways provocative, but one might have hoped he be more willing to consider change. Throwing out alternatives does not suffice in the elaboration of strategy; one must also evaluate the basis for maintaining the status quo.

PHILIP GORDON
The Johns Hopkins University

Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle *by Barbara Hinkson Craig. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. 262 pp. $24.95.*

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974) invalidated a congressional attempt to share the president's appointment powers in naming independent regulatory commissioners, and *Bowsher v. Synar*, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) rejected legislation vesting the authority to impose budget reductions in an official removable by Congress. These modern judicial decisions exalting executive authority are joined by *Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) to invalidate the "legis-

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lative veto" found in more than 200 laws. "In one fell swoop the Court effectively overturned more legislative enactments than it had over its entire history since the first act of Congress was ruled unconstitutional in *Marbury v. Madison*" (p. iv).

Craig's superb book confirms the continuing intellectual vitality of the study of a single constitutional case. Jigdish Chadha's case involved interest group maneuvering, congressional action, conflict within the executive branch, lawyers' arguments and briefs, and administrative and judicial decisions. Craig's longstanding research on the legislative veto—including a previous book, several research articles, familiarity with archives and documentary sources, and a network of contacts—informs her volume.

The serendipity of constitutional adjudication is well illustrated here. A local immigration lawyer, John Pohlmann, undertook a long-shot constitutional challenge of Congress's veto of the Department of Justice's grant to Chadha of permanent residency. Reference to Chadha in a solicitor general's brief urging the Supreme Court not to hear a different legislative veto case brought Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group, with its financial and litigation resources, into Chadha's appeal.

The executive branch was inconstant in protecting executive prerogatives. President Jimmy Carter, Attorney General Griffin Bell, and the White House staff endorsed the legislative veto in order to obtain executive reorganization powers from Congress. The Reagan White House, including Vice President George Bush and Edwin Meese, accepted the veto to conciliate their conservative allies in Congress. But Larry Simms, a career attorney in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, concluded that the veto was wrong as a matter of constitutional principle; and his staff work was critical ultimately in persuading both Carter and Reagan to oppose the veto. At one point a handwritten note from Attorney General William French Smith to Ronald Reagan saved Justice's lawsuit against the legislative veto from opposition by Bush and Meese.

Internecine conflict also marked congressional deliberations. The House Rules Committee repeatedly blocked a generic legislative veto bill because its expedited procedures for consideration of agency rules would have weakened Rules's control over the House calendar. And the majority party leadership's opposition to the veto was gradually eroded and finally fell to the antigovernment stance of new members who came to Washington in the post-Watergate years.

In the courts, Chadha survived a series of mishaps. The death of one judge and the departure of another delayed decision in the Court of Appeals for more than two years, and Judge (now Justice) Anthony Kennedy's decision was narrowly drawn to apply only to legislative vetoes of executive branch determinations but not of independent agency rules. And although Chadha was briefed and argued in the 1981 term, the Supreme Court mysteriously scheduled rehearing for the 1982 term. (Craig notes Court gossip that Chief Justice Warren Burger urged reargument so he could reassign the opinion from Justice Harry Blackmun to himself when he realized late in 1981 the importance of Chadha.) The delay was for-

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tuitous: it gave the D.C. Court of Appeals time to render a sweeping and forcefully reasoned decision striking down the legislative veto in a different case.

Briefs, oral arguments, and judicial decisions are carefully described to show the magnitude of the constitutional issues. A literal reading of the Constitution by the Supreme Court's majority narrowly limits legislative review of executive department and regulatory agency rules. In sharp juxtaposition, the Court's broad "spirit of the Constitution" reading of the text authorizes Congress sweepingly to delegate quasi-legislative rulemaking to the executive branch.

Scholars, commentators, and students will find this an absorbing, thoughtful, and colorful book. Craig's chronicle of Chadha's case artfully portrays the Supreme Court's role as the balance wheel in the ongoing struggle between the executive and legislative departments.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

State Supreme Courts in State and Nation *by G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988. 283 pp. $28.50.*

This is a most welcome book. Not since Henry Glick's *Courts in State Politics* (1971) and Henry Glick and Kenneth N. Vines' *State Court Systems* (1973) have state supreme courts been systematically examined. While courts are often afterthoughts in analyses of state politics, Tarr and Porter reaffirm that they play central roles not only in state legal systems but also in resolving political disputes and developing public policy.

The authors examine the work of state supreme courts in relation to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, to the rulings of supreme courts in other states, and to the decisions of the legislatures and governors of their own states. Case studies of Alabama, Ohio, and New Jersey form the heart of the book. These states were chosen because they represent a variety of regions and political traditions, but most of all because each has experienced important changes in recent decades. As Tarr and Porter describe it, Alabama's supreme court was rescued from disrepute by the efforts of then Chief Justice Howard Heflin, who not only was instrumental in reorganizing Alabama's judiciary, but also brought new procedural rules to the court and helped Alabama's court to join the mainstream of American jurisprudence.

New Jersey's court was largely the product of the reform efforts of Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Since 1947 it has been a model of administrative efficiency for state courts. Tarr and Porter also explain that it has become one of the leaders in the development of new judicial doctrines in such areas as zoning law and fair housing opportunities, equality of school financing, and torts.

Ohio's court also changed, even though it was not much touched by what is commonly termed reform. Its change came during a brief period of Democratic

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control, which brought with it more liberal decisions. It remained, however, a highly partisan court closely linked to the political fortunes of its judges.

It is impossible to do justice to the rich descriptions Tarr and Porter provide. Those details themselves make the book worth reading. The book is weaker in its explanatory efforts. The authors use the "institutional identity" of the courts to account for the similarities and differences they find in the structure and operation of these three courts. This effort, in my opinion, falls short because the concept remains largely undefined (see p. 238ff). They would have done better to borrow more explicitly from organizational theory.

The weakness of their explanations calls attention to another shortcoming: despite the detail they provide, their case studies leave the reader hungry for more breadth and depth. Because each case covers twenty to thirty years, we do not learn enough about what really counts in understanding an organization: the detailed internal operations of these courts or the explicit links with their external environments. Thus, although brief allusions are made to the civil rights movement in Alabama and to the fortunes of governors and key legislators in each state, those developments are not explicitly tied to what these courts did. For instance, we learn little about the ongoing relationship between Governor George Wallace and the Alabama court or the ways in which Ohio's and New Jersey's governors used (and abused) their courts.

Still the book is a promising beginning. It may stimulate others to carry on the pioneering efforts of these authors, not only by extending their analysis to other states but also by encouraging others to be guided by stronger theoretical models and to probe more deeply into the political web surrounding state supreme courts.

HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University

The Cult of the Court *by John Brigham. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987. 269 pp. $34.95.*

A plethora of books about the Supreme Court has been written in recent years; even the present chief justice has contributed his memoirs of an earlier court during his clerking days. This scholarly output is understandable in the context of recent controversies over President Ronald Reagan's third appointment to the Supreme Court and Attorney General Edwin Meese's open challenge to the Court's authority to declare what the Constitution means. There are any number of issues to discuss about the Supreme Court's role in the modern American state.

The first two and last chapters in this book put this literature into perspective by synthesizing most of the major theorists on constitutional interpretation, from critical legal thinkers to the Chicago school of law and economics. Brigham reviews the shift from formalism's belief in the "cult of the robe" to legal realism, where

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the notion that judges are infallible automatons merely discovering, rather than making, law was replaced by the behavioral idea of judicial discretion in decision making.

Brigham himself does not subscribe to any extreme model; his own position is that there is more to judging than merely choosing sides and making policy the way the judges would like to see it. The institution of the Court consists of practices, ways of doing things that affect substantive policies made by the Court. These are not static; they have evolved over time. In fact, even when precedents are overturned, they influence the discourse that follows because of the way they have phrased the questions. Precedents and shared expectations of what the Supreme Court should be circumscribe the freedom of action for any new set of justices.

Among those Court usages that have evolved over time is the power of judicial review, once again made controversial by Meese's challenge. Brigham takes the view that while John Marshall did not invent the power, nevertheless it was not a foregone conclusion. Only in the twentieth century did the Court establish its authority to be final arbiter through usage, not infallibility. The "cult of the robe" has been superseded by the "cult of the court," however the Court is defined at any time in history. Brigham's approach is an historic one in which he reviews all the periods of court activism, from John Marshall's centralization of authority, to the property protectionism of the New Deal Court, and the Warren Court's concern for civil liberties. What is missing is much speculation on where the present Court may be headed under the new leadership of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.

The central chapters of the book treat many traditional subjects—the highly political method of selecting justices; the physical environmental of the Court, including Chief Justice William Howard Taft's role in obtaining a permanent home for the Court; the role of clerks and other nonjudicial personnel; the procedures of the Court; its way of selecting cases; and the impact decisions have on other actors in the political system. Katz also touches on major controversies, such as whether or not the Court is overworked, and proposals to interpose a second appellate level between federal trial courts and the ultimate arbiter.

Brigham's volume is a major synthesis of recent works about the Court and a welcome addition to the extensive literature on the Court. Given the recent furor about Reagan's third appointee to the Court and arguments between the attorney general and sitting members of the Court about what the Constitution means, its review of Constitutional themes is certainly timely. Brigham's perspective is a moderate one, calling for continued attention to the past's influence on the future.

LETTIE WENNER
University of Illinois at Chicago

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The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence *by Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987. 268 pp. $25.00.*

This is a valuable study for more political scientists than those with a special interest in legislatures. It is a carefully crafted analysis of constitutency service by members of the House of Representatives in the United States and members of Parliament (MPs) in Great Britain. Throughout, the authors draw on major national election studies in both countries as well as their own interviews with administrative assistants and MPs.

Probably no student of Congress needs to be convinced that members' staffs devote a considerable amount of time and resources to performing constituency services. It may be less common in the scholarly literature on Parliament to note the substantial commitment members make to perform services for their constituents. In any case, this study provides a thorough survey of these activities and reveals a surprising degree of similarity in the two systems. Many of the differences can be traced to the almost total absence of a personal staff for MPs in contrast to the sizable bureaucracies available to each representative.

As the subtitle suggests, the authors argue that constituency service and independence are interrelated. They can demonstrate the parallel increase in MPs constituency service activities and the increasing defections in Parliament. They argue that representatives can protect themselves from other political forces, including party discipline and coattails, by building a base of support through constituency service. They cannot, however, untangle cause and effect among these factors with the data at hand.

An impressive feature of the analysis is the use of survey data. There are more opportunities for complex analysis in the U.S. data, so often the presentation is unbalanced; but it is invariably interesting. Name recognition, member evaluation, expectations of representatives—all receive careful attention. The authors do not lead the reader to easy, superficial conclusions about these data or their meaning. Anomalies and inconsistencies are not ignored or argued away.

Their approach to data analysis is demonstrated admirably in Chapter 5, which is a remarkably rich methodological discussion of the "paradox" of the low relationship between member efforts in constituency service and constituents' evaluations. They provide not only a sophisticated commentary on their analysis but offer a general summary of the weaknesses in statistical methods and techniques in common use. Every thoughtful practioner of social data analysis can read Chapter 5 with profit.

The excellent methodological discussion could have been strengthened by consideration of interaction effects as an improvement on additive models. Much of the substantive commentary envisions complex, plausible interactions, but these are never modeled into the data analysis. A demonstration of the success (or failure) of an interaction effect would contribute nicely to the methodological instruction regardless of the substantive merit.

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The "personal vote" is conceptualized well beyond a narrow focus on constituency service to cover a candidate's electoral support based on personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record. Ultimately the assessment of the impact of direct measures of constituency service on the vote reveals that constituency service makes a modest contribution. Overall, candidate evaluation, which captures some of the effect associated with constituency service, contributes more significantly to vote choices.

In conclusion the authors argue that single-member districts are a key to interpreting these legislatures. It is a convincing argument even without analysis of multimember constituencies. The authors allege (correctly) that three-person collaborations are a strain. We can hope that the knowledge that they have produced a first rate study will motivate them to undertake further collaboration.

WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN
University of Minnesota

The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense *by Bruce Parrott. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1987. 21 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

SDI and Industrial Technology Policy: Threat or Opportunity? *by Walter Zegveld and Christien Enzing. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987. 186 pp. $32.50.*

Star Wars may be a weapons system that moves from concept to obsolescence without the intervening stage of deployment. This eventuality, to be sure, depends on just which Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) we are discussing: President Ronald Reagan's vision of an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); the Pentagon's more modest objective of a system that reinforces nuclear deterrence; or the critics' notion of a bargaining chip to be exchanged for deep cuts in existing arsenals.

What we might term second generation critiques of the first two versions of SDI have now begun to appear. First generation assessments focus primarily on the technical feasibility, cost, and strategic effects of ballistic missile defense, whether Reagan's dream or the generals' more pragmatic plan. The expansion of the critique does not mean that all issues of practicality, affordability, and stability have been resolved; rather, sufficient time has elapsed for other concerns to emerge as well.

One such concern is Soviet attitudes toward strategic defense. SDI proponents have claimed, of course, that the Soviet Union is vigorously pursuing its own program regardless of its public posture of opposition, while critics argue that the Soviets sincerely fear a strategic defense arms race. Bruce Parrott, in his elegant monograph, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, systematically evaluates these issues. In doing so, he contributes to a fuller assessment of the wisdom of pursuing SDI, which after all must include probable Soviet reactions

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as well as considerations of technology and economics? Moreover, his investigation also illuminates the wider strategic relations between the superpowers and the process of security policy debate and formation in the Soviet Union.

Parrott argues that the Soviets are indeed concerned about the ill effects of an unrestrained defensive arms race. Yet though he suggests that a consensus exists on the need to avoid this competition, he carefully identifies the conflicts and contradictory tendencies that continue within the Soviet leadership. Despite the current Soviet preference to deal with the issue through political negotiations, Parrott believes that if challenged by the threat of American deployment, the Soviets will respond by enhancing both their defensive and offensive capabilities. The results are likely to be most unsettling to the security of the United States. Prudence, he believes, dictates that we continue funding research, as we did before Reagan raised the salience of missile defense, as a hedge against Soviet break out, and use testing and deployment as a bargaining chip.

Walter Zegveld and Christien Enzing address an admittedly secondary issue in *SDI and Industrial Technology Policy*, but one that relates to the claims about the technological and economic benefits that will presumably spin off from the SDI research effort. As Europeans (both scholars are from the Netherlands), the authors are concerned with the likelihood of these promised benefits for both the United States and those European powers who have signed on to SDI.

With respect to the latter issue, the authors enumerate the many barriers to extensive foreign participation in the SDI research effort, including the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the limited capabilities of foreign firms for this type of research, the limited commercial potential of SDI technologies, and the competitive environment that European firms confront. They estimate out of the $25 billion to be spent on the initial research phase, foreign companies are unlikely to realize more than $300 million in contracts over five years.

Since most of the resources are going to stay in the United States, we might expect the United States to reap substantial secondary technological and economic benefits. Zegveld and Enzing, however, are skeptical. The case they make to support their doubts actually serves as a critique of U.S. substitution of defense research and development in general for a direct industrial technology policy. Indeed, their book can be read as a contribution to the growing literature on America's relative economic decline.

SDI research, in their view, has little commercial relevance because of its type and nature, the secrecy that surrounds much of it, and the irrelevance of its products for commerical application. As John Pike points out, banks don't need computers hardened to survive a nuclear war, and hospitals are unlikely to pump their X-ray machines with atomic bombs. Moreover, investigations into previous patterns of commercial spin-offs from military research and development reveal how meagre the civilian benefits have been. After all their evidence, the authors' conclusion seems almost timid: "From a standpoint of industrial technology policy *per se* SDI is not a cost effective approach and could be defined as counter productive" (p. 177).

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While substantively valuable, *SDI and Industrial Technology Policy* is stylistically flawed, perhaps reflecting that the authors are not writing in their native tongue. The phraseology is sometimes awkward; there are a fair number of minor typos and errors; and the organization, while clear, is stilted and sometimes redundant.

Both studies under review, then, make worthwhile contributions to an expanded debate over the wisdom of pursuing the various alternative SDIs. Further critiques of this sort, along with the departure of the dreamer and his dream from the White House, may insure that the third generation of scholarship on SDI will be done by historians.

PETER C. SEDERBERG
University of South Carolina

The Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy *by Morton H. Halperin. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger, 1987. 173 pp. $19.95.*

Morton Halperin writes as a scholar and former practitioner of American foreign policy who has an agenda that he is anxious to interject into the nuclear debate. He argues passionately and articulately that the central fallacy of America's current nuclear posture is that it incorrectly assumes that nuclear explosive devices are "weapons that can be used to fight and win wars" (p. xii). Halperin seeks to go beyond marginal adjustments in correcting this perceived deficiency, such as improving the survivability of nuclear forces and enhancing the capability of conventional forces to fight without resorting to nuclear use. Instead, he advocates radically restructuring American defense so that the United States would procure and deploy its forces, develop its war plans, and make its commitments to defend allies "on the assumption that nuclear devices do not exist" (pp. 58–59, 123).

This proposal brings to the forefront a number of important questions concerning the political and military utility or nucler weapons and the credibility of the American deterrent threat. Unfortunately, Halperin seeks not so much to join the debate on these issues as to lay out an unvarnished polemic against those who believe that nuclear weapons have other uses beyond simply deterring nuclear use by an adversary. In making his argument, Halperin overemphasizes the dangers of escalation and minimizes the uncertainties, tradeoffs, and political costs involved in adopting his recommendations. His conclusions cannot be wholly dismissed, for the dangers of escalation are real and need to be reduced. However, to paraphrase Hamlet, there is more to keeping the peace and avoiding nuclear catastrophe than is dreamt of in Halperin's deterrent philosophy.

Consider the efficacy of nuclear threats in achieving specific political objectives. Halperin examines nineteen cases when the use of nuclear weapons was either threatened or contemplated and concludes that they "have never been central to the outcome of a crisis" (p. 46). Yet the analysis upon which Halperin bases

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this conclusion is brief and facile. He seldom devotes more than a page to any of the crises he is considering, and a couple merit no more attention than two or three paragraphs. The truth, as Richard Betts argues in his recent book, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, is much more complex and uncertain. Without access to Soviet and Chinese sources, any speculation as to the actual influence of nuclear threats remains quite tentative and circumstantial.

Halperin's related claims—that nuclear weapons have no military utility whatsoever and that American military credibility would not suffer under his proposed restructuring—are likewise subjects for careful analysis rather than bald assertion. It is possible that his first premise is correct for Europe, where the vast number of nuclear weapons on both sides, the co-location of military and civilian targets, and the risks of preemption and escalation would make the use of nuclear weapons militarily unfeasible. However, when one considers other scenarios, Halperin's arguments are far less compelling. (Korea provides an interesting counterexample in which the limited use of nuclear weapons could potentially leave American and South Korean forces better off). In any event, conventional force assessments are highly problematic exercises in which there will always be some residual uncertainty. Nuclear weapons provide an important hedge that is unlikely to be provided by improvements in conventional defenses alone.

Finally, Halperin frequently slights the political obstacles involved in implementing his recommendations. He devotes only three pages to "Winning Approval of the New Posture in Europe" and assumes that Europeans will acquiesce to a policy that increases their spending on conventional defense while further decoupling them from the American strategic arsenal. Few western diplomats would share Halperin's belief that this change could be implemented without seriously imperiling the alliance. Halperin also maintains that an American president could make his recommended structural changes in the Department of Defense over the strong objectives of the Congress and the Joint Chiefs, because "the overwhelming weight of public opinion would be on the side of the president" (p. 150). Like the progressive reformers of an earlier era, he places too much stock in publicity and enlightened public opinion as a tool for curing the ills of society.

Despite these difficulties, Halperin makes an interesting contribution to contemporary thinking regarding nuclear weapons. He offers a coherent vision of an alternative force posture that is sure to enliven the nuclear debate. Yet the coherence of this vision comes at a price. Halperin does not begin to confront the full depth and power of the opposing arguments; every doubt, question, and uncertainty is resolved in the fashion that best suits his position. Those who agree with his presuppositions will no doubt find this book to be provocative. However, skeptics will remain unconvinced, and—like the legendary Danish prince—they are likely to be left preferring the evils they know to others they know not of.

ROBERT P. PESCHEL, JR.
Harvard University

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March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present *by Ronald E. Powaski. New York, Oxford University Press, 1987. 300 pp. $19.95.*

This book gives the general reader a straight-forward, nontechnical, and relatively brief discussion of the United States and the nuclear arms race, 1939 to the present. It is mostly descriptive, though includes some effort at analysis. The material is presented mainly in chronological order. Starting with the Manhattan Project and its purpose of being a trump card against the Axis powers in World War II, this book focuses largely on the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as that rivalry has been expressed in the nuclear arms race and in attempts, not very successful, to work out a nuclear accommodation. It is this challenge of arms control, limitation, reduction—a series of efforts covering a time span of more than forty years—that gets the most attention.

Powaski presents the dynamics of nuclear weapons policy making by American political leaders and the policy outcomes. He also discusses Soviet decisions and proposals, but does not attempt to any great extent to delve into the background of decision making in the Soviet Union. For the United States he gives appropriately close attention to the role of the president and his people. Every chapter begins with the name of a president: "Eisenhower and Massive Retaliation, 1953–1961," "Nixon and Salt I, 1969–1972," "Reagan and the 'Rearmament' of America, 1982–1983," etc.

March to Armageddon is an excellent source and summary for any reader wishing to be conversant on the progress, turns, and detours of the American nuclear weapons arsenal and of nuclear arms control negotiations between the two superpowers. Also, at the end of the book the author provides many very good notes to chapters as well as suggested readings. Much of the material is familiar to anyone who has had an interest in U.S.-Soviet relations, but the strength of this book is that it arrays and reviews these events as a linked sequence in one volume. Technical problems such as verification are presented in layperson's language. The difficulty of negotiating agreements when the two powers have asymmetrical nuclear forces are explained. And the pressures on the president are examined: develop more nuclear weapons and more sophisticated delivery systems to keep ahead of the Russians; be fearful of any agreements which could place the United States at a disadvantage or appear to do that.

The subject, of necessity, is somewhat depressing and tedious as the reader confronts an ever-growing supply of nuclear weapons and repeated frustrating attempts to reverse this momentum. It is probably too much to expect this book or any other to explain how to untie the nuclear knots that have imprisoned both the United States and the Soviet Union. The book does give good factual background. What has happened? Why? What efforts have been made, especially in recent years? Where are we now and where may we be going? Realistically *March to Armageddon* does not offer high hopes of breakthroughs. But it does illustrate that some progress has been made and that agreements in the future are at least possible.

R. D. SLOAN, JR.
University of Colorado at Boulder

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The Guarded Gate: The Reality of American Refugee Policy *by Norman L. Zucker and Naomi Flink Zucker. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987. 342 pp. $22.95.*

Norman Zucker served as a consultant to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy during the early 1980s, specializing in resettlement issues. Naomi Zucker has written several excellent scholarly and popular articles about the migration of the Haitian boat people and their subsequent treatment in the detention centers and courts of southern Florida. Now they have joined forces to write a highly readable, and more general account of American refugee policy.

The U.S. decision in the late 1940s to admit displaced persons (DPs) and refugees as special categories of immigrants and the subsequent implementation and refinement of that decision were complicated policy choices. As the Zuckers indicate, the welcome accorded to those who are "not drawn but driven" (xiv) is always conditioned by "conflicts in our basic attitudes" toward "faceless newcomers" (xvii). "Simultaneous feelings of hostility and humanitarianism" (xvii) among the public have been consistently mirrored by politicians pursuing incompatible goals: certainty about immigration numbers and control of negative resettlement impact; satisfaction of ethnic constituents and vocal pro-admission lobbyists; and the promotion of American foreign policy, including the on-going cold war agenda. The growth of an elaborate but divided public-private network devoted to the resettlement of refugees further complicates the politics of welcome.

The Zuckers give a brief but informative account of the historical development of that network. They make a number of sensible—although not entirely original—policy recommendations, including giving the states more leeway in spending resettlement funds, reorganizing the refugee bureaucracy to afford it more independence from the Department of State and the immigration service, and—most controversially—distinguishing between the protection, which they believe must be afforded *all* who are genuinely fearful of persecution, and the immigration opportunities, which they believe should be granted to those who, on a graduated scale, confront the severest threats. Although such a policy might lead to more even-handed treatment of in-country applicants for asylum and out-of-country seekers of refuge, the problems of implementation deserve more attention than they receive.

The Zuckers's treatment of formal and informal lobbying efforts on behalf of refugees is probably also too summary, given their immense historical importance. They are too reticent about the sporadic but serious infighting that pitted the Reagan administration against the UN refugee bureaucracy, and key congressmen against the voluntary agencies. Their account of the origins of modern admissions policy is accurate and beautifully written, but it breaks no new scholarly ground.

Yet many contemporary developments—the true focal point of the book—are covered in depth. The Zuckers provide a concise yet remarkably complete description of the processes that govern the granting of refugee visas abroad, asylum in the United States, and the distribution of resettlement aid. Their most original research—and most persuasive and eloquent writing—chronicles the evolution of

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policy since 1978 as it affects Haitian asylum-seekers and Central Americans seeking relief from deportation. They move beyond familiar descriptions of how cold war ideology shapes policy to the first synoptic account of the ways that these aliens and their allies used the courts to secure at least some protection against detention and summary deportation. They also provide a thoughtful evaluation of recent unsuccessful attempts by Congress to provide the same temporary refuge to victims of generalized violence in Central America that the government has afforded Iranians, Poles, Afghanis, and Ethiopians. Their treatment of the Sanctuary Movement provides a valuable account of the tension between those who regard the illegal harboring of aliens as a form of rescue and those who regard it as public political confrontation designed to highlight deficiencies in U.S. foreign policy.

JOHN A. SCANLAN
Indiana University, Bloomington

If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left *by Maurice Isserman. New York, Basic Books, 1987. 259 pp. $18.95.*

This book traces the fate of the last generation of what loosely might be called the Old Left—American Communists, Trotskyists, socialists, and pacifists—outlining ways in which the survivors of the repressions of the McCarthy era attempted to rebuild American leftist politics. This book is meticulously researched. Isserman has spent much time in the surviving archives of various sectarian publications and has also conducted many interviews with surviving participants in the political movements of the 1950s as well as the early 1960s. The result is a rich compendium of information concerning the ways in which various left organizations tried, almost blindly, to jump-start themselves, even as their organizations were falling apart before their eyes.

One of the most interesting portraits drawn in this study is that of Max Shachtman, a Polish-Jewish immigrant to New York as a child, who moved from being a Leninist Communist to a Trotskyist in the 1920s, to rejecting Trotsky's analysis of the Russian state and developing an independent socialist party. Shachtman was to be the mentor during the course of his career of such luminaries on the left as Michael Harrington, Irving Howe, and Hal Draper. He was among the very first to argue for an electoral strategy for the left that would link them with the Democratic party. The rise of civil rights for blacks would enable the left to replace conservative Southern whites as the pivotal element in the Democratic coalition. Such a strategy still informs left populist politics, perhaps now with the success of the Jesse Jackson campaign for president, more than ever before.

But this is just a thread in what is a complex and fascinating story. Isserman is interested in revealing how the disabling mistakes of the Old Left—excessive

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factionalism, absolutism in strategies, and idealization of class politics—were in some cases avoided, but more often replicated by various groups in the student New Left. In this, perhaps his most relevant chapter is his study of the way in which Irving Howe, Michael Harrington, Michael Walzer, C. Wright Mills and others were able to constitute themselves both as academic intellectuals and political activists from the late 1940s through the 1950s. In this his study is a refreshing and nuanced counterpoint to Russell Jacoby's *The Last Intellectuals.*

If this book has a flaw, it would lie in the relative lack of focused attention it provides the most important movement that was to have an impact on the 1960s resurgence of the left, the black civil rights movement. Addressed obliquely throughout the book, particularly in the chapters on pacifism and the emergence of the student organizations in the early 1960s, there is no sustained attempt to make sense of the place (or lack of place) that the rise of black movement politics in the South was to play in regard to the form and content of the 1960s movement politics.

Despite this shortcoming, and one might argue that such a presentation was simply beyond the ken of this work, Isserman has written a worthy study of the strange paths that led to the beginning of the political movement known as the New Left. Those who want to study what might be called the intellectual politics of left political movements are well advised to examine this book.

THOMAS L. DUMM
Amherst College

The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth: United States Business and Public Policy in the 20th Century *by Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt. New York, Basic Books, 1988. 286 pp. $19.95.*

This is the history of American business, its growth during the period of industrialization, its control of domestic markets, its domination of the world's markets, and its decline in the face of recent competition from abroad. It is also the story of the interface between government and business and of some of the important changes that have occurred in the scheme of government regulation. The modern American firm and the administrative state are institutions that have emerged in recent times, and this volume tells the story of this development in a way that is easy to read. The authors have also been able to make important generalizations without sacrificing the subtle qualifications that are necessary for scholarly work. It is not an easy task to both ring true and tell the story in an interesting way.

Beginning with the 1840s, the United States economy saw tremendous growth and development of the American firm. Small businesses grew into large ones, and with support from a government that was largely sympathetic to that growth. The American business enterprise was able to adjust its organizational structure

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to account for its growth and as a result of that success was responsible for developing the economy of this nation. In addition, American firms met international success, gaining more and more control of foreign markets. There were some occasions when trust busters and the like seemed to pose something of a threat, but for the most part, America meant business and expansion of the firm was greatly appreciated and largely supported by the American public. This trend continued without interruption until the Great Depression when, as the authors see it, American business met with its first real crisis. Thanks to the recovery efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War II, American business entered into a period that the authors describe as the American Era (1940–1969). The efforts of both business and government to work together for recovery was enormously successful particularly in the 1950s, and the era of American dominance lasted for almost three decades.

It is in the American Era where the Corporate Commonwealth really flourishes. The markets grow; employment reaches new levels; government, business and labor cooperate; and the nation's world supremacy seems assured. All of that comes to a rather abrupt end during the Second Crisis of the Commonwealth, a period beginning in 1970 when the United States is virtually overrun by foreign competition stemming from an enormously successful post-World War II recovery in Western Europe and Japan. American business grows sluggish as well, resting on its successes and refusing to face the need to modernize. Adding to American difficulties has also been the decision of oil-producing nations in the Third World to control supplies, leading to an incredible increase in the cost of energy, which further challenges American dominance of the world economy. Indeed, in a short space of time the United States becomes a debtor nation, and a place for tremendous foreign investment. In addition, we are also unsure of how the scope of government regulation must change if the United States is going to adapt its free enterprise system to the late twentieth century. While many have jumped on the deregulation bandwagon, these authors choose to endorse the traditional role of government in monitoring and controlling business activity. The authors feel that the knowledge of America's business history will enable Americans to understand how better to meet the challenges that face the Corporate Commonwealth in the 1990s. They have done a good job, insightful and instructive to the general reader.

Frank J. Macchiarola
Columbia University

Buying into America: How Foreign Money is Changing the Face of Our Nation *by Martin Tolchin and Susan Tolchin. New York, Times Books, 1988. 400 pp. $19.95.*

This book is another reminder that the moorings of political science were and continue to be political economy. The evolution of the economy today to a global

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outreach has catapulted beyond the borders of the United States, playing havoc with America's national sovereignty and twisting the logic of the federal system. State governments and cities are increasingly exposed to the pressures of worldwide economic operations.

A recent *New York Times* story described the new and important role governors must play as agents extraordinaire in search of foreign investment for their "sovereign" states. Virginia's Governor Gerald Baliles proudly boasts of his leadership in helping his state play a prominent part in the global economy. Pointedly, he is quoted as saying, "Our borders today are Brussels and Beijing and Australia and Austria. Our competition used to be South Carolina. It's now South Korea."

Martin and Susan Tolchin have zeroed into this phenomenon with vital information on the way political sovereignty has been replaced by foreign entrepreneurs (at times aided by their governments) in banking, investment firms, industry, real estate, and book publishing. They write that, "Foreign companies are buying up American oil and gas companies at a rapid rate and are making significant inroads into the construction industry, machine tools, automobiles, auto parts, and a host of other industries. More than half of the nation's cement industry and four of the nation's top ten chemical companies are foreign owned, while a French company will soon become the leading manufacturer of television sets in the United States" (p. 6).

Money from abroad, the authors contend, is eroding institutions and undermining America's political and economic independence. This conclusion, however, is contested. President Ronald Reagan, for example, claims that, "We believe that there are only winners, no losers, and all participants gain from it." Walter Wriston and Henry Kaufman, among others, defend the inflow of foreign capital as healthy, helping in restructuring the nation's service economy. But the authors' precision and sleuth work defies such optimistic outlooks. Foreign investors, often operating under a cloak of secrecy, play skillfully with our political process-seeking tax abatements, subsidies, free land, and low interest rates. When necessary, they undermine our laws dealing with antitrust and trade union policies and defy regulations controlling water and air pollution.

Interstate rivalry has reached new dramatic intensity. The location of the Volkswagen Rabbit plant, for example, involved some forty states in competition, each outbidding the other in the number and variety of goodies offered to woo the enterprise. This "greening" of America includes extensive use of lobbying: swarms of foreign delegations go to Washington, state capitals, and city halls pressing policy makers; contributions are targeted to campaign chests; and well organized Political Action Committees (PACs), clever public relations, and media access reach out for public support. Paradoxically, foreign money men (rarely women) from countries with despotic regimes learn to play the democratic process game with distinct acumen. Furthermore, the increasing dependency on foreign capital subjects the United States to the priorities and decision making of foreigners.

The book is crisp and concise, complex deals unraveled, secret arrangements

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exposed—a must for those who are concerned that America is losing control of its sovereignty in the global economy engulfing us.

JEWEL BELLUSH
Hunter College, City University of New York

Government by Proxy: (Mis?) Managing Federal Programs *by Donald F. Kettl. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988. 170 pp. Paper $9.95.*

Donald F. Kettl moves contemporary debate about performance of U.S. domestic programs beyond dichotomous arguments over success versus failure to ground that is more complex and more realistic. He starts with the question: What produced the general loss of faith in the performance of federal government programs? The book demonstrates that federal policy achievement hinges on millions of Americans who act as the government's proxies, including private contractors, state and local governments, private producers, and consumers. These agents function as intermediaries responsible for actually producing the goods or services that federal policy desires.

Kettl examines five forms of government by proxy: contracts with private organizations, which use 21 percent of federal expenditures; grants to state and local governments, which account for 11 percent of the federal budget; tax expenditures, resulting from a tax code that offers incentives to change personal and corporate behavior, which amounted to over 40 percent of federal revenues; federal loans, which total over one trillion dollars; regulations that influence the behavior of individuals, organizations, state and local government, and the federal government itself. For each type of proxy, Kettl provides extensive empirical evidence on cases of success and failure, including the Pentagon's cancellation in 1985 of its contract with Ford Aerospace for the Sergeant York gun and the 1985 crash of a contracted plane in which 248 soldiers were killed in Gander, Newfoundland.

The point of Kettl's analysis is not, however, to shift blame for failure from government to its proxies. The purpose is instead to search for keys to success. The conclusion is that if government by proxy is to succeed, the critical issues that must be resolved are goal conflict and evaluation feedback. The attitude of the book is optimistic. The author apparently believes that the implementation problems he detects are tractable and are thus susceptible to management influence. Imaginative program managers can, he thinks, achieve a coalignment of goals that would reconcile the different goals of the federal government and its proxies, and they can get feedback about performance and make adjustments. Several of the success cases resulted from high level, high visibility negotiation. For example, the Environmental Protection Administration applied negotiated rulemaking, and Connecticut used a negotiated investment strategy to cut the social services block grant.

The book's empirical analysis is comprehensive and is carefully selected and

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evaluated. The case commentaries are replete with implications for theory development. For example, the book's contribution to policy implementation theory goes beyond identification of goals and feedback as key independent variables. Little contemporary research has challenged the dependent variable. What is failure? What is success? One importance of Kettl's contribution is that he begins to raise these questions. The analysis notes that success is a relative term and that conditions conducive to failure are always present when any two organizations must cooperate. It also recognizes that conflicts of values between government and proxies are inevitable and that obtaining feedback is inherently difficult. This view suggests that one should expect neither that federal programs will universally succeed nor that they are doomed to fail. Kettl implies instead that all government by proxy is inherently a risk and that expectations should thus be pragmatic and experimental.

The book would nevertheless benefit from amplified discussion in more explicit and summative terms of its consequences for theory development. For example, if resolution of value conflict is key to implementation, what circumstances are conducive to value concurrence? How does the concept of government by proxy differ from concepts such as third-sector organizations, the mixed economy, third-party government, privatization, decentralization, issue networks, and subgovernments? Does this analysis refute the public-choice perspective that government growth is best explained by government bureaucrats maximizing their personal power, security, and income?

DONNA WILSON KIRCHHEIMER
City University of New York

Reconstructing American Education *by Michael B. Katz. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987. 212 pp. $22.50.*

The author of this book informs us at the outset that it is a multidimensional endeavor. It is about history: how American education took shape. It is about reform: what the historian can tell us about contemporary proposals for change. It is about historiography: what forces propel the politics of educational history. Katz goes on to tell us that this book explores the relationships among democracy, capitalism, and bureaucracy. He argues that the origins of American education can be found in the development of capitalism, the formation of a working class, and the emergence of a political system based upon republican and democratic principles. He explains that bureaucracy is an organizational response to social and institutional problems, the structure of which reflects political priorities, limits policy options, and shapes outcomes.

What we have here is a selection of loosely connected, previously published essays fastened together in a single volume. Some of the pieces are quite good, reflecting the quality of scholarship that has characterized Michael Katz's previous work. However, in this case the whole of the volume is less than the sum of its parts.

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If there is a center of gravity in this book, it can be found in the first three chapters on educational history. An introductory chapter depicts public school systems as institutions originally designed to function as instruments of social order and control. As such, they were more concerned with the character of students than their intellectual capacities, striving to mold attitudes and behavior into an homogenized American culture. The most compelling chapter in the volume conceptually delineates four institutional models that coexisted in American education during the early part of the nineteenth century. These are labeled paternalistic voluntarism, democratic localism, corporate voluntarism, and incipient bureaucracy. It is the last, we are told, that survived and took hold. The third chapter provides a vivid and informative case study on how incipient bureauracy triumphed in the Boston school system between 1850 and 1876.

The weakest chapter in the book attempts to summarize the American experience with educational reform in order to shed light on the present. The Great Society programs are faulted for emphasizing equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition, a charge that even critics of these programs might contest. Katz finds that the recent effective-schools movement puts too much responsibility on teachers. He laments that the new focus on excellence places too much of an emphasis on academic achievement, thereby creating a form of meritocracy. The author's review of these important developments is superficial and misleading. He fails to recognize, for example, that one of the most significant goals of the effective-schools movement was to make educational excellence a reality for all children, advancing the agenda beyond opportunity to equality of outcomes. A chapter on historiography devotes much energy to discrediting the work of conservative scholars, particularly Diane Ravitch. It demonstrates convincingly, as perhaps the previous chapter does inadvertently, how scholars try to conceal their own politics under the mistaken mantle of objectivity.

The final chapter is an essay on higher education in which Katz ironically chastises the "multi-university" for lacking a core of consistent principles and for its inability to resolve the great moral issues of the day. There is no conclusion that attempts to bring the volume together as a single integrated work. In the end, however, the book, despite itself, presents us with a fundamental question that remains an enigma to serious thinkers and scholars such as Katz: Is it possible for our educational institutions to embrace a common set of political, social, and cultural values without compromising our existence as a free and pluralistic people?

JOSEPH P. VITERITTI
New York University

The Grounding of Modern Feminism *by Nancy F. Cott. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1987. 372 pp. $29.95.*

Conventional wisdom has it that there was a sudden and almost deserved death of feminism following ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. This view de-

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fines pre-1920s feminism as relatively narrow and homogeneous in its goals and composition. It suggests that the women's movement quickly fell apart after women got the vote, because the relatively short-sighted activists had had a narrow vision and couldn't readjust to the new political circumstances. This set of assumptions leads us to the dangerous belief that the complexity of agenda and ideology of the current phase of the women's movement is unique to our own period.

Nancy Cott's analysis of feminism and feminists roughly between 1910 and 1930 should destroy once and for all any such simple-minded views of that period in women's history or, by extension, our own. Cott's title points to her thesis. She thinks of her chosen era not as the time when feminism died, but as "the end of the suffrage movement and the early struggle of modern feminism" (p. 10). In particular, she defines her work as "as a study of consciousness—women's willingness or reluctance to say *we*" (p. 9), and the historical conditions in which this consciousness is negotiated and acted out.

The work is framed by a discussion of the history of the words "feminism" and "feminist" themselves. She begins her story as these words came into use. She ends after the terms have already taken on negative connotations, and even an old-fashioned air, among those still struggling on behalf of women. The struggle over the term is the leitmotif of the book; the struggle over the political meaning of women's experience is its chief concern.

The Grounding of Modern Feminism is a crucial study of the history of feminism in the early part of this century. It is equally riveting to those who might be more interested in today's feminism. To find, for example, that the term "post-feminist" was used not long after "feminist" itself gained currency, and to compare its use and historical grounding with the same "new" term today is to begin to gain new depth in understanding the historical phenomenon of feminism. But the titillation of encountering this currently annoying term is not the only reason. The reader familiar with contemporary struggles over gender, strategy, ideology, and the meanings of the social composition of partisans in the movement will, as Cott suggests, find the roots of these in the ground Cott covers. The familiarity is at times almost dizzying, while her piecing together of the story is fresh and exciting.

The book offers a coherent historical treatment and theoretical argument, but most of the chapters can also stand as self-contained essays. They focus on different aspects of women's political organization and activity and on the political significance of women's economic roles and situation. Never do these chapters simply describe organizations or activities, however. Cott always has her eye on the development of feminist political discourse and the question of whether—in the minds of the activists—there is a woman's political discourse.

Cott identifies the key dilemma in feminism: the conflict between the commitment to liberating women through recognition of individuality and individual difference and potential on the one hand, and the need to recognize the common cause and common experience of women as a basis for politics. She also emphasizes not just the diversity and conflict of views within the feminist movement, but the

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fundamental importance of this diversity and conflict in defining what feminism is. She shows how the early "woman movement" became the "women's movement," and points to our own time, when "feminism" is becoming "feminisms." Conflict among different male-dominated political parties does not signify the failure of democratic politics; conflict among different groups of feminists does not signify the failure of feminism.

Nancy Cott's *Grounding of Modern Feminism* is brilliant. It shows the marks of careful scholarship; it is beautifully written; its few illustrations are gems. It will become a key part of the canon of works to read on the history of feminism and women's politics. But it will also be of tremendous value to other scholars in its capacity as a case study of social movement politics and of the political response to the establishment of industrial society in the United States.

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Gender in the Workplace *edited by Clair Brown and Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987. 316 pp. Cloth, $32.95; paper, $12.95.*

In 1900, 20 percent of all women worked outside the home. Their wages lagged far behind men's, and they worked in heavily sex-segregated jobs. By 1980 the proportion of women working had passed the 50 percent mark, but their wages continued to lag, and their segregation persisted unchanged. Hoping to explain women's continuing economic disadvantages, The Brookings Institution and the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession sponsored a conference of economists in 1984. The eight papers and accompanying comments produced from the proceedings are collected in this volume.

The two most ambitious contributions take a historical view. Co-editor Clair Brown seeks to explain why women worked in such low numbers before 1950, and authors Myra Strober and Carolyn Arnold explore the evolution of sex-segregation in the workforce. Brown makes the novel claim that the abysmal state of nutrition in America played an important part in impeding women's workforce participation throughout the first half of this century. Since most families relied heavily on wives' baking to get enough to eat, most women shunned the workforce until major improvements in food production and distribution made nutrition a less pressing concern. Only then could large numbers of women turn their attention to raising their families' standard of living by working for wages. The relative importance of changes in food production, as compared for instance with a declining birth rate and an expanding economy, in drawing women into the workforce remains open to question. But Brown offers an intriguing new perspective on why the majority of American women refrained from workforce participation for so long.

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Strober and Arnold analyze data on bank tellers to explain why once women entered the workforce, they tended to end up in sex-segregation occupations. Before World War II, most bank tellers were men, but as the war drew men into the armed forces, banks began hiring women in large numbers. Many occupations filled by women during the war reverted to men once the fighting ceased, but bank telling proved an exception. The paper givers and commentators disagree on precisely why this happened, but all offer new insights into the forces at work in bringing about change.

Other papers that address women's low wages and workforce segregation are more narrowly descriptive. Heidi Hartmann, through an analysis of personnel records from an insurance firm, finds women in lower-paying occupations, with less likelihood of promotion. Lourdes Benería documents the feminization of manufacturing in Mexico through subcontracting. Richard Freeman and Jonathan Leonard demonstrate that women benefit more from unionization in occupations in the white-collar, public sector than in the blue-collar, private sector. Karen Holden and W. Lee Hansen find that there is a higher degree of sex segregation among part-time job holders than among full timers. Each of these papers generates provocative results, but none explains why the wage gaps and sex segregation described occur and, therefore, how they might be overcome.

Only the two final papers explore possible solutions. Barbara Bergmann and Mark Roberts examine the enforcement of child awards as a way of improving the economic condition of single mothers, while Charles Brown and Shirley Wilcher evaluate the use of subsidies in Sweden to encourage firms to meet sex-based employment quotas. Regrettably, neither of these approaches appears to promise much relief. The lesson conveyed by these papers is that women's low wages and occupational segregation are so deeply imbedded in our culture and economy that only a massive effort on many fronts—including job training, affirmative action, higher wages for lower-paid (mostly female) workers, parental leave, universal child care, and more generous child support—can possibly overcome women's persistent economic disadvantages.

ROSALIND ROSENBERG
Barnard College

The Rhetorical Presidency *by Jeffrey K. Tulis. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 209 pp. $19.95.*

This important study of changes in the style and purposes of presidential communication adds a fresh perspective on the question of the applicability of Richard Neustadt's model of presidential power to the contemporary presidency. The book stands on its own as interesting and informative, but its value grows when it is read with other recent work on changes in the politics of the presidency.

With the advent of the Reagan administration, scholars added "agenda setting

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power" to Neustadt's "power to persuade." In Reagan's second term the focus shifted back to the bases of presidential influence in Congress, with special attention to presidential attempts to mobilize public support. Tulis is mindful of President Reagan's use of the public as a political resource. He points out that "[d]irect popular appeal has been the central element of a political strategy that has produced a stunning string of partisan successes . . ." (p. 4). However, a focus on the Reagan presidency is historically myopic. *The Rhetorical Presidency* argues that neither the strategy of going public nor the public expectation of a personal president are recent innovations. They are devices used throughout the twentieth century that depart from presidential practice at the founding of the republic and in the nineteenth century.

Tulis's central thesis is that our political culture has been transformed since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Two changes highlight this transformation: the public has been drawn into the policy process by presidents trying to increase congressional support for their policies; the public and elite opinion leaders have come to expect presidents to be popular leaders, who lead popular opinion, publicly defend their presidencies and policies, and inspirit the population.

This thesis is developed through a careful examination of doctrine articulated in the Constitution and *The Federalist*. The Founders were deeply concerned about demagoguery and, therewith, suspicious of popular appeals. Rhetoric should be ". . . *public* (available to all) but not thereby *popular* (fashioned for all)" (p. 46). Preferably, communication would be written and addressed to Congress rather than the poeple.

Analyses of the frequency of and occasion for direct contact with the public indicate that nineteenth-century presidents adhered to this doctrine (Table 3.1, p. 64). Substantial increases in the volume of contact with the public begin with the Polk administration (1844) and accelerate after the Civil War, but these Tulis attributes to the spread of the railroad and not to doctrinal change (fn. 3, p. 65).

With the twentieth century came a change in the doctrine. Theodore Roosevelt went public and instituted popular leadership. Woodrow Wilson developed a comprehensive justification for the new doctrine. Since the 1920s, popular leadership has become the norm.

In his examination of twentieth-century presidents, Tulis shifts from quantitative analysis, which he used to good effect on the nineteenth century, to case studies and textual analyses. The cases are well constructed, but they leave open the question of how general are the actions and ideas underlying these particular instances; the answer to that question will make possible a more detailed comparison of the behavior of presidents in the two centuries.

The Rhetorical Presidency is a splendid analytic account of the changes in the demands made of the president and of the behavior of those who have held the office in this century. It leaves unanswered two important questions. First, what led to increases in demands on presidents? Are growth in calls for popular leader-

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ship and expansion of "clerkship" duties of the president linked? And second, what conditions the success of going public? *The Rhetorical Presidency* is a foundation upon which answers to these questions will be built.

RICHARD A. BRODY
Stanford University

The Nationalization of American Politics *by William M. Lunch. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987. 408 pp. $25.00.*

Once upon a time, local and state party organizations dominated American politics; national political institutions were informally constrained by their connection to parties and interest groups; political life was preoccupied with the distribution of material benefits; and presidential nominees were men with the ability and experience to govern. Today, politics and government have become more nationalized and more ideological. As a consequence, federal power is insufficiently checked by local and state parties, and the political system has become more brittle. The electorate is volatile; national, ideologically-based parties threaten to foster and exacerbate conflict; symbols substitute for substance; and political fads increasingly shape public policy. In essence, that is William Lunch's argument.

He spins it out in chapters on presidential elections, presidents, Congress, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, interest groups, and political parties. For the most part, his points are not fresh. We know, for instance, that primaries and caucuses have transformed the presidential selection system and that greatly expanded congressional staffs have become vital to the legislative process.

But Lunch has done a genuine service in amassing insights—in painting the big picture. *The Nationalization of American Politics* is thus an immensely useful volume. If you need a quick summary of changes in the rules governing the presidential nomination process, this is a place to look. You can find, as well, a good discussion of such topics as campaign financing, the new responsibilities of the greatly increased White House staff, the increased decentralization of Congress and its changing composition, and the expansive role that courts have come to play in the formulation of public policy.

In attempting to survey the entire contemporary American political landscape, inevitably Lunch only partially succeeds. In part, his problem is that he tries to do too much. His analytic framework becomes a procrustian bed for his material. Not everything can possibly fit. In part, he overstates his case—to some degree a consequence of his before-and-after approach to American political history. A bit more attention not only to political change in the Progressive and New Deal years, but to the importance of ideology in nineteenth-century political clashes, the cultural base upon which political cleavages then rested, and the long-standing

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irrelevance of material benefits to rank and file voters might have yielded a more nuanced and perhaps less alarmist picture of contemporary political life.

Are we really in danger of watching the realization of Eric Hoffer's mass manipulation nightmare (p. 262)? In the 1988 presidential race neither party is nominating a demagogic ideologue. Lunch's analysis leaves no room for the emergence of Michael Dukakis and George Bush as the presidential frontrunners. It leaves no room, in fact, for the emergence of men or women of quality. The twin goals of winning elections and dividing the fruits of victory no longer animate candidates, he argues; they have become willing to go down to principled defeat. Would that it were just a bit true. His whole distinction between the old style party, oriented towards material rewards, and the party of ideas is overdrawn; the categories overlap. Moreover, to the extent that ideologues do gain office, their powers remain strikingly limited. What will be the legacy of the Reagan years? It has created a deficit that has foreclosed big spending strategies and altered political discourse. But its promise to reshape the national agenda to conform to conservative ideals has not been realized. Nor has unprecedented federal power turned state and local governments simply into "franchise operations" (p. 177); state governments remain laboratories for the development of solutions to social and economic problems.

In erring on the side of excessive ambition, however, Lunch has to be commended. How much better to take the risk of trying to tell the whole story than to write a narrowly focused and safe book.

Abigail M. Thernstrom
Harvard University

White House Ethics: The History of the Politics of Conflict of Interest Regulation *by Robert N. Roberts. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 215 pp. $37.95.*

Conflicts of interest are nothing new in American politics, as Robert Roberts makes clear in this book. The actual behavior in question has evolved to a degree: in the early nineteenth century conflicts of interest grew out of the common practice of officials actively aiding private parties in making claims against the government. Today's much more subtle problems include self-dealing, conflicting financial interests, and the controversial revolving door movement of personnel back and forth between the public and private sectors. Despite the increasing complexity of the problem, however, remedies have changed relatively little. Even the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, seen by many as landmark conflict-of-interest legislation, did little to alter the basic definition and dynamics of the problem. Its real effects have been felt in terms of the increasing price we exact from private citizens who wish to serve in government.

"This book presents a chronological history of the evolution of the system for regulating conflicts of interest," Roberts writes in the preface, and indeed the book

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is precisely that. After a short introduction, the first chapter traces conflict-of-interest problems from 1789 up until the end of World War II. Eight more chapters bring the story up to date, treating each presidential administration as a separate era. Chapter X is an epilogue, and contains a proposal for a National Commission on Public Integrity. The title, *White House Ethics*, is actually slightly misleading, as the book examines the entire executive branch.

The historic approach is both the strength and weakness of the book. Researchers will find an impressive amount of basic information here, along with useful accounts of the tortuous politics of reform. But there is little analysis: the narrative simply moves from administration to administration, from scandal to scandal, telling us about people and events but never considering them in theoretical terms. Deciding what the whole story means is a task left almost entirely to the reader.

For example, a continuing debate has to do with the choice between administrative and criminal sanctions. Critics of administrative remedies contend that they amount to asking officials to restrain themselves, while others argue that because most conflicts of interest are relatively minor, the heavy sanctions and cumbersome procedures of criminal law will often be inappropriate. Roberts recounts this debate at many points, but never attempts to resolve it or even analyze it in depth. The book lacks an analysis of the goals conflict-of-interest policy should serve, and of the ways they fit into the broader political, institutional, and cultural setting. Similarly, there is no discussion of what the conflict-of-interest story tells us about such concerns as the politics of policy formation, public administration theory, or the tenuous boundaries between public and private life. When the author's very interesting proposal for a national integrity commission finally does appear, it is given only two and a half pages, and is not explicitly linked to the problems described in the rest of the book.

Scholars and reformers will, however, get a useful historical introduction from Roberts's book. And the value of that service should not be underestimated: generations of reformers have reinvented the wheel and have fought political battles that would have given their predecessors a strong sense of *déjà vu*. One reason for this, as Roberts correctly notes at the outset, has been a "general lack of understanding of how the system developed." *White House Ethics* is a contribution toward that sort of understanding; reformers will also find it a sobering reminder of the intractability of public ethics problems.

MICHAEL JOHNSTON
Colgate University

Qaddafi's Green Book: An Unauthorized Edition *edited with an Introduction by Henry M. Christman. Buffalo, N.Y., Prometheus Books, 1988. 114 pp. $17.95.*

This book is an insult. Indeed, it is not worth a review at all except to expose the fraud it is. Promoted as a serious contribution to the literature on Qaddafi and

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modern Libya, it is in fact an irresponsible publishing gimmick. Many authors and publishing houses have attempted to cash in on the American confrontation with the Libyan regime in the last decade, but this is one of the more reprehensible efforts.

During the late 1970s Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi issued three slim pamphlets outlining his political philosophy. Together they are known as *The Green Book*. They have been translated, more or less comprehensibly, into virtually every written language and distributed all over the world, the better to spread the message. Qaddafi and his advisers appear to have considered selling them, on the theory that readers would take them more seriously if they had to buy them, but the decision was quickly taken instead to make them available for the asking. They are available from the Libyan Mission to the United Nations to anyone who requests copies.

The book under review is a large-type reprinting of an English translation without critical notes or commentary except in the brief introduction. Much of that introduction is an error-ridden account of Qaddafi's life and leadership. A few examples suffice: the Fezzan, far from being "the traditional stronghold of Bedouin culture" (p. 8), is a region known better for its non-Arab—Tuareg, Berber, and Black African—inhabitants. Qaddafi rose to captain in the army, not colonel; that rank he bestowed upon himself on coming to power. Corruption based on oil wealth could not have led Qaddafi to become an admirer of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s; petroleum was not exported from Libya until the 1960s.

So, if the biographical facts are wrong, what about the discussion of the text? Most of it is simply silly. Qaddafi is compared to Ataturk, Nasser, Mao Zedong, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, William Jennings Bryan, Huey Long, and Joseph Broz Tito without much purpose. In fact, it is apparent that Christman knows virtually nothing about Qaddafi's intellectual life or about the small but serious literature on the subject. He devotes quite a bit of attention to a passage in which, in describing the contribution of his theory to the problem of democracy, "Qaddafi (or his translator) uses one of the most horrifying slogans in modern history—'the final solution'—apparently without realizing its association with the Holocaust . . ." (p. 30). My translation uses the (no clearer) phrase "the theoretical solution"; the Arabic text says "the ultimate solution." Are we interested in what Qaddafi means or in what, in a generally terrible translation, struck Mr. Christman as odd? Why not the famous slogan "In need freedom is latent," which is something Qaddafi really believes? (And by which he means, as is clear from the Arabic, that those in need are not truly free.)

There is a lot that might be done with *The Green Book*. A genuine critical edition, comparing the Arabic original and the English versions, examining the intellectual structure—a sort of Straussian reading, for example—might be fascinating. This book is not only none of that, it asks that you pay eighteen dollars for what you can get for the price of a postage stamp. Don't bother.

LISA ANDERSON
Columbia University

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Japan, Disincorporated: The Economic Liberalization Process *by Leon Hollerman. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 185 pp. Paper, $12.95.*

Japan is arguably the greatest problem facing the world economic order in the waning years of the twentieth century. Far too often observers of the international scene ignore Japan as an outlier in their models, but Japan is too large and too important to be ignored. Leon Hollerman brings Japan squarely into focus, demonstrating why and how it is different. Anyone whose understanding of economic and bureaucratic processes is based on the United States will come away from this book thoroughly disabused of any notion that Japan can be described or analyzed in the same terms.

This book is about the Japanese-style dismantling in the 1980s of the heavy protectionism and domestic regulation that had characterized the earlier postwar period. But, the author assures us, this is just a passing phase, to be followed by a reincorporation of Japan as a "headquarters country," with a Japanese government/business coalition running multinational operations dominating world economic activity.

Hollerman ought to be the man to tell us about these developments; he has forty years of experience observing Japan, beginning with a stint as an international economist on Douglas McArthur's staff during the occupation. He takes us through such subjects as Japanese decision-making practices, reform of the foreign exchange control law, banking regulation, and the administrative reform movement. However, as much as I agree with many of his broad conclusions about how Japan operates, this book is disappointing in important ways.

First, the title is misleading; the book is primarily about financial deregulation in Japan, whereas most readers expect a book about Japan, Inc. to deal with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

Second, despite a 1988 copyright, this book is already old and outdated. The primary research was conducted in the summer of 1982, and the text appears to have been made final in 1984. Surely there was ample time for updating the manuscript for important developments in this swiftly changing area. For example, the text makes no mention whatsoever of the key bilateral document signed in 1984 known as the Yen-Dollar Agreement, while the offshore banking facility, foreign seats on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and privatization of the Japanese National Railways are all discussed as possible but difficult future changes.

Third, the discussion would be greatly facilitated by use of tables and charts. The book, however, has only three tables, all of which deal with the government budget and are only marginally connected to discussion in the text. Even in a book that has its primary focus on the political process of regulatory change, statistical data on profits, market shares, or the size of various financial markets is invaluable to understanding the power struggles among the relevant actors. Furthermore, the author does not acknowledge or use any of the extensive literature on this subject in English or Japanese.

Finally, the style of this book is particularly irritating. The text resorts to long

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verbatim quotations from interviews that wander from the point of the discussion (as on pp. 56–61), has chapter conclusions that are only vaguely related to preceding discussions, and suffers from abrupt and sometimes illogical changes in topic. One is often left with little sense of direction.

If you are largely unfamiliar with Japan and are unconcerned with the timeliness of the information, then this book may be a useful introduction to the byzantine and Machiavellian world of Japanese policy making. If your interest is Japan or Japanese financial regulation, other books cover much of the same ground more thoroughly and accurately. Leon Hollerman would have done us all a favor by skipping this book and fleshing out his headquarters theory instead; that book would be more interesting, more controversial, and could have drawn more deeply from his long association with Japan.

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

America at the Polls 2: A Handbook of Presidential Election Statistics, 1968–1984 *compiled and edited by Richard M. Scammon and Alice B. McGillivray. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1988. 594 pp. $60.00.*

Biographical Directory of the Council of Economic Advisers *edited by Robert Sobel and Bernard S. Katz. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 301 pp. $49.95.*

Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making, 3rd ed. *by Joel B. Grossman and Richard S. Wells. New York, Longman, 1988. 719 pp. $41.95.*

County Government Finances in 1985–86 *compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. 111 pp. $5.50.*

The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics *by Jay M. Shafritz. Chicago, The Dorsey Press, 1988. 661 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963: Vietnam 1961, vol I *edited by John P. Glennon et al. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. 790 pp. $21.00.*

The International Relations Dictionary, 4th ed. *by Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1988. 446 pp. $42.95.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 58: 1919 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988. 663 pp. $52.50.*

Revolutionary and Dissident Movements: An International Guide *edited by Henry W. Degenhardt. New York, Longman, 1988. 466 pp. $140.00.*

Terrorism, 1980–1987: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography *compiled by Edward F. Mickolus with Peter A. Flemming. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1988. 314 pp. $55.00.*

Vital Statistics on American Politics *by Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988. 403 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $11.95.*

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

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



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

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

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

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